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Abstract
In this thesis, I investigate decision-making in the fields of behavioral economics, experi-
mental economics, and law and economics. The research questions I ask are: Canwenudge
people towards being more honest? Can we use language to find out who lies? Which fac-
tors influence a judge’s decision, and how do people cooperate? Specifically, I investigate
contributions in a public goods game, (dis-)honest decision-making in a die-in-the-cup and
tax compliance game. Furthermore, I investigate the bounds of rational decision-making
in the context of the law. To answer the posed questions, I apply – alongside traditional
econometrics – machine learning methods: I use natural language classification to predict
decisions based on text data. Furthermore, I use time-series clustering to reduce complexity
and thereby enable theory building and interpretation.
Keywords: Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics, Law and Economics, Ma-
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Honesty, cooperation, and law-abiding behavior are values towhich all members of our so-
ciety should adhere. However, instances where these values are violated, are easily found:
In Germany, in the year 2018, the value of detected tax fraud alone was around 2.6 billion
euros (BMF 2020), and the lack of the willingness to cooperate prevents climate protec-
tion measures to be implemented. Generally speaking, unethical, uncooperative, and law-
neglecting behavior cause problems from which all members of our society suffer. To face
these problems, many behavioral economists dedicate their time and effort to the topics
mentioned above. With this dissertation project, I join these scholars in their endeavor.
More specifically, I ask: Can we nudge people towards being more honest? Can we inves-
tigate language to find out who lies? Which factors influence a judge’s decision, and how
do people cooperate? In order to answer these questions, I work both with experimental
and field data. The methods I deploy are highly interdisciplinary and reach from classical
econometrics to machine learning.
The central goal of behavioral economics is to investigate the bounds of rationality of
agents’ decisions. Each of the four chapters of my dissertation deal with this central theme.
In chapter 1, I study a game where participants can lie without facing the risk of being pun-
ished. In this context, rationality would predict individuals would opt for the highest pos-
sible monetary payoff, but in reality, many subjects report honestly even if this particular
choice is associated with a suboptimal payoff. Nevertheless, is honesty the intuitive behav-
ior, or is the selfish behavior a person’s first reaction? So far, studies have found support
for both options, leaving this question an open puzzle. Chapter 1 is an attempt to solve the
dispute.
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Instead of investigating the default behavior, in chapter 2, I predict participants’ behav-
ior. More specifically, I analyze written language obtained from group chats to determine
who of the participants of a tax evasion game plan to lie.
Not all economic games are structured such that the rational player has to lie to earn
the highest payoff. In a public goods game, the Nash Equilibrium is to freeride. Despite
this theoretical prediction, experimental data displays various strategy profileswith positive
contributions. In chapter 3, I investigate those strategy profiles by a data-driven approach.
I outlined three games in which experimental studies have found behavior that could
not be predicted by standard economic theory. In chapter 4, I investigate such “irrational”
decisions outside of the laboratory. A rational decision in the legal context should exclu-
sively be based on law and statues. However, research shows that external variables, such
as socio-demographic characteristics, additionally influence a judge’s decision. To capture
such a relationship, the dependent variable, namely the legal decision, needs to be mod-
eled in a measurable form. In chapter 4, I map the written opinion text of judges on a
two-dimensional scale representing political ideology.
Methods beyond traditional econometrics. Each of the four chapters of this
work advances the frontiers of our understanding of bounded rationality. Beyond that,
three chapters draw upon machine learning methods allowing to not only predict but also
substantiate choices. The usage of these methods makes this work unique, because so far,
most research in the field of behavioral economics draws upon traditional econometrics
for data evaluation. However, even if data from laboratory experiments are structured and
only a fraction of the size of what would be considered Big Data, complexity still exists,
which is hard or even impossible to reduce by traditional econometrics. These problems
arise, for example, for text data and multi-round decisions.
Muchbehavioral experimental research allows for communicationbetweenparticipants,
for example, in the form of chats. However, in many cases, chat data is hardly analyzed be-
cause language is too complex to be captured by a simple analysis tool. A possible solution
is natural language processing, which allows to analyze the text in a resource-efficient way.
In chapter 2, I use natural language processing to analyze chat texts from a tax evasion
experiment. More specifically, a classifier is trained to label chat texts as either “honest” or
“dishonest”, depending on the income stated.
In chapter 4, I again deploy supervised machine learning. Much research in the field of
empirical legal studies quantifies the political ideology of judicial opinions. So far, human
coders assess whether the text is considered as conservative or liberal. Due to the resource
intensity of the labeling process, a frequently used database in this filed holds political ide-
ology labels for less than 5% of all judicial opinions available. I train a classifier based on the
available labels to predict political ideology labels for the remaining 94% of the opinions.
Apart from text, another instance of data that requires machine learning techniques is
multi-round decisions, with temporal and inter-group dependencies. More concretely, in
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chapter 3, I use unsupervised machine learning in the form of clustering algorithms to find
strategies played by participants in a public goods game.
Contributiontotheliterature. Thiswork contributes to the literaturebydemon-
strating howmethods commonly used in computer science can be leveraged for the field of
behavioral economics. In the following, I demonstrate how each of the four chapters ad-
vances the knowledge in a particular field of research.
Chapter 1 contributes to the experimental literature by investigating (dis-)honest deci-
sion making. The paper proposes a solution to a long-standing dispute about whether a
human’s nature is selfish or not. A few papers have already argued that the diverging find-
ings in this respect are due to a methodological flaw. In Chapter 1, this flaw is satisfyingly
corrected for the first time. We achieve this goal by introducing various improvements to a
widely-used game in the literature on lying, namely Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)’s
dice-in-the-cup game. Most experimental studies increase the probability that a participant
will stick with her default by limiting the time available to make a decision. However, we
believe that the dice-in-the-cup game triggers a particular default behavior: Most partici-
pants have fantasized repeatedly about rolling and reporting the number six in the past.
That is the winning strategy in most board games. Therefore, we introduce a novel type
of die, namely a color die, which excludes such a lying default. We furthermore introduce
a novel randomization device, a dice tower, to exclude the possibility that incomplete ran-
domization distorts reports. Finally, the study is among the very few ones in this field of
research to track mouse movements on the decision screen. Instead of analyzing a one-
dimensional decision, a participant’s mouse trajectories provide detailed insight into the
decision process.
Based on the methods just mentioned, we conduct an experimental study that includes
four treatments. Participants either roll a regular (i) or color (ii) die. After doing so, they
are asked to report the upward-looking face under time pressure (iii) or not under time
pressure (iv). Their payoff depends on this report, which is stated by clicking on one of six
choice options displayed in a circularmanner on a computer screen. While doing so,mouse
movements are tracked. We analyze the reports with an ordered logit regression within a
Bayesian framework. The resulting treatment coefficients are significant and point in the
directionhypothesized: Under timepressure, participants rolling a coloreddie report lower
results than participants rolling a numbered die. It is the mouse movements that add the
final puzzle piece: Depending on the treatment, some trajectories start at a less and end
at a more lucrative option, but we also find trajectories that start at a more and end at a
less lucrative option. Based on the regression coefficients and the insights gained by the
mouse trajectories, we confidently state: Honesty and dishonesty are both default behav-
iors. However, the default crucially depends on the situation: In a novel situation, such as
rolling a colored die, the easiest and quickest answer is the truth.
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In chapter 2, I again investigate (dis-)honesty. The chapter contributes to the usage of
text in behavioral experimental research. This chapter is the first to systematically test vari-
ous supervised classification methods on datasets obtained by experimental research.
Many experimental studies investigate channels that influence lying behavior, such as
group interactions which are found to increase dishonesty. Those interactions often take
place in the formofwritten textmessages, mostly analyzed in a very resource-intensiveway:
Researchers read the text and categorize it to provide a qualitative description of the con-
tent. However, the text can be used for yet another purpose: It holds the potential to
directly predict lying. More precisely, chapter 2 consists of two parts: In the first part, a
supervised classifier is trained based on chat data to predict participants’ decisions, both
provided by an existing experimental study. For the second part, a new experimental inter-
vention was conducted. Based on the resulting data, the generalizability of the classifier is
tested.
The first part aims to train a predictive classifier by testing various configurations: The
main parameters varied are the shapes of the dependent and independent variable, embed-
ding techniques, and different classification algorithms. The results show that pretrained
Word2Vec embeddings combinedwith stackingmultiple classification algorithms reach the
best performance. However, the predictive power of the classifier is weak, it reaches an F1
score of .411. Nevertheless, this result was expected, given the adverse conditions themodel
faces: Less than 700 samples are available for training and the distribution of the labels to
be predicted is heavily skewed. Overall, chapter 2 shows successfully that choosing the clas-
sification configuration carefully is extremely important: The best configuration reaches a
F1 score double as high as the worst configuration.
The second part of chapter 2 is concerned with generalizability. For that purpose, we
design a new experimental study that alters the initial (dis-)honesty framework concerning
three significant dimensions: (i) Instead of reporting (taxable) income, participants work
for a fictitious company and report surplus hours. Additionally (ii), the direction of the lie
is changed: The more hours are reported, the higher is the payoff; and (iii) the group size
shrinks from three to two. Given that the pretrained model is already weak, it might not
be possible to express an unequivocal statement, concerning the classifier’s generalizability.
Nevertheless, we set the two AUCs – .597 for the first, and .529 for the second dataset – in
context and conclude that the model does not generalize to another experimental behav-
ioral setting.
In the final part of Chapter 2, we investigate various concepts potentially related to ly-
ing. We find significant correlations for risk attitudes, beliefs about others’ behavior, and
the experience of joy during the experiment. To proxy joy, we use a dictionary-based ap-
proach to estimate the degree of positivity associated with a chat text. This investigation
allows us to find out inwhich direction causality points: As participants chat before report-
ing surplus hours, we conclude: A joyful group chat is more likely to result in a false report.
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Chapter 3, as do chapter 1 and chapter 2, contributes to the behavioral experimental
literature. More precisely, chapter 3 investigates public good games and thereby makes
a methodological and a substantive contribution. On the methodology side, it shows in
which ways clustering can be used to infer the composition of the type space. On the sub-
stantive side, it shows that existing theories about behavioral types can only explain a very
narrow fraction of the data.
Based on a pilot, we select an algorithmic clustering configuration known to have ex-
cellent performance. We use multivariate clustering and feed the algorithm with pairs of
experiences and choices.
Onemight naïvely think that the algorithmwill find asmany clusters as there are distinct
behavioral programs. With simulation, we show why this approach must fail. We simu-
late all combinations of five behavioral programs that have been theorized in the literature:
altruists, conditional cooperators, far-sighted freeriders, hump-shaped contributors, and
short-sighted freeriders. For investigating these five behavioral programs, we need many
more clusters. Yet we also show that we do not need the theoretical maximum of 350 clus-
ters; this would approach next to unusable for real data, as one would need a considerable
amount of data for that many clusters to be credible. We use internal cluster validation
indices to determine that the appropriate trade-off between underusing and overusing the
evidence is reached with approximately 40 clusters. Some of these clusters are indeed pure,
in the sense that all combinations of experiences and choices stem from participants of the
same simulated type. Yet many are not, as different behavioral problems may generate in-
distinguishable behavior. We do not see this as a limitation of the approach. Instead, it
demonstrateswhat can be achievedwith clustering: one is informed about distinct patterns
and must discuss whether they could be generated with alternative behavioral programs.
We apply this methodology to a large dataset consisting of 16,474 observations. Results
clearly show that the true type space is much more abundant than thus far assumed by the
literature. Only very few of the clusters that we find in the experimental data can be ratio-
nalized with any of the five theoretical behavioral programs used to simulate data. We find
practically no altruists and only very few outright selfish participants. Very few participants
are near-perfectly reactive, as assumed by the canonical model of conditional cooperation.
No cluster requires the assumption that players are hump-shaped, and perversely react to
good experiences.
Chapter 4 is again concerned with supervised learning and text. As opposed to chapter 1
and chapter 2, it does not contribute to behavioral experimental literature but to the field
of empirical legal studies. It does so in twoways: It replicates a famous paper byLandes and
Posner (2011) that relates judge characteristics to the political ideology of judicial decision-
making. Furthermore, it contributes to an intensely used database in the field: The Songer
database provides political ideology labels only for roughly 5% of judicial opinions. By de-
ploying supervised classification, we generate robust predictions for the remaining 95% of
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judicial opinions.
More precisely, in the first part, we replicate the linear regression framework proposed
by Landes and Posner (2011). We add multiple robustness checks, such as aggregating the
dependent variable on another level, multiway-error clustering, and an extreme bounds
analysis. By doing so, we replicate the original study’s most robust findings: The party
of the appointing president crucially influences whether a circuit court judge’s opinion is
considered conservative or liberal.
In the second part, we exploremultiple classification configurations to train a highly pre-
dictive classifier: We achieve the highest performance with a tf-idf weighted bag-of-words
combined with a Ridge classifier. The latter is adjusted by isotonic calibration and achieves
a F1 score of .67 on a binary label. To assess the robustness of both our predictions and
the regression framework, we repeated the empirical analysis on the full sample, including
hand-labeled and predicted labels. Results show that, again, the most robust findings of
the initial regression framework still hold.
Author contributions. In the following, I provide a detailed list of how different
authors contributed to the following chapters.
Chapter 1 is coauthored by Olexandr Nikolaychuk (ON). CIH acquired the funding,
preregistered the experiment, conducted half of the experimental sessions, visualized the
results, wrote the initial draft, and presented the project at a lab meeting at theMax Planck
Institute forResearchonCollectiveGoods (May2018), theYoungScholar’sResearchWork-
shop inNeuchâtel (September 2018), the ESA conference inUtrecht (May 2019), and at the
C-SEB gender symposium (October 2019). ON developed and tested the code for the ex-
perimental app, conducted half of the experimental sessions, and extensively reviewed the
draft. CIH and ON were both equally involved in developing the hypotheses, the statisti-
cal analysis, and the experimental setup. The project was supported financially by theMax
Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods (1000e) and the Center for Social and
Economic Behavior, University of Cologne (4000e).
Chapter 2 is coauthored by Martin Fochmann (MF) and Peter Mohr (PM). CIH ac-
quired the funding, preregistered the experiment, developed the oTree code, conducted
the experiment, trained the classifier, analyzed the experimental data, and wrote the initial
draft. Furthermore, CIH presented the paper at the MPI thesis workshop in Wittenberg
(March 2019) and the MPI lab meeting (July 2020); MF provided the training data, super-
vised the experimental implementation, the statistical analysis and provided critical com-
ments to the paper. MF and PM both developed the vignette of the experimental study.
The project was supported financially by the Center for Social and Economic Behavior,
University of Cologne (3000e).
Chapter 3 is coauthored by Christoph Engel (CE) and Marcel H. Schubert. CIH im-
plemented the local regression approach as proposed by CE, and visualized the results. In
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addition, CIH presented the project at a lab meeting of the Amsterdam Cooperation Lab
at VU Amsterdam (February 2020). CIH and MHS were both equally involved in data
curation and tested different configurations and data setups. CE andMHSwrote the code
for simulating the data. CE identified the literature gap, formulated the research goals, and
supervised the implementation of the clustering specifications. CIH and MHS provided
the initial draft of the methods section. CE critically reviewed the latter and wrote the re-
maining parts of the paper.
Chapter 4 is coauthored byMarcel H. Schubert (MHS), and Elliott Ash (EA). CIH pre-
pared the data used for replication, and conducted the regression analysis as well as robust-
ness checks. Furthermore, CIH developed and implemented the original version of the
code that tested the different initial classification setups. MHS was responsible for scrap-
ing and preprocessing the text data. Furthermore, he implemented the final grid search on
the cluster. CIH and MHS were both equally involved in writing the original draft and
presenting the paper at the PELS replication conference in Claremont (April 2019). Fur-
thermore, CIH presented the project at theMPI lab meeting (November 2019). EA super-
vised the research activity, proposed analysis methods and visualizations of the results, and
provided part of the data to be analyzed. He furthermore extensively reviewed the draft.
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Only time (whatever that may be) will tell.
Stephen Hawking
1
Color Me Honest! Time Pressure and
(Dis-)Honest Behavior
We introduce a modified version of the die-in-the-cup paradigm to study (dis-)honest be-
havior under time pressure. Replacing the regular die with one that has a distinct color on
its either side enables us to manipulate the amount of familiarity with the randomization
device. This both removes the limitations of the original paradigm and allows for a test
of theories that suggest that (dis-)honest behavior is affected by the relative difficulty of
generating false reports. We also replace the cup with a simple mechanical device for better
control over the very process of rolling the die and collect mouse movement data from the
participants to investigate the present behavioral archetypes. Ourmain finding is that time
pressure leads to more dishonest behavior, but only if the regular die is used. We also find
that when given the time to deliberate, the participants generally report lower values if the
regular rather than the color die is used.
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1.1 Introduction
Everyday life offers ample opportunities for gains throughmisreporting. Whether individ-
uals take the chance or not depends on the circumstances. One popular example is that of
a mother visiting an amusement park with her child. She arrives at the register and is told
that children under the age of six enter for free. Her child has just turned six. What do
you think, will the mother tell the truth and therefore have to pay the entrance fee, or will
she claim the child to be younger than six to dodge it? Would you expect her answer to be
different, had she known the rule beforehand?
Just like in the above example, this research project investigates lying behavior in sit-
uations where one has an opportunity to gain some material benefit (Tang 2012). More
specifically, we are interested in the effect of time pressure on truth-telling.
Existing literature appears somewhat conflicted as studies found both positive and neg-
ative effects of time pressure on truth-telling. Most studies use the die-in-a-cup paradigm
(Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) to measure such behavior, which is not surprising as
the paradigm has certain advantages. Nevertheless, we cannot but also notice some limita-
tions that it has.
First, there is no intrinsic value to the state of the world that the participants report in a
regular die-in-a-cup scenario. When telling the experimenter what they rolled, they are ef-
fectively saying howmuchmoney they would like to receive as opposed to what happened.
We also believe that the use of the all too familiar six-sided die with pips (where progres-
sively higher values are almost exclusively associated with higher payoffs) makes it overly
easy for the participants to misreport both voluntarily and involuntarily. One needs not
look at the die or even roll it. As long as one wants to maximize the own payoff, it is clear
what their claim should be. It is quite common to attempt to “break the spell” by making
the six a suboptimal report. Furthermore, whilewe agree that itmay help alleviate the issue,
it would be overly optimistic to assume that to be the end of the story.
With this inmind, we suggest a variation of the die-in-a-cup paradigmwhere the regular
die is replaced with one that has a distinct color on each of its sides. This way, (i) there is
a meaningful state of the world for the participants to report; and (ii) without knowing in
advance the association between the colors and payoffs, there is no readily available report
to fall back onto.
1.2 Literature
As a starting point of our analysis, we look into experimental studies from the fields of be-
havioral economics and experimental psychology that consider truth-telling as a function
of time pressure and experience. While some find lying to be intuitive, others reach pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion. In order to make sense of such contradictory results, we
discriminate among the studies on the bases of their manipulation and reporting frame-
work.
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Literature on lying tends to use the following three types of manipulation to provoke
quick and intuitive reactions: cognitive load, ego depletion, and time pressure. These are
followed by an individual decision situation or a game that allows the participants to lie in
order to gain a monetary benefit.
Capraro (2017) induces timepressure anddeploys a variant of thedeceptiongame (Gneezy
2005). In a similar context, Gunia et al. (2012) sort participants’ decisions according to their
response times. In the end, the two studies come to opposing conclusions: The former
finds the participants to be more honest under time pressure, whereas the latter finds hon-
esty to be positively associated with deliberation time.
Lohse, Simon, and Konrad (2018) put their participants under time pressure to report
the outcome of a lottery that determines their payoff. The authors conclude that time to
reflect increases one’s awareness of the misreporting opportunity.
Tabatabaeian, Dale, and Duran (2015) ask the participants to predict the outcome of a
virtual coin flip and find that dishonest reports are associated with shorter decision times.
Houser, Vetter, and Winter (2012) ask the participants to report the outcome of an actual
coin flip and find them to be more likely to lie if they receive nothing in an earlier dictator
game.
Perhaps themost commonly used decision scenario in the literature on lying is the afore-
mentioned die-in-a-cup paradigm (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013). Bereby-Meyer et
al. (2018) and Van’t Veer, Stel, and Beest (2014) use it in conjunction with cognitive load
while Foerster et al. (2013) and Shalvi, Eldar, andBereby-Meyer (2012) pair it with time pres-
sure. The first two studies agree that cognitive load leads to truth-telling while the other
two disagree as far as the observed effect of time pressure is concerned.
Shalvi, Eldar, andBereby-Meyer (2012) conclude that time pressure results inmore lying,
whereas Foerster et al. (2013) find the opposite. Foerster et al. (2013) claim that the partic-
ipants of Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) were able to come up with a lie before
the start of their time pressure condition. In an attempt to tackle the issue, they augment
their setup to contrast reports of individual rolls with reports of a series of rolls (with short
breaks in-between).
While we agree with the general statement of Foerster et al. (2013), we believe that the
issue requires a more substantial treatment. In our opinion, the regular die as a means of
randomization is all too familiar to student participants. Even those who do not have first-
hand experience with it are to be expected to be familiar with the concept through popular
culture. Therefore, it is likely that participants’ reports collected within the standard die-
in-a-cup paradigm are informed by their earlier experiences outside the laboratory1.
Numerous brain studies have shown that practice helps improve the efficiency of knowl-
edge retrieval and response inhibition across various task domains (Brehmer, Westerberg,
and Bäckman 2012; Hu, Rosenfeld, and Bodenhausen 2012; MacLeod and Dunbar 1988;
1 Weare not saying that it is reasonable to expectmost to cheatwhenplaying, e.g., a board game. It is sufficient
for our argument to expect most to know what is feasible and desirable when rolling a die.
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Milham et al. 2003; Olesen, Westerberg, and Klingberg 2004; Pirolli and Anderson 1985;
Walczyk et al. 2009). In particular, rehearsed lies are associated with less conflict than spon-
taneous lies as evidenced by lower relative activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (Ganis
et al. 2003).
As regards to documented behavioral effects are concerned, rehearsed lies are associated
with slower reaction times than spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al. 2003; Johnson, Henkell,
et al. 2008; Walczyk et al. 2009). Ganis et al. (2003) even report that they could not detect
statistical difference in response times between rehearsed lies and truthful answers. It is also
noteworthy that very little practice is required to alter the cognitive cost of lying (VanBock-
staele et al. 2012), and the effect carries over across various decision tasks (Hu, Rosenfeld,
and Bodenhausen 2012; Van Bockstaele et al. 2012).
1.3 Hypotheses
Following the die-in-a-cup paradigm, we take the regular six-sided die with pips as the con-
trol treatment. As the first manipulation, we replace the regular die with a distinct color on
each of its sides (hereafter, color die). This way, (i) there is a meaningful state of the world
for the participants to report; and (ii) without knowing in advance the association between
the colors and payoffs, there is no readily available report to fall back onto. As the second
manipulation, we put the participants under time pressure to elicit their spontaneous re-
actions.
Altogether, with a 2 × 2 factorial design as summarized in Table 1.1, we aim to test the
following hypotheses.
Table 1.1: Hypotheses and Experimental Design
regular die color die
time pressure RP > CP
∨ ∧
no pressure R = C
Hypothesis 1 RP > R.
When dealing with the regular die, the participants are expected to report higher values
under time pressure (indicated with P). As long as there is no time for deliberation, they
will fall back onto the readily available reports.
Hypothesis 2 CP < C.
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When dealing with the color die, the participants are expected to report lower values un-
der time pressure. Since there is no readily available report to fall back onto, generating a
dishonest one requires more time than telling the truth.
Hypothesis 3 R ≈ C.
Without time pressure, the participants are expected to report similar values when dealing
with the regular and color die. When provided with sufficient time for deliberation, they
will be (dis-)honest to the same extent regardless of the type of the die.
Hypothesis 4 RP > CP.
Under time pressure, the participants are expected to report higher values when dealing
with the regular die than when dealing with the color die. Since there is no readily available
report to fall back onto in the latter case, they will have to resort to telling the truth.
1.4 Experimental Setup
To achieve our research goals, we modify the standard die-in-a-cup paradigm (Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) in the following two ways. First, as we explained earlier, we replace
the regular die with a color die. Second, we replace the cup with a dice tower (section A.4
provides a picture of the tower).
The dice tower is a significant improvement over the cup as it enables control over the
quality and duration of the randomization phase. With the cup, both are at the discretion
of the participantwho can, e.g., cheat by producing ineffective lateralmovements or violate
the time pressure manipulation by taking their time to shake the cup. With the dice tower,
one needs only to tip the die over the ledge, which ensures proper randomization and stable
timings across the participants.
The experiment is comprised of four stages. Stages 1, 3 and4 are executedwith the help of
computer terminals using oTree (Chen, Schonger, andWickens 2016) (sectionA.4 provides
screenshots). Stage 2 (rolling the die) is executed in the physical space and synchronized
across the participants. All participants are divided into four groups, according toTable 1.1.
Before each session, the requisite die2 is placed on top of the dice tower and coveredwith
an opaque paper lid in order to rule out potential priming.
In stage 1, the participants receive general instructions on paper, and treatment specific
instructions on the computer screen. When everyone is ready, stage 2 begins where the par-
ticipants remove the lid and tip the die over the ledge following a five-second countdown.
In stage 3, the participants are presented with six buttons arranged in a circular pattern
and occupying most of the screen real estate. Depending on the treatment condition, each
2 Color: green on top, gray facing the participant; regular: one on top, two facing the participant
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button corresponds to one of the six colors or one of the six faces of a regular die3, and the
associated payoff is revealed as long as themouse cursor is hovering over it. The participants
submit their report by clicking any of the six buttons. In the background, their decision
process is being tracked through the cursor movements (hereafter, mouse movements).
In the time pressure conditions, the participants have a limited amount of time to report
their die roll. FollowingDana,Weber, andKuang (2007), they are not given a precise cutoff
point but rather an interval. Based on a pilot session with 12 participants, we determined
the optimal interval to be between 6 and 12 seconds.
In stage 4, the participants are asked to provide answers to three blocks of questions.
First, we domanipulation checks (where applicable) by asking if the participants can clearly
distinguish between all six colors used in the experiment, if they have a favorite color, if
they can recall the payoff associated with the color they reported (incentivized), if they felt
time pressure, and if they felt some general pressure during the experiment. The second
block contains three problems of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick 2005) as a crude
measure of cognitive ability. In the final block, the participants are asked to fill out a basic
demographic questionnaire as well as to report on their prior experience with laboratory
experiments and games involving dice.
1.5 Results
The experiment was conducted in the economics laboratory of the Friedrich Schiller Uni-
versity of Jena inNovember 2018 and in theMPI decision lab inBonn in June 2019. Overall,
we collected 234 observations. We excluded color-blind participants and those who failed
to report on time (in time pressure conditions). The final sample contains 229 observa-
tions, of which 61% are females; 87% are business administration and economics students.
The average age is 24.4 years (SD 7.68).
Table 1.2: Means by Treatment
CP C RP RPS R RS
means 3.09 3.33 4.09 4.38 3.52 3.42
SD 1.84 1.57 1.70 1.50 1.81 1.84
p-value 0.21 0.68
Two-sided p-values compare our means (R and RP) to those ones by Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-Meyer (2012) (RS
and RPS ).
Table 1.2 provides a basic overview of the data by summarizing mean reports (with SD)
across the treatment conditions. It also contains the results of Shalvi, Eldar, and Bereby-
Meyer (2012) that can be directly compared to ours when the regular die is being used. We
3 Particular arrangement randomized across the participants.
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observe the mean reports of 4.09 (1.7) and 3.52 (1.81) relative to their 4.38 (1.5) and 3.42
(1.84) with and without time pressure, respectively. These differences are not statistically
significant at the 10% level (t-test, two-sided p-values of .21 and .68, respectively), and we


















































































Figure 1.1: Empirical Cumula ve Distribu on Func ons by Treatment
The dashed red line denotes the full honesty benchmark. The color blue denotes rolling the color die. The dashed
lines in blue and black denote the me pressure condi ons.
Even thoughmean comparison can be useful as a quickmeasure of differences across the
treatment conditions, we do not regard it as a sufficient statistic of interest for this type of
data. Instead, we consider Figure 1.1 providing the empirical distribution functions for each
condition grouped according to Hypotheses 1–4.
As one can see, the empirical distribution function in condition R stochastically dom-
inates that one in condition RP. This means that when dealing with the regular die, the
participants tend to provide higher reports under time pressure. They also tend to report
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higher dice rolls relative to the reference uniform density of telling the truth (the dashed
red line). Both of these findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1.
If the color die is used instead, the opposite appears to be the case as the empirical dis-
tribution function in conditionC stochastically dominates that one in conditionCP4. The
participants tend to report lower values under time pressure, and even though they still
over-report relative to the truth-telling benchmark, they do so to a smaller extent. This
behavior is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
When we compare the reports without time pressure, the empirical distribution func-
tion in condition C stochastically dominates one in condition R. In reference to the truth-
telling benchmark, it appears that the participants hardly lie on the aggregate level when
dealing with the regular die but tend to over-report when dealing with the color die in-
stead. This finding is not consistent with Hypothesis 3 and we explore it further using the
collected mouse tracking data in the next section.
With regards to the empirical distribution functions in conditionsCP andRP, noobvious
pattern emerges there. If anything, it appears that under time pressure, both participant
groups tend to over-report relative to the truth-telling benchmark but in somewhat differ-
ent ways. The regular die report distribution is simply skewed to the right, whereas in the
color die report distribution, a sizable portion of the probabilitymass is associatedwith the
reports of three and four while five is considerably underreported. As far as Hypothesis 4
is concerned, we deem these findings inconclusive.
Following the visual analysis, we investigate the hypotheses within a Bayesian frame-
work. Since the die roll report has an inherent ordering as a dependent variable, we opt
for the ordered logit as the general framework for the statistical analysis of the results. We
implement the estimation with normally distributed, vague priors (∼ N (0, .0001)), sam-
pling from two separate chains, where 10, 000 samples of each chainwere used for adaption
and 100, 000 samples were used for burnin. After the burnin, we collect 100, 000 samples
from each chain. Furthermore, we use a step wise algorithm based on the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC) to determine the necessary set of control variables. Equation (1.1)
denotes the final specification:
report∗i = β1 ·R
P
i + β2 ·Ci + β3 · Pi ·Ci + β4 ·EHIi + β5 ·ECONi + β6 · PEDi + εi (1.1)
where i indexes the participant, and report∗i corresponds to the latent variable. RPi and
Ci equals one if the participant is assigned to the treatment condition with time pressure
and a color die, respectively; EHIi, ECONi and PEDi each equal one if the participant
reports experience with laboratory experiments, studies economics, or studies psychology
or education, respectively.
4 Except for the observed frequencies of reporting the lowest roll, which are very close regardless.
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Table 1.3: Ordered Logit Regression within a Bayesian Framework
Odds Ratio Estimate [HPD 95%] ESS BF (>0) psrf
RP 1.89 0.64 [-0.04,1.3] 188 29.78 1.01
C 1.94 0.66 [-0.01,1.32] 163 35.60 1.01
P · C 0.41 -0.90 [-1.82,0.02] 594 32.04 1.00
H2 0.77 -0.26 [-0.92,0.39] 3.65
H4 0.79 -0.24 [-0.91,0.42] 3.16
EHI 1.86 0.62 [0.12,1.1] 215 140.44 1.00
ECON 2.14 0.76 [0,1.53] 1732 40.60 1.00
PED 1.72 0.54 [-0.16,1.25] 607 14.15 1.00
RP: treatment no color, pressure; C: treatment color; P · C: treatment color, pressure; H2: tests Hypothesis 2; H4:
tests Hypothesis 4; EHI: ample experience with laboratory experiments; ECON: field of study is economics; PED:
field of study is psychology or educa on; HPD: highest posterior density; ESS: effec ve sample size; BF: Bayes
factor; psrf: poten al scale reduc on factor.
Table 1.3 provides the coefficient estimates, as well as estimates for Hypothesis 2 and
Hypothesis 4. H2 denotes testing the hypothesis β1 + β3 < 0; H4 denotes testing the hy-
pothesis β2 + β3 < 0. AsH2 andH4 are not estimated by Equation 1.1 directly, neither the
effective sample size (ESS), nor the potential scale reduction factor (psrf) are provided.
β1 (RPi ) tests Hypothesis 1. Its Bayes Factor is 22.89 which, according to Jeffreys (1998)’s
scale of interpretation, provides strong support for the hypothesis that rolling the regular
die under time pressure increases reports as opposed to not being under time pressure.
β2 (Ci) tests Hypothesis 3. Its Bayes Factor is 27.74, providing strong support for the
claim that when not under time pressure, rolling the regular die decreases reports as op-
posed to rolling the color die. We, however, hypothesized not to find any significant differ-
ence between these two treatment groups. Therefore, section 1.6 further investigates this
unexpected finding.
Hypothesis 2 cannot be investigated directly by Equation 1.1. Instead, β1 +β3 < 0 needs
to be tested. The resulting Bayes Factor is 3.65, providing substantial support for the claim
that rolling the color die, participants report lower results under time pressure than when
not under time pressure.
Similarly, Hypothesis 4 cannot be investigated directly by Equation 1.1. Instead, β2 +
β3 < 0 needs to be tested. The resulting Bayes Factor is 3.16, providing substantial support
for the claim that when under time pressure, rolling the regular die results in higher reports
than when rolling the color die.
As far as the control variables are concerned, the following results were achieved: The
Bayes Factor for β4 (EHIi) is 115.69, providing decisive support that participants having
taken part in multiple experimental studies report higher results. The Bayes Factor for β5
(ECONi) is 34.77, providing very strong support that participants studying economics re-
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port higher results. Finally, the Bayes Factor for β6 (PEDi) is 12.18, providing strong support
that participants studying either psychology or education report higher results.
To summarize, an ordered logit regression within a Bayesian framework confirms three
out of four hypothesis. More precisely, we find strong support forHypothesis 1, substantial
support for Hypothesis 2, and substantial support for Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 3 was not
confirmed, insteadwe find strong support against it. We initially hypothesizednodifference
inmeans for conditionsR andC; however, it turned out that rolling the regular die leads to
lower reports than rolling the color die when not under time pressure. To investigate this
unexpected result, we analyze participants’ mouse movements in section 1.6.
1.6 Mouse Movements
To report the number or color rolled, participants needed to click on one of six choice
options on the computer screen. On this screen, mouse movements were tracked to gain a
more nuanced explanation of the decision making process.5
Recent models show that even before choosing a particular target, participants can hold
several movement plans in their mind and display a movement according to their average
(Alonso-Diaz, Cantlon, and Piantadosi 2018; Dotan, Meyniel, and Dehaene 2018; Erb et
al. 2016; Friedman, Brown, and Finkbeiner 2013; Pinheiro-Chagas et al. 2017). This idea
that movement can start even before the final decision is why we track participants’ mouse
movements on the decision screen: The trajectories can provide a valuable insight into a
participant’s decision making process.
We analyzed themousemovements byplotting trajectories byparticipants and categoriz-
ing them concerning themovement’s start- and endpoint. By that procedure, we identified
four types, of which Figure 1.2 shows representative trajectories.
The A type explores only one option and clicks on it. The majority of participants,
75.43%, belong to this category. The A = Ω type (9.48%) explores several choice options.
However, this type ultimately reports the option which it explores first. The A < Ω type
(11.64%) explores several choice options. The option reported is greater than the option
explored first. The A > Ω type (3.45%) again explores several choice options. The option
reported is smaller than the option explored first.
Before interpreting the four types by treatment – Table A.3 shows a summary – the
reader is asked to remember that participants in the color treatment need to hover over
a choice option to reveal the associated payoff. By contrast, the payoff in conditions R and
RP was identical to the number of pips on the choice option displayed. Consequently, if
participants in this treatment want to maximize their payoff instead of reporting the num-
ber rolled, they can directly go to the desired option without taking a detour.
5 Mousemovements are unlikely to be driven by other factors than the payoff related to the color. SectionA.2






















Figure 1.2: Behavioral Archetypes Found
Themajority of A types rolled the regular die. These participants could be either payoff
maximizers or reporting the number they rolled. By contrast, A types rolling the color die
are unlikely to be payoff maximizers: 5/6 of those would need to take a detour to find the
highest payoff and therefore, would not be anA type. Themost likely interpretation is that
these participants indeed report the number they rolled.
The majority of A = Ω types rolled the color die. Two possible interpretations could
explain their detour: curiosity and temptation. In the open answer field, many participants
stated that they were curious or wanted to check whether all six payoff options were avail-
able. Another interpretation is that participants went to the face they rolled, subsequently
were tempted to maximize payoff but ultimately go back to their initial choice. For partic-
ipants rolling the regular die, possible interpretations are temptation or guilt: In the same
manner, as participants rolling the color die, they could go to the number they rolled ini-
tially, get tempted to maximize their payoff, but ultimately decide to report the number
rolled. The thought process could also go the other way round: A = Ω types rolling a reg-
ular die could have chosen the payoff maximizing face first, felt guilty, and thought about
reporting their actual role, but in the end, they decided for the payoff maximizing strategy.
The interpretation for A < Ω types is similar, regardless of whether the participant
rolled the regular or the color die. The most reasonable explanation for this behavior is
payoff maximization: Participants move the mouse cursor to the option they rolled first
but finally reported a more lucrative option.
A > Ω types, rolling a regular die, are likely to be motivated by a feeling of guilt: Those
participants navigate to the payoff maximizing option first, feel guilty, and, finally, the feel-
ing of guilt wins. Therefore, they chose the face they had rolled. The most reasonable
explanation in the case of the color die is that they randomly picked one color, felt guilty,
and chose the number rolled in the end.
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Table 1.4: Par cipants in Treatments R and C by Behavioral Archetype
R C
A 51 (87.93%) 34 (58.62%)
A = Ω 1 (1.72%) 14 (24.14%)
A < Ω 3 (5.17%) 9 (15.5%)
A > Ω 3 (5.17%) 1 (1.72%)
Absolute counts by type, percentages in parentheses.
1.6.1 Interpreting the Findings Regarding Hypothesis 3
The categorizations and interpretations outlined above help explain the puzzling findings
regarding Hypothesis 3: When not under time pressure, participants rolling the color die
(C) significantly report higher numbers than participants rolling the regular die (R). Ta-
ble 1.4 counts participants by type. It clearly shows that most participants rolling a regular
die belong to category A. By comparison, more participants rolling the color die belong
either to the A = Ω or A < Ω type. A Fisher’s exact test confirms these intuitions: The
behavioral archetype is not independent of treatments (p-value = 8.07 · 10−5).
Howdoes the analysis of the behavioral archetypes connect to the puzzling findings con-
cerningHypothesis 3? If we assume that average reports are similar for types A andA = Ω
then the difference in means concerning treatments R and C is mostly driven by A < Ω
types. By definition, those types report higher numbers. As treatment C includes three
times as manyA < Ω types as treatmentR, we expect that it is mainly this type driving the
difference in mean reports.
The question left is why are there more A < Ω types in treatmentC thanR? The expla-
nation is found in participants’ statements: When asked to explain their behavior, many
participants in treatment C reported that they had been just curious which numbers were
behind the different colors. A = Ω and the A < Ω types reflect this intention. While
A = Ω types report honestly, A < Ω types most likely do not. The A < Ω type, how-
ever, less likely reflects a dishonest intuition and rather the giving in to temptation: Given
participants’ explanations as well as the high share of A = Ω types in the same treatment,
we interpret that A < Ω started with innocent curiosity but discovered a lucrative choice
option on the way. It was too hard to move on, and finally, they gave in to the temptation.
In other words, treatmentCmight have seduced participants to higher reports even if they
started with honest intentions.
1.6.2 Types Proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)
We are not the only ones who introduced typing to analyze treatment effects. Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) introduced the types “honest”, “partial liars” and “income maxi-
mizers”. They estimate each type’s shares based on the rules of probability, assuming uni-
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formly distributed reports. Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) interpret these estimates
as upper bounds.
Ourmouse-trackingdata allowsus toprecisely determine the share of the types proposed
by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Honest subjects are either A or A = Ω types.
Partial liars are A < Ω types, reporting a value smaller than 6. Incomemaximizers are A <
Ω type, reporting a value= 6. The reader is asked to keep inmind that the abovemapping
is only possible for the participants in the color treatment. Only in this treatment, we canbe
sure that mouse movements directly map to the thinking process. Table 1.5 reports shares,
either estimated by the rules of probability (first two columns) or by visual inspection (last
two columns).
Table 1.5 shows that the share of incomemaximizers is higher when estimatedwith prob-
abilities thanwithmouse tracking. Upper bound estimations according to Fischbacher and
Föllmi-Heusi (2013) for honest participants and partial liars are therefore not correct. The
comparison implies that participants should not be assigned to Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi (2013) types based on the rules of probability. Instead, mouse tracking allows for an
adequate allocation of the type space.
Table 1.5: Types Proposed by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)
CP C CPm Cm
honest reporters 41.38 51.72 88.33 86.21
partial liars 0.00 0.00 5.00 3.45
income maximizers 13.10 15.17 6.67 10.34
CP denotes the treatment where par cipants roll dice with colors under me pressure. m denotes counts based on
mouse movements. The absence of m denotes counts based on probability.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate lying behavior in situations where opportunities to gainmate-
rial benefits are available. To this end, we implement a 2× 2 experimental design allowing
for manipulations of the amount of time available to the participants and the familiarity
with the randomization device.
As the core of the framework, we use amodified version of the die-in-the-cup paradigm,
where the regular die with pips is replaced with one that has a distinct color on its either
side. Besides, we replace the cup with a dice tower, which allows for better control over the
very process of rolling the die.
Our contribution is two-fold: First, we add to thediscussionof the effect of timepressure
on (dis-)honest behavior. Second, we improve the existing methodology in the field by
allowing for more abundant and realistic scenarios to be implemented in the lab.
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Our immediate findings suggest that time pressure leads to more dishonest reports, but
only if the regular die is used. This finding is in line with theories that suggest that such
action is affected by the relative difficulty of generating false reports. On a more intuitive
note, our findings suggest thatwhen facedwith a new situation, one’s immediate reaction is
to tell the truth. However, when one has lied repeatedly in a specific situation, and when a
cue triggers this behavior, e.g., a regular die, it ismost natural to drawupon this very default
when under time pressure.
Furthermore, when given the time to deliberate, the participants generally report lower
values when dealing with regular dice than with color dice. This finding was not hypoth-
esized but could ex-post be rationalized by consulting the mouse trajectories collected on
the decision screen: It seems as if the colored choice options sparked the innocent curiosity
to explore multiple options. During this search, also lucrative choice options were discov-
ered. Once the temptation was found, it was hard to resist. However, at this stage, this
interpretation is merely speculation; further research needs to confirm this hypothesis.
On a more general note, the mouse-trajectories suggest various behavioral archetypes
concerning (dis-)honest behavior: The A type makes no detour and directly reports once
choice. The A = Ω type explores all options but reports the options on which the search
started. The A > Ω trajectory started on a more lucrative choice than that one chosen,
and the A < Ω trajectory started on a less lucrative choice option than that one chosen.
Especially these last two trajectory-types suggest that lying and truth can both be default
behaviors.
The trajectories provide dimensions of a decision that are not present in a one-pointed
report. We believe that mouse-tracking data can enrich the insights gained from decisions
made in various contexts and provides fruitful research opportunities. For example, cov-
ering the payoff associated with one’s choice by colors, as we did it, paired with tracking
mouse movements makes an investigation of search patterns about lying under time pres-
sure possible.
Outside of the laboratory, based on our findings, we would advise policymakers to con-
struct a novel situation, if honest decisions are crucial for the public good. Another intu-
itive conclusion is that if one wants to be more self-disciplined about personal values such
as honest decision-making, one should pay close attention to how to construct the envi-
ronment: Tempting and immoral choices should be made hard to reach.
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Human: What do we want?!
Computer: Natural Language Processing!
Human: When do we want it!?
Computer: When do we want what?
Posted by sachintripathi007 on Reddit
2
Predicting (Dis-)Honesty: Leveraging Text
Classification for Behavioral Experimental
Research
Many laboratory experiments in experimental behavioral research offer participants the op-
portunity to chat with each other. The chat is often directly related to a numeric variable,
e.g., the amount of money sent by a dictator. This kind of data can be leveraged for super-
vised classification, where text serves as input and the numeric report as a label. However,
experimental data have different properties – such as being small or heavily skewed – as
compared to datasets typically used for text classification. This paper systematically inves-
tigates various classification setups to testwhether supervised learning can at all classify chat
texts obtained by experimental behavioral research. More specifically, we train a classifier to
predict whether a group reported (taxable) income honestly, based on chat texts obtained
from a tax evasion experiment. The classifier’s generalizability is tested on data obtained
from a new experiment where participants play in a different setup. Results show that
the predictive performance of the best model is rather weak (F1 score = .411). This result
was expected as the dataset is tiny and heavily skewed. However, we successfully show that
a careful selection of the classification configuration doubled the weakest setup’s perfor-
mance. Furthermore, we found that the pretrained classifier does not generalize to another
context. This result wasmost likely driven by an already weakmodel, as well as structurally
different communication in the new experimental setting.
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2.1 Introduction
In many behavioral experiments, (numeric) decision data is collected alongside process
data, such as texts generated through group chats. Such data can be interpreted as labeled
data, where the chat text serves as input and the numeric decision as the label. This prop-
erty makes experimental data an exciting candidate for supervised learning, as real-world
text data, by contrast, rarely possess this characteristic.
Even though having gold-standard labeled data available, behavioral research does not
exploit this property. In this discipline, text data is – as by now – exclusively used in the
line with process data. Capra (2019), Elten and Penczynski (2020), Fochmann et al. (2019),
and Kocher, Schudy, and Spantig (2018) assign labels derived from theoretical reasoning,
to the obtained texts by hand. Andres, Bruttel, and Friedrichsen (2019) and Capra (2019)
construct word-clouds with the chat texts. Both hand-assigned labels and word-clouds are
used to distinguish treatment groups.
Arad andPenczynski (2018), Burchardi andPenczynski (2014),Georgalos andHey (2019),
and Penczynski (2019) use (semi-)supervised learning to assign labels to text. These authors
are among the rare ones in the discipline to leverage machine learning. Their approach is
different from ours because they assign labels by hand and train an algorithm on this asso-
ciation. They do not connect decision with process data, as this paper does.
Furthermore, this paper systematically tests multiple configurations of classification se-
tups. Burchardi and Penczynski (2014), Georgalos and Hey (2019), and Penczynski (2019),
and Arad and Penczynski (2018) each just use one configuration: They combine a bag of
words approachwith a linear classifier. By contrast, our paper aims to give awell-researched
recommendation for using a classification setup specifically tailored to experimentally col-
lected chat data.
Such a systematic reviewof techniques is necessarybecause supervised classificationmight
fail because this kind of data often shows problematic characteristics such as small size and
an imbalanced share of labels. More specifically, this paper uses supervised machine learn-
ing to classify group chats, which resulted in honest or dishonest reports. Subsequently, the
classifier is tested on a new, unseen dataset to evaluate its predictive potential in a different
experimental setting.
2.2 Model Architecture
Text classification is a prevalent task in Natural Language Processing. Therefore, literature
provides an exhaustive palette of feature engineering techniques and classifiers. However,
not all of these methods are equally well suited for the type of data we plan to investigate.
Additionally, experimental behavioral data has characteristics that can be exploited to in-
crease the classification’s performance. The following section describes themultiple config-
urations tested to train a classifier that learns the association between process and decision
data.
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2.2.1 X and y variations
The experimental behavioral data has characteristics that can be exploited in order to in-
crease the classification’s performance. In experimental games, such as a public good game,
a group chat precedes the actual (numeric) decision. The subsequent decision is taken in-
dividually, e.g., each group member makes an individual contribution to a shared public
good. Consequently, the numerical decision could be predicted by the group chat or an in-
dividual’s chat messages only. As stated in the literature, many scientists in this field assign
labels or categories manually to the text data. These labels can be exploited for predictions,
too. Often, there are chat snippets to which no label is assigned because these are filler sen-
tences, which are commonly arising in chat communications. Excluding them from the
input data could reduce noise and therefore increase accuracy. Furthermore, spelling mis-
takes are common in user-generated content. Thus, the variations proposed above can be
implemented on text with and without spellchecking.
A decision task most often follows the communication phase. The numeric decision
is context-dependent; however, in most cases, this decision can be mapped to a broader,
binary concept, such as cooperativeness in public good games. Setting this threshold to
form categories of a previously continuous variable can be theorized or derived by data in-
spection. Through the lens of a classifier, is communication in the case of full cooperation
structurally different than in the case of partial cooperation? A systematic comparison of
classification results based on various thresholds can answer this question. In other words,
the threshold chosen by this procedure defines the labels such that the classifier can eas-
ily distinguish them. We want to highlight that the chosen threshold is not “better” than
others, it is just an “easier” threshold for the classifier to work with.
2.2.2 Embeddings
Classification algorithms only work with numerical input. Therefore, words need to be
transformed into numbers. A simple and efficient baseline for text classification is to rep-
resent sentences as bag of words or bag of n-grams (Harris 1954). We implement a bag of
words approach either based on absolute counts or tf-idf weighted counts.
However, treating words as atomic units has many disadvantages, such as that there is
no notion of similarity between words. A possible remedy is to use vector representations
that can preserve the meaning of words. In the following, we focus on static embeddings
because they require fewer data than dynamic embeddings. The three most widely known
algorithms to train word embeddings areWord2Vec (Mikolov et al. 2013), GloVe (Penning-
ton, Socher, and Manning 2014), and fastText (Joulin et al. 2017).
Word2Vec trains a neural network based on texts. The resulting embedding captures
whether words appear in similar contexts. GloVe focuses on word co-occurrences over
the whole corpus. Its embeddings relate to the probabilities that two words appear to-
gether. The method builds on the idea that semantic relationships between words can be
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derived from the co-occurrence matrix (Pennington, Socher, and Manning 2014). fastText
improves onWord2Vec by takingword parts into account, too. This trick enables the train-
ing of embeddings on smaller datasets, generalization to unknown words, and to capture
partial information about the local word order (Joulin et al. 2017).
Besides training word embeddings on the actual corpus at hand, we deploy pretrained
embeddings: Those vectors were trained on an external, much bigger corpus. Thismethod
seems especially useful because text data obtained by laboratory experiments are limited in
size.
Additionally, we combine word embeddings to form sentence embeddings: Directly av-
eraging all word embeddings that occurred in the text has proven to be a stable baseline
across multiple tasks (Banea et al. 2015; Hu, Lu, et al. 2014; Socher et al. 2013). However,
means could be a relatively weak way to describe the distribution of word embeddings
across a text. To weight features concerning saliency, we apply tf-idf weighting of the indi-
vidual feature vectors, as proposed by Kenter and De Rijke (2015).
Instead of averaging word embeddings over the sequence, we additionally train para-
graph vectors directly. More specifically, we use document embeddings and distributed
memory (PV-DM) (Le and Mikolov 2014) instead of distributed bag of words. The cen-
tral idea is to randomly sample adjacent words from a paragraph and predict a center word
from the randomly sampled set of words by taking the context words and a paragraph id
as input.
2.2.3 Classifiers
Logistic regression, support vectormachines (Joachims 1998), orNaïve Bayes (Zhang 2004)
are considered as efficient baselines for text classification. Furthermore, we test one non
parametric model, namely k-nearest neighbors (Sun and Chen 2011), and non-linear mod-
els like Random Forests (Breiman 1998, 2001) and XGBoost (Chen, Schonger, and Wick-
ens 2016). We also test ensemble techniques such as bootstrap aggregating (Breiman 1996),
short boosting, and model stacking (Wolpert 1992). Another model tested is a 2-layer per-
ceptron.
The following paragraph provides a brief explanation of the classifiers deployed: A sup-
port vectormachine finds the decision boundary to separate different classes bymaximizing
the margin. A Naïve Bayes classifier takes advantage of probability theory and the Bayes’
theorem: It calculates the probability of each class for a given text and then outputs the
class with the highest score. K-nearest neighbor classification is based on a majority vote:
A text is assigned to the class with the most representatives within the nearest neighbors of
the point representing the text in space. A random forest classifier consists ofmultiple indi-
vidual decision trees. Each tree predicts the class of a given text, and the class with the most
votes becomes the model’s prediction for a given text. XGBoost denotes a specific imple-
mentation of gradient boosted decision trees designed for speed and performance. Bagging
is an ensemble technique that combines the results of multiple classifiers trained on differ-
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ent subsamples of the same data set. The technique reduces the variance of predictions.
Model stacking is another ensemble learning technique which combines the predictions of
several base models: Ameta-algorithmmakes the final prediction based on the predictions
of multiple base models. Each model’s votes are weighted by a certain weight to derive the
final prediction. Stacked ensembles tend to outperform the individual base models. The
two-layer perceptron is a simple feedforward neural network, composed of an input layer
that receives the text and an output layer that predicts the class; in between is one hidden
layer.
2.2.4 Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the X-, and y- variations, the embeddings, and the classi-
fiers, standard evaluation metrics, such as accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, and AUC are
reported.
The accuracy denotes the fraction of correct predictions. However, it is not suitable to
evaluate a classifier’s performance on imbalanced data: If the classifier exclusively predicts
the majority label, the accuracy is high, but the classifier performs poorly.
To evaluate an imbalanced dataset like ours, the F1 score is the preferred metric. The
F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. For binary classification, precision
quantifies how many of the texts that are predicted positive are positive1. Recall calculates
how many of the actual positives are labeled as positive.
The F1 score is the preferredmetric to evaluate amodel’s performancewithin one dataset.
When comparingmodels across datasets, however, an independent prevalencemetric needs
to be consulted. The F1 score is solely interested in the performance of the positive class.
Therefore, it is sensitive to different class distributions when comparing across datasets. By
contrast, AUC is prevalence independent because thismeasure is built from a separate eval-
uation of the two classes (for an excellent explanation see Straube and Krell 2014). AUC is
short for Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC). The ROC curve (receiver operating charac-
teristic curve) plots the false positive rate on the x-axis and the truepositive rate on the y-axis.
By doing so, it shows amodel’s performance at all thresholds. Consequently, AUC∈ {0, 1}
measures the two-dimensional area underneath theROCcurve. Themeasure equals 1 if the
model predicts correctly. It equals 0 if the model predicts the inverted ground truth. If the
AUC equals .5, the model is not able to effectively separate classes. AUC is our metric of
choice when comparing a model’s performance across different thresholds to binarize y,
and across two experimental datasets.
To evaluate the embedding techniques, we additionally consult a visual representation.
The trained embeddings should capture themeaning of a givenword. For this purpose, the
embeddings are plotted in a two-dimensional space. Before doing so, the dimensionality
of the embeddings needs to be reduced, from 300, which is the standard dimension size in
1 For the classification of imbalanced datasets, it is common to associate the minority label – which are the
truth-tellers in our case – as the positive class (1).
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literature, to two. For that, we use principal component analysis (PCA) (Halko, Martins-
son, and Tropp 2011). PCA performs linear mapping in such a way that the variance of the
data in the low-dimensional representation is maximized.
2.3 Experiments
We evaluate the proposed configurations on an experimental behavioral dataset. The con-
figuration that reaches the highest F1 score is used to train the final model. The general-
izability of the resulting model is subsequently assessed on a second, unseen behavioral
experimental dataset.
2.3.1 Finding the Best Configuration
Dataset. Fochmann et al. (2019) provides the dataset on which the configurations are
trained and tested. In the context of a behavioral experiment, participants play a tax eva-
sion game where the vignette states the (taxable) income they earned. Participants discuss
whether to report their income truthfully or not in a group chat. Subsequently, they in-
dividually state their income. The dataset includes 141 subjects within 47 groups, taking
overall 855 decisions.
The label, or y, to be predicted is the income stated by participants. This paper aims
to predict the broader concept of truth-telling and not specific levels of the income stated.
Whether the stated income is classified as truth or not depends on the threshold applied.
Different settings might require a different threshold; however, for the purpose of this pa-
per, the threshold is exclusively chosen based on performance criteria. The full honesty
benchmark was to report 1000 tokens. Consequently, all reports from 0 to 999 can be
called a lie. Other thresholds tested are the mean (317), and half of the endowment (500).



































(b) Categories based on Specific Thresholds
Figure 2.1: Taxable Income Stated
Figure 2.2 plots three different indicators that describe a group’s communication. Each
subfigure plots two distributions: The orange distribution reflects honest, the blue one
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Figure 2.2: Distribu on of Three Indicators by Label on Experimental Chat Data
dishonest communication. To achieve this classification, the dependent variable – the re-
ported income – was mapped from a continuous to a binary scale based on the full (dis-
)honesty threshold. Figure 2.2a plots the stop word ratio’s distribution. Both distributions
are bimodal, with one peak around .1 and another peak at .4. The peak at .1 is less pro-
nounced for honest group chats indicating that these texts include fewer stop words than
texts classified as dishonest. Figure 2.2b plots the distribution of the number of words per
group chat. Both distributions show a noticeable peak at the bin, indicating 0 to 20 words.
The suspicious reader might ask: Why is a considerable share of the group chats so short?
The answer lies in the structure of the experimental setup. Depending on the treatment,
participants stay in the same group for up to nine rounds. Very often, there is extensive
discussion at the beginning of the experiment; but in later rounds, participants coordinate
on reporting the same number as in previous rounds. Apart from this peaking first bin, the
two distributions allocate their masses differently: Group chats classified as dishonest in-
clude fewer words than as honest classified group chats. This shift in distributions could be
interpreted as coordinating on an honest requires more discussion and seems less intuitive
than coordinating on a dishonest answer. Figure 2.2c plots the distribution of the mean
word length per group chat. The distributions are again bimodal, both peaking at 4 and
8.5 words. Mean word length is very similar for both honest and dishonest communica-
tion, suggesting that the complexity and structure of the language used are quite similar
across both labels. Overall, Figure 2.2 provides a qualitative interpretation of the text data.
It is particularly interesting to compare this figure to chat data collectedwithin a new exper-
imental setup in another part of this paper. The comparison shows how communication
structurally differs across contexts.
Apart from providing chat text, Fochmann et al. (2019) furthermore provide 34 labels
which the authors assigned to the chat after reading its content. These labels define the
chat, for example, as a concrete money proposition or lying strategy. Section B.1 provides
a complete list of these labels. To each chat, no label, one label or multiple labels could be
assigned. To exploit this information, we train variations of the classifiers only on these
labels or based on chat texts to which labels were assigned. The later variation excludes
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chats.
The chat-based configurations are built either on standard preprocessed or spellchecked
and then preprocessed text. The spell checker implemented uses the Levenshtein Distance
(Levenshtein 1966) to find permutations within an edit distance of two from the original
word. It then compares all permutations to words in a word frequency list. Those words
that appear more often in the list are more likely correct (Norvig 2007). Overall, the spell
checker corrected 599 out of 3474 (17.24%) unique words in the text.
All text-based variations are preprocessed using the package spaCy (Honnibal andMon-
tani 2017). First, the text is tokenized, and punctuation and stopwords are removed. Then,
depending on the feature representation, bi-grams2 or uni-grams are built. Finally, all to-
kens are lemmatized3. We remove the words occurring less than five times, which results in
2, 678 unique words.
After preprocessing, the data is split: The train set contains 684 examples (80%) and
the test set 171 examples. The split is a stratified group split, meaning that the distribution
of the labels in the whole dataset is preserved while ensuring that the same groups do not
appear in both train and test set. Furthermore, we randomly oversample theminority class
in the training set because the labels’ shares are imbalanced.
Results. In section 2.2, we propose various parameters to vary, which results in a vast
set of combinations. As it is computationally not efficient to test all possible combinations,
we step-wise choose the best configuration to proceed with.
The performancemetrics reported in the following section have to be interpreted in con-
text: The training set is tiny (less than 700 samples), and the data is heavily skewed. It can
not be expected to achieve a highly predictive classifier; it is also possible that it is beyond
the capacity of any machine learning model to distinguish.
Most of the following tables report a high recall, which can be explained by the low
predictive quality of the models combined with the imbalanced class distribution of the
dataset: When optimizing the F1 score, it is easier for a model with low predictive quality
to achieve a high recall than to achieve a high precision on the minority class.
Furthermore, the following tables mostly report an accuracy below 50%. As will be ex-
plained in the following section, the prediction threshold is chosen, such that the F1 score
is maximized. This procedure results in a decline in the accuracy. Additionally, accuracy is
an inconclusive metric when working with an imbalanced dataset.
In the following descriptions of the tables, we consult the F1 score for comparingmodels
within a dataset, and the AUC for comparing models across datasets.
2 Bi-grams are built with Gensim’s (Rehurek and Sojka 2010) “phrase detector”, implying that only bi-grams
of common phrases are built.
3 Stemming, as opposed to lemmatization is typically faster as it merely chops off the end of the word.
Lemmatization, however, is more accurate because it derives the root form of a word.
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Best Combinations of X and y. First, we test all possible X- and y-combinations.
For this step, we chose a baseline setup where tf-idf vectorized text is input to a support
vector machine (SVM). The regularization parameterC, the kernel k, and the degree of the
polynomial kernel function d were subject to a five-fold cross-validated grid search, where
we choose C ∈ [−1..4], k ∈ {linear, polynomial, rbf}4, and d ∈ {2, 3}. Furthermore,
based on the best parameters proposed by the grid search, the model is refitted ten times to
reduce prediction variance. Within each fit, the classification threshold is chosen such that
it maximizes the F1 score (as proposed by Lipton, Elkan, and Naryanaswamy 2014). The
reported model metrics are averaged over the ten fits.
Each subtable of Table 2.1 shows the best performing combinations for each variation of
X and y. Table 2.1a shows no variation in performance concerning the spellchecked and the
original text. The spellchecker corrected only 17% of the unique words present in the text.
Possibly, the correct adjustions were balanced by those where the spellchecker mistakenly
changed a word’s meaning.
Table 2.1b represents a comparison of different models across datatsets. The labels’ im-
balances vary by the threshold chosen. Therefore, we consult the AUC to select the best
performing threshold. The highest AUC (.558) is reached when the dependent variable is
binarized based on its mean (317).
Table 2.1c shows that labels as input reach the highest F1 score (.500). This result is not
surprising: The 34 labels were assigned by a researcher after reading the chat texts and are
therefore far less noisy than chat data. However, assigning labelsmanually is labor-intensive
and prone to mistakes. After all, this paper aims to provide an automated approach to text
classification. The second best F1 score (.362) is achieved by using chat texts grouped on the
subject level (“chat, subject”). Chat texts do not require labor-intensive preprocessing, and
as the loss in performance is tiny, we stick with thisX variation for the remaining analysis.
Overall, Table 2.1 implies to binarize y based on the mean of the reported income, and
deploy chat texts grouped by individuals as inputX.
Features. We construct features as described in subsection 2.2.2. We either train embed-
dings on our corpus or deploy pretrained embeddings. We downloaded the latter vectors
from theWebsite “deepset.ai” (Rusic, Pietsch, andMöller 2020) whichwere trained on the
GermanWikipedia corpus scraped in 2015. The performance of the different text represen-
tation techniques is assessed in twoways. For bothmethods, a linear logistic regressionwas
used.
Table 2.2 sorts the feature representation based on the F1 score. Overall, the range of the
observed F1 scores is narrow (F1 score∈ [.35, .49]). The performance of the four best varia-
tions is almost indistinguishable, showing a standard deviation of only .004. Among those
four are the bag of words approaches, and the pretrained Word2Vec embeddings. The un-
weighted bag of words performs best (F1 score= .490), closely followed byWord2Vec em-
4 rbf stands for radial basis function.
31
Table 2.1: Best Combina ons by Input Varia on
(a) data
F1 prec rec AUC acc
original 0.362 0.227 0.963 0.558 0.286
spell-checked 0.362 0.227 0.963 0.558 0.286
(b) y
<mean 0.362 0.227 0.963 0.558 0.286
<500 0.295 0.185 0.848 0.529 0.427
<1000 0.209 0.126 0.857 0.544 0.449
(c) X
label 0.500 0.389 1.000 0.928 0.846
chat, subject 0.362 0.227 0.963 0.558 0.286
chat, group 0.329 0.214 1.000 0.501 0.337
F1 score, precision, and recall are reported for the minority label (= 1) “honest”.
beddings, pretrained on the German Wikipedia corpus, and tf-idf averaged over the texts
(F1 score = .489). fastText embeddings rank second lowest with an F1 score of .354, indi-
cating that a bag of n-grams was not more informative than a bag of words.
Secondly, feature representations should be able to preserve word meanings, at least to
such degree that similar words are close in space. For Figure 2.3, the embeddings’ dimen-
sionalities were reduced via PCA. Furthermore, it plots only the 30 most common features
to keep the visualization readable.
As expected, Figure 2.3b and Figure 2.3c successfully group words of similar contexts:
These embeddings leveragepretrainedvectors and thereforehad the chance to learn aword’s
meaning from a vast corpus. Figure 2.3b shows that “kontrollieren” (to control), “verdi-
enen” (to earn), “verlieren” (to loose), and “verstoßen” (to comply) are close in space, and
thereby precisely capture the setting of the experiment: If the group does not complywith
the rules and they get controlled, they loose part of their earnings.
Figure 2.3d shows successful grouping, as well. This result is interesting, as fastText em-
beddings were solely trained on our corpus but nevertheless manage to grasp the word’s
usage in our context. Figure 2.3a, by contrast, does not succeed in doing so.
Overall, the performance metrics suggest that pretrained Word2Vec embeddings per-
form second best and seem to learn a word’s meaning reasonably well. Therefore, for the
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Table 2.2: Comparison of the Embeddings’ Performance
F1 pr re AUC acc
bag of words 0.490 0.335 0.953 0.563 0.373
Word2Vec (pre, tf-idf) 0.489 0.336 0.982 0.509 0.372
Word2Vec (pre, smpl) 0.486 0.329 0.971 0.482 0.353
bag of words (tf-idf) 0.482 0.332 0.922 0.565 0.376
Word2Vec (tf-idf) 0.481 0.321 1.000 0.554 0.320
Doc2Vec 0.361 0.232 0.909 0.500 0.317
GloVe (pre, tf-idf) 0.356 0.223 0.959 0.494 0.272
GloVe (pre) 0.355 0.222 0.967 0.469 0.262
fastText 0.354 0.239 0.740 0.569 0.436
Word2Vec 0.350 0.275 0.659 0.547 0.489
The classifier used was a logis c regression implemented with the squared euclidean norm as penalty. “pre”-
trained vectors were deployed; “ -idf” weigh ng was applied. F1 score, precision, and recall are reported for the
minority label (= 1) “honest”.
remainder of the analysis, we deploy pretrained Word2Vec embeddings, which we average
and tf-idf weight for each subject’s chat text.
Classifiers. All classification models’ hyperparameters were tuned based on a 5-fold-
cross-validated grid search. Which parameters were tuned, depended on the particular clas-
sifier chosen. Based on the best parameters proposed, each model is refitted ten times to
reduce prediction variance. Within each fit, the classification threshold is chosen such that
it maximizes the F1 score (as proposed by Lipton, Elkan, and Naryanaswamy 2014). The
reported model metrics are averaged over the ten fits.
Table 2.3a summarizes the performance metrics for all classifiers tested. As it was the
case for Table 2.2, in Table 2.3a, the range of the F1 scores is small: F1 ∈ [.35, .41]. The best
performing classifier (F1 score = .411) is a stacking classifier, the weighted average of the pre-
dictions of different models, as presented by Table 2.3b. Its – in comparison – outstanding
performance is not surprising as a combination of estimators reduces their individual bi-
ases (Wolpert 1992). Weights as presented by Table 2.3b have to be understood as weight
per vote and are chosen such that the F1 score is maximized. In our setting, the random
forest classifier earns the highest weight, followed by the 2-layer perceptron and the linear
logistic regression.
To summarize, Table 2.3a suggests that there is notmuch variation in performance across
classifiers, and stacking multiple classifiers reaches the highest performance. Therefore, we
stick with this ensemble model for the rest of the analysis.
Overall, we show that binarizing the dependent variable at the mean, combined with
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Figure 2.3: Word Embeddings, Reduced in Dimensionality by PCA
grouping the chat texts by subjects, reaches the highest performance. Pretrained and tf-idf
averaged Word2Vec embeddings are the most reliable representation of the text. Finally,
stacking multiple classifiers outperforms the single ones. This combination yields an F1
score of .411. Nevertheless, this score is ratherweak, but this number has to be interpreted in
context: A setupwith< 700 training samples and the labels’ highly imbalanced share could
be beyond any machine learning model’s capacity. Nevertheless, we show that carefully
selecting the configuration can achieve considerable gains in performance. The lowest F1
score reached was .209, which is approximately half of the best model’s F1 score.
Apart from the F1 score, we consult the AUC, too. Amongst all models tested, the stack-
ing classifier shows the highest AUC (.597). By contrast, XGBoost yields the lowest AUC
of .474 and therefore performs worse than a random guess. We do not expect that XG-
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Boost learns to make “negative” predictions; instead, we consider the difference of roughly
.03 as noise. Following that logic, we would interpret an AUC of .53 as a random guess,
too. However, the stacking classifier yields an AUC of .597, which we, therefore, do not
consider a random guess. The predictive power is still weak, but the model did learn to
predict (dis-)honesty to some extend.
To summarize, even though the trained classifier’s predictive power is weak, it is better
than a random guess, which can be considered a success, given the unfavorable circum-
stances of tiny and heavily skewed data. Furthermore, this paper successfully shows that
testing multiple configurations is necessary to find a suitable classification setup for behav-
ioral experimental data.
Table 2.3: Results for All Classifiers Tested
(a) Performance Metrics for All Classifiers tested
F1 prec rec AUC acc
Stacking 0.411 0.292 0.741 0.597 0.556
KNN 0.390 0.268 0.778 0.581 0.492
SVM 0.364 0.227 1.000 0.526 0.266
RF 0.364 0.236 0.894 0.550 0.343
NN 0.356 0.225 0.926 0.559 0.298
Bagging 0.356 0.220 1.000 0.543 0.238
LLR 0.355 0.229 0.893 0.522 0.319
XGBoost 0.349 0.215 1.000 0.474 0.214








F1 score, precision, and recall are reported for the minority label (= 1) “honest”.
2.3.2 Testing Generalizability
Ideally, the classifier trained generalizes to another setting. Therefore, we collected chat data
via a new behavioral experiment. The experimental setup was preregistered5, programmed
with oTree (Chen, Schonger, andWickens 2016), and conducted online via the server of the
MPI Decision Lab6 in May 2020. Furthermore, the project was supported by the Center
for Social and Economic Behavior, University of Cologne, with 3000e.
The instructions state that the participantworks as an employee for a fictitious company.
Together with one additional team member, she completed a project for which both team
members worked the same surplus hours. Both team members could coordinate in a chat




the higher was the salary that the fictitious company would pay. If the team members’ re-
ports diverged, the couplewas controlled. Couples that reported the same amount of hours
were randomly controlled with a probability of 30%. If the participant got controlled and
reported more than ten surplus hours, she payed a fine. Section B.3 provides screenshots
of the experiment.
On a more general note, the new experimental setup alters the setting by Fochmann et
al. (2019) concerning three significant dimensions: Firstly, the context is no longer a tax
evasion setting, but participants report surplus hours. Secondly, the direction of the lie is
switched: It is optimal to overreport in the surplus hour setting, whereas it was optimal to
underreport in the tax evasion setting. Thirdly, the group size is reduced from three to two.
Data. Overall, 351 observations were collected. Participants were, on average, 24.8 years
old, and 60% of them were female. Figure 2.4a shows the distribution of surplus hours
stated. It is binarized based on the full honesty benchmark (10), the mean report (34.1),
and half of the full dishonesty benchmark (30). The distribution of the stated income is
bimodal, where the greatest masses lie at the full honesty benchmark (10) and the full dis-
honesty benchmark (60). Comparing Figure 2.4a to Figure 2.1a, it is evident that the partic-
ipants in the new experiment report considerably more honestly than those in Fochmann
et al. (2019). For the classification, we binarized the income stated based on themean of the
reported surplus hours.
































(b) Categories Based on Specific Thresholds
Figure 2.4: Surplus Hours Stated
Is communication structurally different in the two experiments? Simple word counts
suggest that it indeed is: The text data in Fochmann et al. (2019) counts 3, 003 unique
words; the text data in the new experiment counts 1, 398 unique words, where only 847
words intersect.
Figure 2.5 provides a more detailed answer to the question posed. According to Fig-
ure 2.5a, the distributions of the stop word ratios across the two labels peak roughly at the
same values. Figure 2.2a shows similar behavior, and peaks occur in both datasets around 0
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and 4. Furthermore, the distribution of the mean word length is bimodal for honest chats
and unimodal for dishonest chats. The highest peaks for both distributions occur around
4, which is true for Figure 2.2c, too. Finally, Figure 2.5b displays that chats classified as hon-
est contain fewerwords than chats classified as dishonest. This relationship is the otherway
round for Figure 2.2b.
Overall, the word counts and the distributions displayed in Figure 2.5 suggest that com-
munication is structurally different across the two datatsets.
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Figure 2.5: Distribu on of Three Indicators by Label on the New Experimental Chat Data
Comparing AUC. To assess the in section 2.3 trained model’s generalizability, we assess
its out-of-context predictions on the complete dataset obtained by the new experimental
setup. As described in the previous section, the configuration for themodel chosen are pre-
trained Word2Vec embeddings, combined with a stacking classifier. Table 2.4 presents the
out-of-context predictions across three thresholds. As the thresholds affect the imbalance
of the labels, we consult the AUC instead of the F1 score. The best AUC (.529) is achieved,
by binarizing the observed distribution at the mean of the reported surplus hours.
Next, we compare the out-of-context results (on the second experiment) to the results
on the test set of the first experiment. As this is a comparison across datasets, we again
consult the AUC instead of the F1 score. On the test set of the first experiment, the model
reaches an AUC of .597. On the out-of-context predictions, the model yields an AUC of
.529. Both AUCs are very low, considering that .500 is equivalent to a random guess. The
reader is asked to remember that we consider a variation of .03 as noise. Consequently,
while the classifier’s predictive performance in the first experiment can be interpreted as
slightly better than a random guess, the AUCdoes not indicate any predictive power in the
second experiment. Therefore, we conclude that the classifier cannot generalize sufficiently
well to another context.
This interpretation was already suggested by introspecting the data: The data obtained
by the new experimental setup shows that subjects report far more honestly than in the
study by Fochmann et al. (2019). Furthermore, distributions show that in the experiment
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by Fochmann et al. (2019), groups chatted less, if they reported honestly. In the new exper-
imental setup, groups chattedmore if they reported honestly. Furthermore, the number of
intersecting words in both datasets is small. These structural differences likely prevented
the already weak model from generalizing to a new context.
Table 2.4: Out-of-Context Performance of the Pretrained Classifier
y F1 prec rec AUC acc
>mean 0.704 0.548 0.995 0.529 0.553
> 30 0.591 0.425 0.986 0.510 0.433
> 10 0.455 0.305 0.922 0.506 0.365
Classifica on was based on pre-trained Word2Vec embeddings, averaged over texts by -idf weigh ng and a
stacking classifier. F1 score, precision, and recall are reported for the minority label (= 1) “honest”.
2.4 Assessing Robustness
The previous subsection addressed the generalizability of the classifier. This subsection ad-
dresses its robustness concerning twomajor components: Is text an independent predictor
in laboratory experiments? Moreover, does the text reflect concepts that previous literature
found to predict lying?
Controlling for Experimenter Demand Effects. To rule out omitted variable
bias, in the new experimental setup, we checked for experimenter demand effects, which
possibly could influence both: chat behavior and the actual report. Therefore, we ask
whether participants changed their chat behavior because they anticipate the experimenter
would read their communication. On a binary scale, only 4% of participants (overall 14)
stated to have changed their chat behavior. Participants could additionally explain their
choice. Five people state they thought about the chat being read but did not change their
behavior. Four people state that they put more effort into proper grammar and spelling.
Furthermore, four people state theywrote less text, and two people state that they reported
more honestly.
Out of these four categories, the most critical is the fourth one. However, only two par-
ticipants stated to having answeredmore or less honestly, which is negligibly low. The third
category, having written less text, is more likely to be motivated by privacy concerns than
appearing (dis-)honest in the face of the experimenter. The first two categories are uncor-
related with the dependent variable. Overall, the low number of participants who changed
behavior and the categorization of answers show that there is no reason for concern that
participants changed their behavior due to an experimenter demand effect. Therefore, we
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conclude that chat text in laboratory experiments is a suitable independent variable based
on which valid predictions can be made.
Various Concepts to Influence Lying. After participants had stated the num-
ber of surplus hours, they answered control questions which targeted concepts that were
shown in previous experimental research to influence lying behavior. For example, we
asked about various feelings and emotions felt during the experiment, risk attitudes, or
the field of study. Section B.2 provides more details about the questions and their scales.
We visually inspect the distributions of these answers, as displayed by Figure B.1 and Fig-
ureB.2. Concepts that show little variation in responses are unlikely to be a strongpredictor
for lying behavior in our setting. Therefore, we only select concepts that show substantial
variation to be included in a linear regression.
Table 2.5 deploys the regression results, which highlight significant correlations of the
concepts just mentioned. At this point, it is not our goal to investigate causality. The
following four coefficients were found to significantly influence the dependent variable:
When the believed number of dishonest people increases, the participant’s report increases
(belief = .450). Furthermore, the more joy a participant experienced, the more surplus
hours she stated (joy= 1.378). Apositive and significant relationshipholds for risk attitudes,
as well: The more risk affinity a participant stated, the higher the reported surplus hours
(risk = .905). Likewise, political orientation has a significant influence on lying behavior:
Themore left-wing a participant claimed to be, the lower was the number of surplus hours
stated. In other words, right-wing oriented participants were more dishonest (politics =
−1.081).
The following three coefficients did not significantly influence the dependent variable:
Having participated in more than one economics course, the experience with laboratory
experiments and attitudes towards lying did not affect lying behavior. Especially the latter
finding, together with the strong influence of experiencing joy, might hint at the limited
external validity of laboratory experiments: Lying in a gamemight be perceived as substan-
tially different than lying in real life. Playing a game and getting the most out of it (e.g.,
through lying) seems to be a playful and fun experience for participants.
In the following, we investigate the chat messages in terms of those concepts that signif-
icantly influence the number of surplus hours stated.
Searching for keywords targeting beliefs and political orientation did not yieldmeaning-
ful results. Only one couple speculated about other groups’ behaviors. No couple spoke
about political issues, which was expected, given the experiment’s context.
To investigate risk attitudes, we searched for two keywords’ patterns. Results show that
31% of all texts include a discussion about either “risk” or “safety”. This percentage is rather
high when keeping inmind that these are only two keywords. Nevertheless, it is consistent
with the analysis by Fochmann et al. (2019), who found that risk-related arguments mainly
drive the influence of group interaction on behavior.
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Residual Std. Error 16.408 (df = 310)
F Statistic 32.849∗∗∗ (df = 7; 310)
Note: ∗p< 0.1; ∗∗p< 0.05; ∗∗∗p< 0.01; hours stated ∈ [10..60], 10≡full honesty; joy experienced ∈ [1..10],
1≡experienced no joy; beliefs ∈ [0..100]: 0≡0 people state more than the true amount; risk a tude ∈ [1..11],
1≡not risk-prone; poli cal orienta on ∈ [1..9], 1≡le -wing; econ classes ∈ [1..2], 1≡par cipated in less than
one econ class; lying a tude ∈ [1..10], 1≡one should never lie; lab experience ∈ [1..5], 1≡never par cipated in
one
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The concept of risk could be investigated directly. A direct investigation is, however, not
straightforward concerning the concept of joy. Therefore, as a proxy, we use Rauh (2018)’s
German Sentiment Dictionary, which includes 17, 330 terms indicating positive sentiment.
Figure 2.6 shows that the dictionary based approach approximated joy sufficiently well, as
texts with a higher positivity score are associated with more hours stated. The regression
analysis can not make any claims about causality, but Figure 2.6 suggests the direction of
this correlation: Participants chatted before they stated their surplus hours. This order-
ing could be interpreted as experiencing positive feelings and emotions such as joy, made























































































































Figure 2.6: Rela on of the Posi vity Score and Surplus Hours Stated
To conclude, this subsection shows that the concepts of joy and risk attitudes are highly
predictive and are indeed topics that participants have in mind when developing their de-
cisions.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we test multiple text classification setups to find the best configuration for
behavioral experimental text data. Furthermore, we test whether a classifier trained in the
context of one behavioral experiment generalizes to another. For that purpose, we conduct
a new behavioral experiment.
Results exhibit that even if an individual participated in a group chat, only the individ-
ual’s text messages are most predictive of her decision. When mapping the decisions to a
broader concept, themean report as binarization threshold performs best. Concerning the
feature representation, pretrained Word2Vec embeddings perform best and can preserve
the meanings of the words considerably well. Furthermore, a stacking classifier outper-
forms all individual models tested. The best configuration yields an F1 score of .411, indi-
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cating that the classifier’s predictive quality is low; However, this result was expected as the
dataset is tiny and heavily skewed. Nevertheless, this paper succeeded in showing that care-
fully selecting the classification configuration yields a considerable gain in performance.
Finally, we assessed the generalizability of the classifier. It might not be possible to ex-
press an unequivocal statement, as the classifier’s performance is already weak. Neverthe-
less, we set the twoAUCs– .597 for the first, and .529 for the seconddataset – in context and
conclude that the model does not generalize to another experimental behavioral setting.
Furthermore, the behavioral experiment reveals interesting concepts connected to par-
ticipant’s lying behavior. Our findings confirm the established results in the literature that
beliefs about other’s lying behavior and risk attitudes strongly influence one’s (dis-)honesty.
Additionally, we found that experiencing joy is positively correlated with lying. Analyzing
text data sheds light on the direction of this correlation: It seems as if positive sentiments
experienced during the group chat encouraged lying in the subsequent decision.
As we could reach a considerable gain in performance just by varying configurations, we
expect that training a predictive model would be possible, if a considerably bigger dataset
was available. A classifier that was pretrained by these methods could be used in multiple
ways.
In the context of experimental behavioral research, it could be leveraged tomaximize in-
tervention effects. Assignment to treatment in experimental research is usually random.
However, evidence shows that the heterogeneity in reaction to treatment is not random
(Engel 2019). Assigning one group to – let us say an honesty treatment while neglecting
its type might – in the worst case – crowed out intrinsic motivation and thereby dimin-
ish the intended intervention effect (Fehr andRockenbach 2003; Frey andOberholzer-Gee
1997; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). A possible way out is to assign the intervention not
randomly but only to groups showing specific characteristics, e.g., an intention to report
dishonestly. In this work, we show that group chats are well suited to inform the researcher
about the groups’ attitudes and planned actions. A predictive model could assess in real
time the group’s intentions. If the classifier labels a group’s intention as dishonest, for ex-
ample, the group at handwould automatically be assigned to an honesty treatment to alter
the behavior towards amore honest response. We successfully tested real-time classification
in oTree and can provide the research community with this functionality upon request.
Thoughwe implemented quite an array of configurations, the current paper leaves space
for future research. The classifier’s predictive performance is low and very likely increases
with the size of the training data. It would be interesting to train the best model we found
on data of at least double the current training set size.
Furthermore, in many behavioral experimental settings, participants decide repeatedly
over multiple rounds. Screening the chat data by Fochmann et al. (2019) reveals that the
early chat rounds are the most informative ones. Most groups stick with their initial deci-
sion and, consequently, chat about unrelated topics in later rounds. A classification model
can exploit such additional information: Decisions in t−n could serve as input features for
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predictions in t. Another way to reflect the time component would be to assign a higher
weight to chat texts in t− n as opposed to chat texts in t.
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However beautiful the strate , you should occasionally
look at the results.
Winston Churchill
3
Charting the Type Space: The Case of
Linear Public Good Games
Behavior in economic games is not only noisy. One has reason to believe that heterogeneity
is patterned. A prominent application is the linear public good. It is widely accepted that
choices result from participants holding discernible types. Proposed types, like freeriders
or conditional cooperators, are intuitive. However, the composition of the type space is
neither theoretically nor empirically settled. In this paper, we leverage machine learning
methods to chart the type space. We use simulation to understand what can be achieved
with machine learning. We rely on these insights to find clusters in a large (N = 16,474) set
of experimental data. We discuss ways in which these clusters could be rationalized.
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3.1 Introduction
Standard theory predicts the tragedy of the commons. Everybody maximizes individual
profit and exploits socially minded choices of others. If members of the community inter-
act repeatedly, but it is known when an interaction will stop, the gloomy prediction still
holds. A robust experimental literature shows that, in the aggregate, results look different.
In a standard symmetric linear public good, average contributions typically start consider-
ably above zero but tend to decline over time (Chaudhuri 2011; Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003).
A substantial theoretical literature rationalizes these results, usually by introducing some
form of social preference into the utility function (for an excellent overview see Fehr and
Schmidt 2002). While such extensions of motives can generate a starting point above zero,
it is more difficult for them also to explain the downward trend. For this, one needs a re-
active element. It has been prominently introduced into the literature with the concept of
conditional cooperation (Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001). A conditional cooperator
is willing to act unselfishly provided she expects or knows that others will do so as well. In
principle, the downward trend could result from the fact that conditional cooperation is
imperfect. While participants would not be outright selfish, they would still try to out-
perform their peers, albeit only slightly (Fischbacher and Gachter 2010). Yet one of us has
shown that the data do not support this explanation. Instead, the downward trend results
from bad experiences. If participants, in the previous period, have been overly optimistic
about the contributions of their peers, they adjust their beliefs and, in turn, their contri-
butions, in the subsequent period. Critically they overreact to negative experiences (Engel
and Rockenbach 2020).
This is where the present project starts. If the population were homogeneous, and en-
tirely consisted of conditional cooperators, there could not be a downward trend. The
source of the trend, and hence the need for at least some form of institutional intervention
to sustain cooperation, must be heterogeneity. Even if many individuals are in principle
good-natured and happy to cooperate in good times, their willingness to do so is fragile.
If they experience exploitation, they react. While the claim is intuitive that populations
are heterogeneous, understanding the character of this heterogeneity is inherently diffi-
cult. One needs estimates about the utility functions of group members: is an individual
outright selfish? Is she so strongly motivated by the common good that she does not care
about others’ choices? Or does she react? If so, what does she react to? And how strongly?
There could also be mixed types: individuals freeride or cooperate for that matter, uncon-
ditionally as long as a certain threshold is not crossed. Reaction functions might have an
exploratory component: while an individual is in principle of a certain type, she occasion-
ally tests the waters by contributing more or less than suggested by her ordinary reaction
function. Reaction functions could be non-linear. Conditional cooperators might, for in-
stance, be happy to tolerate an occasional bad experience (maybe attributing it to others
having made a mistake), but they might lose faith, and react very strongly if bad experi-
ences repeat. Theremight be individuals who try to educate their groups by showing them
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what could happen if others do not stop misbehaving. For that purpose, they might once
contribute nothing, and go back to high contributions in the following period. Reaction
functionsmay also depend on the effects of occasional exploitation. In the standard setting
(group size 4, marginal per capita rate .4) 3 loyal members still make a small profit if they
continue to cooperate (and accept that the free rider gains a windfall profit).
All these behavioral programs resonate with data from public good experiments. How-
ever, these are only ex post rationalizations. Moreover, not every dataset could be reason-
ably explainedwith all of these behavioral programs. Before the field canmove forward and
better targeted interventions can be designed, one needs a much deeper understanding of
behavioral heterogeneity. Ultimately it would be highly desirable to formally define, and
experimentally test, these reaction functions. However, a necessary first step is exploratory:
which reaction functions exist, and how prevalent are they? Charting the type space is the
aim of the present project. We start by assuming that the theoretical possibilities for the
composition of the type space are partly understood. We further note that reactions may
differ in kind, but also in degree, which is why parameters must be estimated. This is why
we revert to machine learning. We use a reasonably large dataset of earlier linear public
goods to find types and discuss reaction functions that would rationalize the reaction pat-
terns.
In principle, choice data iswell suited for our endeavor. The choices of others in previous
periods are the only information to which participants can react in an anonymous linear
public good. For each individual, we can checkwhether, and if so, how they have reacted to
past choices of the remaining members of their group. We can represent the development
of their choices over time as a timeseries. We can use the rich set of methods developed
in the machine learning community for clustering the timeseries of choices, giving the al-
gorithm the possibility to use the average choices of the remaining group members in the
previous period as an input. From these clusters we can extract what machine learners call
a prototype.
This approach, however, presupposes that reaction functions can indeed be inferred
from choices. Arguably this will depend on at least two features of the data: the preci-
sion with which an individual participant has reacted to experiences, and the character of
these experiences. The former depends on the noise rate. Potentially individuals have a
particular reaction function, but they do not act upon it at all times. The latter depends on
group composition and initial choices. To illustrate: in a group of three straightforward
free riders, a conditional cooperator can be expected to quickly make choices that are in-
distinguishable from the choices of native free riders. Discriminating between the choices
of conditional cooperators and of free riders will be the more difficult, the lower the initial
contribution of a conditional cooperator. It should be equally challenging to discriminate
between conditional cooperators and genuinely cooperative participants if a group of na-
tive cooperators surrounds a single conditional cooperator.
Before using machine learning for clustering participants in real data, we, therefore, in-
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vestigate with simulated data the framework conditions under which potentially powerful
algorithms can find types. In simulations, we can systematically vary the composition of
the type space, the definition of individual types, and the noise rate. This first step yields
one crucial insight: machine learning methods find patterns. If the choice program of an
individual is reactive, the same choice patternmay result from different reaction functions,
depending on the choices the remaining groupmembers havemade in the previous period.
Consequently, there is no one to one mapping between patterns and types. This must be
reflected in the design of the clustering algorithm. We show that interpretation becomes
much easier if one estimates a number of patterns that is considerably bigger than the ex-
pected number of types and hence reaction functions.
Simulation also helps us with two further tasks. We can estimate the richness of the data
that is required for making the exercise meaningful. Furthermore, we can check in which
ways fine-tuning the algorithm improves estimation.
As explained above, we do not take it for granted that the type space has already been un-
derstood completely. Amajormotive for our project is the possibility that there are further
types that have not been theorized. Yet for our simulations, we need to build in types that
have already been conceptualized. In the simulations, we work with groups consisting of
different fractions of the following five types: altruists, whomwedefine as participantswho
do not react to experiences, and who start with relatively high contributions. Such partici-
pants may exhibit variance, the more so, the higher the noise rate. However, they show no
trend. The corresponding type at the lower end is total free riders. They in principle do not
make contributions to the public project, but may occasionally deviate from this program.
Pure conditional cooperators start with relatively high contributions but adjust them to
experiences. Following Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001), we allow for hump shaped
contributions: up to a value near half the endowment, they increase contributions in re-
action to good experiences, but they exhibit a perverse reaction to even better experiences.
Following Engel and Rockenbach (2020), we finally implement farsighted free riders. For
some initial periods “they feed the cow” bymaking substantial contributions but then start
“milking” it by reducing their contributions below average contributions in the previous
period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 3.2, we situate our en-
deavor in the literature. In Section 3.3, we discuss the choice and fine-tuning of the al-
gorithm. In Section 3.4, we explain the data generating process induced by public good
experiments. In Section 3.5, we use simulation to demonstrate how clustering algorithms
can help the researcher find types, defined by how they react to experiences with the choices
of other participants. In Section 3.6, we apply the method to a sizeable set of experimental
data. We offer interpretations of the empirical type space. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Literature
It has often been noted that choices in public good experiments are not homogeneous (see
only Fischbacher and Gachter 2010; Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001). But the liter-
ature has only relatively recently begun to define the type space more precisely. Amin,
Abouelela, and Soliman (2018) use theory derived from Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr
(2001) to classify 72 participants from a new experiment into seven types, and then use sim-
ulation to find out which fraction of which type is required to sustain cooperation in a
linear public good. Lucas, Oliveira, and Banuri (2012) show with simulation that coopera-
tion is hard to sustain in a linear public good if the group consists of heterogeneous types
(which they take from Fischbacher and Gachter (2010)). Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) de-
velop a model that combines social preferences with learning. In the framework of this
model, conditional cooperation is not a type but develops endogenously. They use data
from, among others, Isaac andWalker (1988) and Andreoni (1995) to calibrate their model,
and argue that it has a good fit. We have a different goal. On the one hand, we do not ex-
pect individual choices to bemerely noisy. We consider the possibility that heterogeneity is
patterned. On the other hand, we do not assume that the behavioral forces that drive this
heterogeneity are already fully understood. On the contrary, we want to find patterns that
are hard to reconcile with extant theoretical concepts. The purpose of our exercise is hy-
pothesis generation. Testing these hypotheses would require a series of new experiments.
That is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Engel (2020) also usesmachine learning to organize the type space for experimental data,
and demonstrates the approachwith data from Fischbacher andGachter (2010). However,
he has a different research question. He wants to compare the performance of a finite mix-
ture model (that estimates the type space and choices conditional on type simultaneously)
with a two-step approach (that first estimates the type space from the data, and then choices
conditional on type in a mixed effects model that interacts the types estimated in the first
step with the effect of experimental manipulations). He also uses a different approach for
estimating types, using the coefficients of local (per participant) regressions as inputs for a
classification and regression tree.
A third group of contributions is more remote. Game theory usually starts with a com-
plete definition of the game. Yet when they are exposed to one of the games of life, individ-
uals often do not know that much. They must learn what game they are playing. This task
is even more laborious if they cannot exclude the heterogeneous population with whom
they play. Vorobeychik, Wellman, and Singh (2007) use machine learning methods for the
task. Games can be too complex for solving them analytically. Then solutions must be
found computationally. Ficici, Parkes, and Pfeffer (2012) make the game tractable by first
compressing a large number of agents into amanageable number of clusters, and then solve
the simplified game analytically.
Closest in spirit are Bapna et al. (2004) and Lu et al. (2016). Both papers aim at classi-
fying bidding strategies in online auctions (Bapna et al. 2004) and in flower auctions (Lu
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et al. 2016), using machine learning methods. We have a different game (a dilemma), ex-
perimental data, and exploit the power of algorithms for the classification of time series
data.
3.3 Method
Clustering time series data Repeated experiments produce time series data. It is
meaningful to relate the choices of an individual at a given point in time to the choices this
individual hasmade at an earlier point in time, and that shewillmake at a later point in time.
From the development of choices over time, one can infer the program this individual has
followed. One can capture the dependence of choices over timewith the help of parameters
of an appropriate transformation, and then cluster individuals with classic algorithms for
static data (Liao 2005); this is how Engel (2020) proceeds, using the coefficients of linear
local (per participant) regressions as input for the classifier. This straightforward approach
may well be sufficient for many practical applications. Yet the approach requires that the
local regressions adequately capture the characteristics of an individual’s choice program.
As in this project, we want to find the best way to characterize these programs, we prefer a
classifier that remains open to unexpected features of the individual timeseries. This is why
we exploit the raw time series and use classifiers that have been developed explicitly for time
series data (for overviews see Liao 2005; Sardá-Espinosa 2017).
Multivariateclustering Actually,many standard experiments arenotonly repeated.
They are also interactive and produce panel data. In an interactive experiment, the pro-
gram of an individual participant may react to the experiences she has made with others’
choices. This may hold for a cognitive reason: the individual learns from others; or for a
motivational reason: the individual wants to react to the choices of others. In principle,
the reactive component of the individual choice program could be captured by regressing
individual choices on the experiences resulting from the choicesmade by other groupmem-
bers. Yet this approach assumes that the reaction to experiences is systematic. We are open
to this possibility but do not want to impose it on the design of our estimation. This is
why, instead, we provide the algorithmwith the exact information that participants receive
in the experiment. It consists of the average choice of the remaining groupmembers in the
previous period. The algorithm thus simultaneously receives two times series: the devel-
opment of the choices over time that each participant has made; and the corresponding
development of the average choices made by the remaining group members in the respec-
tive previous period.
Choice of the clustering algorithm Multiple methods have been developed for
clustering (raw) multivariate time series (for overviews again see Liao 2005; Sardá-Espinosa
2017). For our data generating process, partitional algorithms outperform hierarchical al-
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gorithms. A partitional algorithm assigns each time series to exactly one cluster. The num-
ber of clusters is predefined. The procedure starts with randomly chosen centroids, and
iteratively improves cluster assignment until the distance between clusters is maximized
(Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2009, chapter 13). We use k-means, as implemented in
the dtwclust package in R.
Our choice of input requires that we use an algorithm that can handlemultivariate data.
This excludes the otherwise powerful TADPole algorithm. We do, however, not consider
this as a significant limitation. The main appeal of TADPole is efficiency, not accuracy
(Begum et al. 2015). And it turns out that less efficient alternative algorithms still work
reasonably well both with our simulated and experimental data.
In principle, our data generating process would also be amenable to the use of a “fuzzy”
algorithm. An attractive candidate would be the fuzzy equivalent of k-means, the c-means
algorithm (Bezdek 2013). In the spirit of a finitemixturemodel (McLachlan andPeel 2004),
fuzzy algorithms assign individual time series only probabilistically to any cluster. Yet, even
when using simulated data (arguably more clean), the algorithm often does not converge.
This is why we do not report estimations with this algorithm. We again think that the
resulting limitation is not severe. For comparison with alternative algorithms, we anyhow
would have had to use a “crisp” version, that assigns the individual time series to the most
likely candidate.
Distance measures All time series clustering relies on a measure for the dissimilarity
of two series. Specifically, partitional algorithms need to define the proximity of a data
point (time series) to the centroid. It is the distance measures that most profoundly distin-
guish algorithms for the clustering of time series from algorithms used for cross-sectional
data. Two series may have a different length. Seeing the similarity may require that one se-
ries is shifted in time. If two series are very close at some point but take on a pronouncedly
different shape, one would not want to cluster them as similar. Dynamic time warping
(DTW) tackles these challenges. It only requires that the beginning and the end of the
time series are firmly matched, and allows all intermediate points to be shifted forward or
backward, to construct a better match. The method uses dynamic programming for the
purpose (Berndt and Clifford 1994).
In its basic form, this method is computationally very costly. The procedure may occa-
sionally even lead to pathological matches. Both motivate the imposition of constraints.
They limit the area that can be reached by the algorithm. We use the constraints pro-
posed by Cuturi (2011) and implemented in the dtwclust package as option sdtw (for “soft
DTW”), and allow for windows of size 2.1 The algorithm thus seeks for similarity in the
present period, but also two periods before and after. Given much of our experimental
1 As a rule of thumb, a window of about 10% of the length of the time series is sufficiently wide (Ratanama-
hatana and Keogh 2004, sec.2.1 with refs.).
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data has only ten periods, and experiences begin only in the second period, this window-
size seems appropriate for our data generating process.
Prototype extraction The purpose of clustering is grouping the data by somemea-
sure of proximity. Thiswould not be necessary if the datawithin each clusterwere perfectly
homogeneous. But ultimately, one wants to interpret the cluster. This requires defining a
prototype, an observed or constructed time series that best characterizes the cluster. If one
uses a partitional algorithm, the prototype is also used during the clustering process, as a
cluster centroid. We use the centroid based on soft DTW (sdtw_cent). The method uses
DTWmatches, rather than the raw data, to find the most characteristic time series, relying
on soft DTW as the starting point.
3.4 Data Generating Process
Linear Public Goods While we believe our method to be applicable more generally
for finding patterned heterogeneity in repeated, interactive experiments, our specific object
of investigation is a linear public good. The following profit function defines the game:




where π is profit of individual i in period t. Every period, the individual receives an en-
dowment e. She can keep the endowment or contribute c to the group’s public project.
Marginal per capita rate μ < 1 < Kμ creates the dilemma. As μ < 1, each individual is
best off keeping the entire endowment for herself. Yet as Kμ > 1, the group is best off if
all members contribute the entire endowment. Most frequently, e = 20,μ = .4,K = 4
have been chosen (Chaudhuri 2011; Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003). Then three loyal group
members still make a small profit. This serves as a buffer against the rapid decline of con-
tributions.
Simulated type space In their seminal paper, Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001)
argue that (in their one-shot version of this game) there are three types: freeriders, con-
ditional cooperators, and “hump-shaped” players. In his reanalysis of Fischbacher and
Gachter (2010), Engel (2020) further finds a small, but discernible fraction of altruists.
In their reanalysis of Fischbacher and Gachter (2010), Engel and Rockenbach (2020) use
a combination of belief and choice data to distinguish a fifth group, which they call far-
sighted free riders. In our simulations, we allow for these five types. We focus on a partner
design. Groups stay together for the full duration of the game. We always allow for an in-
dividual random effect ηi and residual error εit ⊥ ηi, which we both define to be normally
distributed with mean 0 and standard deviation .3 (∼ N (0, .3)). Thus, we implement the
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type space as defined in Table 3.1, where c−i,t−1 is the average contribution of the remaining
group members in the previous period.
We have two types that exhibit variance (between participants due to ηi, and within par-
ticipants due to εit), but that do not react to experiences: short-sighted freeriders and altru-
ists. The contributions of these types do also not have a trend. They are random walks,
albeit with opposed starting points. By contrast, the remaining three types are reactive,
which may depending on the choices of the remaining group members c−i,t−1, lead to a
trend. We have (true) conditional cooperators start in the middle of the action space. In
early periods (t < τ) far-sighted freeridersmimic conditional cooperators, but fromperiod
τ on, they freeride. Such participants “feed the cow” for a while, to then “start milking”
it.2 Finally, we simulate hump-shaped participants such that they start rather low, at 5, and
have them behave like conditional cooperators as long as the remaining groupmembers, in
the previous period, have on average not contributed more than half of the endowment.
If c−i,t−1 > 10, they exhibit a perverse reaction. The more others have contributed, the less
they contribute themselves.
Table 3.1: Simulated Type Space
type t = 1 t > 1
short-sighted freerider 0 0
far-sighted freerider 10 c−i,t−1 if t < τ0 if t ≥ τ
conditional cooperator 10 c−i,t−1
hump shaped 5 c−i,t−1 if c−i,t−1 ≤ 10−c−i,t−1 if c−i,t−1 > 10
altruist 20 20
We have groups of size K = 4, and we allow for n = 5 types. Participants choose their
contributions to the public good simultaneously, which is why their order does notmatter.
We consider the possibility that types are presentmore thanonce in a group. Hencewehave







(5 + 4 − 1)!
(5 − 1)!4!
= 70 (3.2)
different group combinations. In our simulations, we include each of these 70 combi-
nations of types four times.
2 In our simulations, we set τ = 5.
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3.5 Types versus Patterns
Confusion matrix Simulation is routinely employed to test the performance of an
estimator. One generates a data set where one knows ground truth and checks whether
a proposed estimator reasonably reconstructs the simulated parameters. If an alternative
estimator outperforms a competing estimator, one adopts the better performing method.
Simulation gives the researcher confidence in using an estimator with data where she does
not know ground truth.
When applied to our estimation problem, the seemingly straightforward criterion for
choosing an estimator would be the frequency of identifying the simulated types. Assessed
with this criterion, the results reported in Table 3.2 are sobering. Each of the five types is
precisely 224 times present in the dataset. Yet the size of the clusters ranges from 135 to 320.
All clusters except the third are fairly impure: participants from different simulated types
are put into the same cluster. In clusters 2 and 5, there is a prominent type, but it is not
in the majority. In cluster 4, the most prominent type (conditional cooperators) is in the
majority, but the cluster is tiny.
Yet it is most worrisome that, even knowing ground truth, it is hard to match clusters
with types. Numbers are printed in italic if the most frequent type per cluster, and the
most frequent cluster per type, coincide. In the example dataset, this holds for all types but
the hump-shaped players. But even if one were to use these possible unique matches, only
48.3% of all participants would be matched.
Table 3.2: Types vs. Clusters
cluster 1 2 3 4 5 Total
short-sighted freerider 48 140 0 0 36 224
hump shaped 24 60 0 58 82 224
conditional cooperator 0 60 28 77 59 224
altruist 0 0 224 0 0 224
far-sighted freerider 64 60 0 0 100 224
Total 136 320 252 135 277 1120
Clusters are patterns, not types Figure 3.1a shows why the attempt fails to val-
idate 5 clusters by comparing them with 5 simulated types. The algorithm visibly does a
good job at clustering the data. But it clusters patterns of observed contributions, and of
observed experiences. There is no one-to-one mapping of 5 patterns to 5 types. Cluster 1
collects choices when experiences are excellent, but choices are more selfish. This holds for
far-sighted freeriders, for hump-shaped players, and even for a few short-sighted freeriders
if they arematchedwith particularly cooperative types. Cluster 2 assembles individuals and
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groups that exhibit the classic downward trend, which can occur for all types but altruists.
Cluster 3 stresses unswerving cooperativeness, irrespective of experiences. This, of course,
holds for altruists and those conditional cooperators in a particularly cooperative environ-
ment. In cluster 4, reactive types manage to cooperate reasonably well, whether they are
conditional cooperators or hump shaped players. By contrast, cluster 5 assembles reactive
types that do not manage to sustain cooperation, at least not in the long run.
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cluster 1 2 3 4 5
(b) 5 Types in 5 Clusters
Figure 3.1: 5 Clusters for 5 Types on Simulated Data
It is even more instructive to consider which types are put into which clusters (Fig-
ure 3.1b). Altruists are in a cluster of their own (but some conditional cooperators are also
put into this cluster). All other types are distributed across multiple clusters. For condi-
tional cooperators, there is a close mapping between experiences and choices. Depending
on the quality of experiences, they are distributed over 4 clusters. For far-sighted freeriders,
the gap between their contributions once they start cashing in and experiences are critical.
This, in principle, also holds for hump shaped players. Yet if their contributions are rela-
tively high and reflected in their experiences, they are put into one cluster with a fraction
of conditional cooperators. Finally, short-sighted freeriders are split into three clusters, de-
pending on the cooperativeness of experiences.
Hence upon closer scrutiny, there is not a problem with the performance of the algo-
rithm. It just does not dowhat onemight have naïvely expected. The object of classification
is not types, but time series. Three of the types that we have simulated are reactive them-
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selves. Unless the environment exclusively consists of short-sighted freeriders or altruists
(which only holds for 2 of 70 simulated group compositions), individuals with a consistent
reaction function respond to various environments. If we impose 5 clusters, the algorithm
must distribute pairs of experiences and choices across these clusters as best it can.
If one allows for types to be reactive, one cannot directly infer reaction functions from
the data. Precisely because types are allowed to be reactive, the same reaction functionmay
lead to distinctly different choice patterns. Just considering choice patterns would be mis-
leading as well. One would miss the possibility that, in specific environments, multiple
types exhibit very similar behavior. In Figure 3.1a, the point is most forcefully illustrated by
the biggest cluster, cluster 2. Since overall cooperativeness is low in these groups, the choices
of conditional cooperators, hump-shaped players, far-sighted freeriders, and short-sighted
freeriders look very similar.
One needs an indirect strategy if one wants to infer potentially reactive types from the
data. The proximate object of discovery cannot be types. It must be two-dimensional pat-
terns, i.e., combinations of the development of experiences over timewith the development
of choices over time. The data can only inform the researcher about the distinct charac-
teristics of these patterns. As the next step in the research process, she must attempt to
rationalize these patterns.
Howmany patterns? From the foregoing, it is clear that one should expect more pat-
terns than types and hence should impose a number of clusters that is larger than 5. But
which is the optimal number? Aswe know the data generating process, with our simulated
data, we can derive the maximum from theory. In the dataset, we have 5 types who inter-
act in groups of 4. From (3.2) we know that this leads to 70 different group compositions.
Onemight think that the number of environments that a playermay face is smaller, as there
are only three others in the group. Yet others are potentially themselves reactive. Then the
choices the individual in question hasmade in the pastmay have influenced the experiences
she has herself made in subsequent periods. Theoretically there are consequently 5 types
·70 environments= 350 different patterns.
In the simulated data set, we have 1120 pairs of time-series for experiences and individual
choices. If it were necessary to estimate 350 clusters, there would be little more than 3 par-
ticipants per cluster, on average. The simulated dataset would be too small for the purpose.
More disturbingly, it would be challenging to compile a set of experimental data that is big
enough for this study’s ultimate goal: to find out whether there are untheorized types. In
the following, we show that a more parsimonious approach is both feasible and adequate.
It has the additional important advantage that it can be applied to datasets where ground
truth is unknown.
In machine learning language, one then faces a problem of unsupervised learning. “In-
ternal” cluster validation indices have been developed for this task. They strike a balance
between underfitting and overfitting the data. One does not want to miss information in
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the sample that is informative about the populationonewants tounderstand. On the other
hand one is concerned that one might assign meaning to noise. The following validation
indices have been developed for time series data:
• Silhouette index (Sil)3
• Dunn index (D)
• COP index (COP)
• Davies-Bouldin index (DB)
• modified Davies-Bouldin index (DB*)
• Calinski-Harabasz index (CH)
• Score Function (SF)
These CVIs differ by the emphasis they put on cluster cohesion over cluster separation;
whether they combine both parameters by way of summation or division; whether or not
they rely on normalization (for detail see Arbelaitz et al. 2013). As we have no strong con-
ceptual reasons to prefer oneCVI over the other, we employ allmethods and aggregate over
the outcomes to find the best number of clusters.4
Results are visualized in Figure C.1 in the Appendix.5 Visibly the indices do not all come
to the same conclusion. TheCH index has an earlymaximum. TheDB index declines with
few clusters but stabilizes from 14 clusters on. The SF index steadily grows until it reaches
16 clusters and then levels off. DBstar is relatively stable, but peaks at 32 clusters. The Sil
index exhibits a few occasional drops but otherwise is fairly stable. Except for a slight peak
at 10 clusters, the COP indexes also very stable. The D index has local ups and downs, but
a positive trend.
To find the optimal number of clusters in the face of this heterogeneity, we proceed as
follows: independently for each index, we rank the preferred number of clusters. Subse-
quently, separately for each number of clusters, we aggregate the ranks. It turns out that a
specification with 39 clusters ranks highest. It is followed by 36 and 40 clusters, which gives
us confidence that the optimal number of clusters is in this range.
3 Letters refer to the code in R package dtwclust.
4 As the clustering algorithmhas a randomstartingpoint, we repeat the comparisonwith tendifferent starting
points and use the mean index per CVI.
5 The Dunn index, the COP index, and the Davies-Bouldin index are to be minimized, while the remaining
indices require maximization. For comparability, the indices to be minimized are recoded.
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Howdotypes translate into patterns? Aswe have explained, we cannot use the
mapping between clusters and types to validate our estimation procedure. “Ground truth”
consists of pairs of experience and choice patterns. We are not aware of the formalizations
of such pairs. Yetwe can use simulated types to understand how the procedureworks. This
will helpwith interpretation if, with experimental data, wedonot knowreaction functions.
This step of the analysis serves two functions. At a more general level, it helps understand
pairs of experiences and choices as the object of investigation. We can use the patterns that
we observe in the simulation as a blueprint at a more specific level. If in the experimental
data, we find patterns that are dissimilar to all the 39 patterns shown in Figure 3.2, we know
that extant theory does not exhaust the type space. If such patterns are sufficiently frequent
in the experimental data, we know the gaps in the present understanding of the type space.
Figure 3.2 shows how types translate into two-dimensional patterns. The translation is
easiest to understand for types we know not to be reactive themselves, i.e., for altruists and
short-sighted freeriders. Altruists are dispersed over the first 7 clusters. Unsurprisingly,
their contributions (left panel) are always near the top; for them, only the noise terms cre-
ate variation. Yet the algorithm splits them up into clusters depending on the experiences
they make, i.e., depending on the characteristics of the environment. As we know the data
generating process, we can reconstruct how these environments originate.
In clusters 1 and 2, altruists are together with conditional cooperators. Experiences start
at a lower level but gradually move to the top. This pattern would not emerge in the pres-
ence of a far-sighted freerider: she would start cashing in and draw down experiences from
then on. The pattern could also not emerge in the presence of hump-shaped players: they
would react perversely right from the start. Finally, the pattern would be impossible in a
group with short-sighted freeriders: experiences could not reach the top. In clusters 3, 4,
and 5, the level of experiences is less good, but on average, experiences are relatively sta-
ble. This pattern can result if an altruist is alone in a group with others who are willing to
sustain a medium level of cooperation. They could be conditional cooperators or hump
shaped players. In all three clusters, a few times series have a kink in the middle. We know
that this kink is triggered by the presence of at least one far-sighted free rider. Yet as long as
the kink is not pronounced, the algorithm does not use it to characterize the cluster. This
is different with clusters 6 and 7. In these clusters, the kink dominates the shape of the
environment. These are groups with more than one far-sighted freerider.
On the lower endof the spectrum, short-sighted freeriders are spread over clusters 29–39.
Clusters 34–39 are exclusivelypopulatedbyparticipantswhomweknowtobe short-sighted
freeriders. We find themirror image to altruists. Clusters do not differ by participants’ own
choices: they are always near the bottom. The algorithm distributes participants over dif-
ferent clusters since they live in characteristically different environments. In clusters 36–39,
the average contributions of the remaining groupmembers start somewhere in the middle
and gradually deteriorate. This pattern results if sufficiently many of the group members
are reactive, be they conditional cooperators, hump-shaped, or far-sighted freeriders. In
58
clusters 34 and 35, contributions of others do not fall to the bottom and are reasonably sta-
ble. This pattern requires that others sustain cooperation in the face of exploitation. By the
design of the game, this is only possible if there is nomore than one short-sighted freerider
in the group. In clusters 29–33, the algorithm mixes short-sighted freeriders with differ-
ent types. These different types affect the level and shape of participants’ contributions:
they are slightly more positive than in clusters 33–39. Among themselves, clusters 29–33
differ from the experiences participants make. These experiences are poor and declining in
clusters 30–32, but very favorable in cluster 29.
There are only 5 clusters that exclusively consist of conditional cooperators, clusters 8, 9,
11, 15, and 22. In clusters 1, 2, and 7, they are put togetherwith altruists. In clusters 12–14 and
16, they are classified together with hump-shaped players. In cluster 21, they are together
with far-sighted freeriders. In cluster 33, they are together with short-sighted freeriders.
Clusters 10, 17, and 23–25 mix themwith even more types. This forceful shows: an entirely
reactive type is most challenging to infer from the choices she makes, combined with the
choices to which she reacts. Yet another characteristic is worth noting. If there are con-
ditional cooperators in a cluster, contributions and experiences resemble each other very
closely. Like chameleons, participants adapt to the local environment. If this environment
is cooperation friendly (clusters 1–2), so are the conditional cooperators. If the level of co-
operation is not perfect, but reasonably high (cluster 8, 14, 15, and 16), this is what they
match. If far-sighted freeriders start cashing in (clusters 11, 12, 21, and 22), they follow suit.
If cooperation quickly fades out (clusters 13, 17, 23–25), this is how they behave as well. The
near perfect match between choices and experiences is how this type can be inferred from
the data.
Whenever there is a kink in experiences, there is at least one far-sighted freerider in the
group. But the inverse does not hold. The fact that there is a kink in contributions does
not imply that the participant in question is a far-sighted freerider. She may instead be a
conditional cooperator (clusters 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 21, 22) or a hump-shaped player (clusters
10, 12, 21), who reacts to the choices of one or more far-sighted freeriders. As these two
types are reactive as well, experiences may also exhibit a kink when the player in question
is indeed a far-sighted freerider (clusters 18 and 19). There is, however, a way to identify
far-sighted freeriders from the data. This is straightforward if experiences are stable, and
only the participant in question reduces contributions (cluster 20). More frequently, the
cue is more subtle: the participant’s contributions decay earlier than experiences (clusters
10, 18, 19).
Hump-shaped players are most easily identified if they react inversely to experiences.
This happens if the mean contributions of others fall below the threshold (which we have
simulated to be at 10). Then they swap strategies and start (re-)stabilizing cooperation (clus-
ters 26 and 27). Yet if the cooperation level is poor in the first place, hump-shaped players
just behave like conditional cooperators, and are hard to distinguish from them (clusters




Section 3.5 has demonstrated inwhichways, in a linear public good, a pair of two timeseries
is related to the reaction function of a participant. The development of choices over time
must be seen in the light of the development of experiences this participant has made. As
we have explained, there is no one-to-one mapping between this two-dimensional times
series and the reaction function, and hence the participant’s type. Yet we have shown in
which indirect ways the type can be inferred. As we expect the type space to be limited,
we use clustering (of two-dimensional time series data) to organize the evidence. This gives
us a methodology for the ultimate purpose of writing this paper: we want to infer from
clustering real, experimental data whether the true type space differs from, or is richer than,
the five types that have already been established and theorized.
Table 3.3: Informa on on Experimental Studies Included
study period endowment group size MPCR subjects
Diederich, Goeschl, and Waichman (2016) 7 40 10 0.3 360
Diederich, Goeschl, and Waichman (2016) 7 40 40 0.3 200
Diederich, Goeschl, and Waichman (2016) 7 40 100 0.3 500
Diederich, Goeschl, and Waichman (2016) 7 1, 000 10 0.3 50
Engel and Kurschilgen (2013) 30 20 4 0.4 44
Engel and Kurschilgen (2014) 30 20 4 0.4 48
Engel and Kurschilgen (2020) 30 20 4 0.4 48
Engel and Rockenbach (2020) 20 20 3 0.4 30
Engel, Kube, and Kurschilgen (2020) 10 20 4 0.4 96
Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2009) 20 20 4 0.4 40
Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2009) 20 20 4 0.6 176
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) 10 20 4 0.5 24
Data Table 3.3 defines the dataset. We only use data from linear public goods without
any experimental intervention, i.e. data from voluntary contribution mechanisms. We
have a total of 18,090 observations from 1,616 participants. As participants have not yet
made any experiences in the first round, we only use data from the second round on, which
gives us 16,474 usable datapoints. Figure 3.3 visually represents the dataset. On average,
all experiments featured in the dataset exhibit the characteristic negative time trend. Yet
there is considerable variance. The level of cooperativeness is differently high. The decay
in cooperation is differently steep. In one experiment, contributions are even almost stable
over time. We see this variance as an advantage. It gives usmore scope for finding unknown
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Figure 3.3: Means of Par cipants’ Contribu ons by Study
Clustering Section 3.5 shows that, for finding reactive types, one needs a sufficiently
large number of clusters. With simulated data, 39 clusters have proven the best amount.
Our strategy for finding hitherto unknown types relies on a comparison between simu-
lated data patterns and the patterns generated by the otherwise same methodology with
experimental data. This is why we use the same algorithm, with the same parameters, and
have it organize the data into 40 clusters.
Table 3.4: Size of Experimental Clusters
cluster 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
size 44 54 43 69 20 28 20 15 6 15
cluster 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
size 20 21 18 17 4 14 16 50 52 32
cluster 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
size 75 104 35 89 30 45 18 56 25 18
cluster 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
size 99 31 55 87 26 91 61 21 58 34
As a comparison of Figure 3.2 with Figure 3.5 shows, in the experimental data there is
considerably more variance between individuals than in the simulated data. In the interest
of facilitating interpretation, we, therefore, exploit that the clustering algorithm not only
assigns participants to clusters. It also, separately for each cluster, defines a prototype, using
the centroid. These prototypes (of choices combined with experiences) are collected in
Figure 3.4. We focus on this graph.
A few of the experimental clusters resemble clusters in the simulated data. Cluster 1 (ex-
perimental) is similar to clusters 1 and 2 (simulated). Cluster 2 (experimental) is similar to
Cluster 3, 4, and 5 (simulated). Cluster 6 (experimental) is related to Cluster 11 (simulated).
Clusters 37 and 40 (experimental) are comparable to clusters 34 and 35 (simulated). Yet,
the prototypes of many experimental clusters are completely different from the simulated
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clusters. Moreover, even if a cluster is comparable in some respect, it is dissimilar in an
important other respect.
Interpreting the five biggest clusters We start discussing the true type space
with the five most frequent clusters. In the biggest cluster 22 (104 groups), groups success-
fully coordinate in themiddle of the action space. This also holds for the player in question.
Yet her choices exhibit considerably more variance (Figure 3.5). In the most characteristic
time series of individual choices (the centroid), contributions increase slightly in the second
half of the game but go back to themidpoint in the end. Different deviations are present in
the raw data (Figure 3.5), but deviations from themiddle tend to be small. In principle, this
pattern could result from conditional cooperation. However, the centroid suggests that de-
viations to higher contributions are not just noise, but systematic. Such deviations cannot
be explained bypure conditional cooperation. The choice programmust go beyondmerely
matching (reasonably favorable) experiences. A potential motive is signaling. Participants
who are willing to cooperate themselves signal others that the whole group could do even
better, by shifting to a higher level of contributions. This would be participants who are
unwilling to be exploited and therefore go back to the way how others react to the initia-
tive. But in their perspective, this would only be the second best outcome. They give in
to the implicit message they receive from the rest of the group: we are not willing to invest
even more in the joint project.
The second biggest cluster 31 (99 groups) looks like the classic pattern from VCM ex-
periments: choices and experiences decay over several initial periods, and almost reach the
bottom. Clusters 13, 23, 24 of the simulated data exhibit a comparable pattern. Yet one
difference is worth noting. Individual choices stay in the area of experiences but are sys-
tematically lower. There are two possible interpretations. Fischbacher and Gachter (2010)
have suggested the possibility of conditional cooperation being imperfect. In their reanal-
ysis of Fischbacher &Gächter’s data, Engel andRockenbach (2020) argue that the seeming
imperfection results from the choices made by far-sighted freeriders. In the simulations,
this type has been modeled as participants perfectly mimicking conditional cooperation
until a specific period. For rationalizing cluster 31, one would need an alternative defini-
tion of the type. Selfish participants would never perfectly condition their contributions
to experiences. Theywould just stay close enough so that truly cooperative groupmembers
can assign a lower overall level of contributions to noise.
Participants assigned to the third biggest cluster 36 (91 groups) exploit more cooperative
group members: their contributions are systematically below experiences. Nevertheless,
their choices are not at or near the bottom. In the beginning, they even increase contribu-
tions. At some later point (at period 7 in the centroid), they increase contributions even
further to decrease them. This pattern can be rationalized by the intention to exploit the
groupwhile beingwary that others could lose faith if the overall level of contributions looks
too poor. This would be super smart free riders. They invest in sustaining the cooperative-
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ness of the remaining group members that they intend to exploit continuously.
In the fourth biggest cluster 24 (89 groups), experiences are almost entirely stable, at an
intermediate level. However, the participant reacts to this stability with pronounced insta-
bility. In the centroid, the participant reduces contributions for two periods and then goes
back to the group’s cooperation level. None of the five simulated types could rationalize
this behavior. Two plausible choice programs could generate this behavior. One option is
a far-sighted freerider who tries to exploit the group but is afraid that further exploitation
would not be tolerated. Alternatively, participants who in principle are willing to cooper-
ate want to test the waters, or fall into temptation for that matter, but lose courage.
The fifth biggest cluster 34 (87 groups) is also best explained bymodified free-riding. For
most of the experiments, experiences are almost entirely stable, at an intermediate level.
However, choices deteriorate in the first periods, remain stable at a level below experiences,
and further decay by the end of the game. It is only at this point that experiences slightly
decay as well. This could be the behavior of a person intending to exploit the group. She
might hold the opinion that contributions slightly below experiences will not induce co-
operative participants to reduce contributions. In this perspective, the initial decay results
from learning. A selfish participant believes that she can somewhat reduce her contribu-
tions without putting the cooperativeness of the truly cooperative participants at risk. By
the end of the game, she sees no point in further sustaining cooperativeness. A slight de-
cay in the contributions of others would no longer outweigh the additional cost of their
contributions.
Families of clusters In Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 we have ordered the 40 clusters such
that family resemblance becomes visible. In clusters 1–5, the participant is very cooperative.
In cluster 1, individual and social cooperativeness match nearly perfectly. Now the partic-
ipant in question increases her contributions over the first periods. This excludes that she
is genuinely cooperative; she is not an altruist in the sense of the simulation. The pattern
can be rationalized by perfect conditional cooperation. By contrast, choices in clusters 2–5
are substantially higher than experiences. However, choices are only very close to the top
throughout in cluster 2. In clusters 3–5, choices increase for the initial periods. They de-
crease in the end. In the centroid of cluster 5 there is also a dip at an intermediate period. In
cluster 4, choices never reach the top. None of clusters 2–5 could result from conditional
cooperation. Yet choices can also not be explained by altruism. Otherwise, choices would
have to be at the top continuously. These choice patterns suggest a missing hero attitude.
Participants want to save the entire group by inducing all others to make higher contri-
butions. The lower contributions in the first rounds would result from doubt whether
cooperation is possible in this group. The participant in question would conclude that the
overall level of cooperation is high enough to invest in sustaining a high level of coopera-
tion worth making. The decay of contributions in the final periods, observed in clusters
3–5, supports this explanation. The later in the game, the lower the expected payoff from
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any further investment.
Choices in the two clusters of the second family (clusters 6 and 7) look very similar.
Choices quickly move to the top (cluster 6) or to a very high level (cluster 7), and stay high
until close to the end. Yet experiences are very different. In cluster 6, they are very high,
while they are rather low in cluster 7. The pattern of choices and experiences in cluster 6
could result from either conditional cooperation or a very patient version of a far-sighted
freerider. By contrast, in cluster 7, the participant in question contributes high above ex-
periences throughout the game. This pattern can only be generated by a participant who
wants to save her group, maybe also intends to educate the other groupmembers. We have
put both clusters into the same family to signal that the samebehavioral programmight also
be at work in cluster 6, with the only difference being the susceptibility of the remaining
group members to the benevolent intervention.
The characteristic feature of the third family of clusters (clusters 7–9) is contributions
that start high, go low, and recover. In clusters 8–9, these choices are observed when ex-
periences are stable at an intermediate level. In cluster 10, experiences slightly decay over
time. None of the simulated types can rationalize these choice patterns. All three clusters
are relatively small. We can, therefore, not exclude that participants did not follow a con-
sistent choice program. Yet the behaviormight be rationalized by exploration. Participants
might want to find out, at a potential cost to themselves, whether they canmake evenmore
money by reducing contributions. Explorationwould not be irrational as participants have
no direct information about the choice programs followed by the remaining group mem-
bers.
In the fourth family (clusters 11 and 12), experiences are stable at an intermediate level.
The characteristic feature of this family is contributions that start high, fall reasonably low,
and recover. Again none of the simulated types can generate this behavior. It could, as in
the previous family of clusters, result from exploration. But there is also a motivational
option for rationalizing these choices. Participants would initially be falling for the self-
ish temptation. But when they realize that the remaining members do not retaliate, they
repent.
In the fifth family (clusters 13–17), not only choices zigzag; so do experiences. This be-
havior may result from a very narrow definition of conditional cooperation in a noisy envi-
ronment. While we cannot exclude this interpretation, we deem an alternative explanation
more likely. Participants refrain from formulating a choice program, and instead adopt the
heuristic “follow the crowd”.
The sixth family is fairly large. It encompasses clusters 18–25, and 467 participants. Ex-
periences are fairly stable at an intermediate level. In most of these clusters, experiences are
also relatively uniform, except for cluster 25 and, to a lesser extent, cluster 18. Clusters differ
by the most characteristic individual choice pattern, i.e., the centroid. In cluster 25, one
may argue that choices mirror experiences. Therefore, it is conceivable that choices have
been motivated by a narrow reading of conditional cooperation, or by the heuristic “fol-
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low the crowd”. Yet neither explanation works for clusters 18–24. We have already offered
explanations for the choices in clusters 22 and 24. There are differences in the beginning.
Contributions go down in clusters 18, 21, 23 and 25, and up in clusters 19, 20, and 22. An
explanation for choices at the beginning of the game might be a stepwise adaptation to
experiences. This would not be irrational. When they decide about their contributions,
participants do not know how experiences will develop over time. They might cautiously
move into the direction of experiences butwould not do so entirely until they have received
repeated information about the level of cooperation in their group. There are even more
pronounced differences in the end. Contributions go down in clusters 18, 20 and 22, and
up in clusters 19 and 23. In the end of cluster 24, contributions go first down and then
up again. In the end of cluster 25, contributions go first up and then down. The fact that
choices deteriorate in the end could be explained if participants interpret positive contri-
butions as an investment in their group’s cooperativeness. This would be the same motive
as in the first family of clusters. The investment would only be muchmore moderate. The
participant only refrains from exploiting her peers. The choice pattern in cluster 24 could
result from a far-sighted freerider who repents. The upward trend in the end of cluster 19 is
most peculiar. In the final period, choices even go above experiences. The raw data demon-
strate that this upward trend is actually the characteristic feature of the entire cluster and
not just noise. It could be explained by the intention to reward group members for their
loyalty.
We have put cluster 26 in a family on its own as it has little resemblance to any other
cluster. Experiences are reasonably stable, at an intermediate level. Yet choices first go up,
almost from bottom to top. They stay above experiences for a while, start falling, and al-
most reach the bottom in the end. Forty-five participants are sorted into this cluster. The
raw data show variance in the exact shape of contributions. But there is always a low begin-
ning, a high plateau, and contributions gradually falling in the end. As choices stay high
above experiences for quite someperiods, the pattern is unlikely to result from some variant
of far-sighted free-riding. One would need a very contrived subjective theory of the reac-
tions of the remaining group members to explain why the participant in question deems
it necessary to contribute that much, only to make sure that the contributions of the re-
maining groupmembers do not fall below an intermediate level. Repent is also not a likely
explanation. It could motivate why a participant overcompensates early exploitation. But
would not explain why contributions steadily fall, and are way below experiences, by the
end of the game. One consistent explanation would be this: initially, the participant holds
the belief that, in this game, everybody will be selfish and hence contribute 0. She learns
that this is not how others in her group behave. She needs the initial periods to be con-
vinced that the cooperative behavior of others is indeed steadfast. She considers it unfair
that, due to her error, she has exploited the remaining groupmembers in early rounds, and
wants to compensate them by even contributing more than others for several periods. Yet
the motive for making high contributions would not be to save the group or to be overly
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generous. She just wants tomake the rest of the groupwhole. Once this has been achieved,
she starts increasing her payoff.
The eighth family comprises clusters 27–31. The family resemblance stems from the fact
that contributions start high but fall over time, even to the bottom, in some clusters. There
are clear differences between the clusters in this family, though, in the experiences these par-
ticipants make. We have already discussed the biggest cluster in the family, cluster 31. It can
be rationalised with a variant of far-sighted free-riding. The same explanationmight hold a
fortiori for cluster 30: in this cluster, individual contributions are even further below expe-
riences from the fourth period on. It is rather unlikely that conditional cooperation would
be that imperfect, while the pattern of choices fits a free rider who has come to the conclu-
sion that sufficiently many loyal members will tolerate exploitation. Cluster 29 looks more
like conditional cooperators losing faith, after an initial attempt at raising the contribution
level. Participants put into cluster 27 are willing to exploit the group. But they do not
contribute 0 right away. Instead, they gradually reduce contributions. This suggests yet
another variant of five-sighted free-riding: participants test what they can get away with,
without killing the cow theywant tomilk. Although choices in clusters 27 and 28 look sim-
ilar, the level of experiences in cluster 28 calls for a different explanation. As participants
initially contribute substantially above experiences, their beliefs about the reaction func-
tions of the remaining groupmembers would have to be reasonably contrived tomake this
choice pattern optimal for a participant who wants to maximise income. A more likely ex-
planation is a participant who tries to raise the contribution level, realises that the group is
not responsive, and stops investing in cooperativeness once she considers the cost of invest-
ment (by not maximising her own payoff) to be out of proportion, given the low number
of periods to come.
In the ninth family, consisting of clusters 32–34, contributions also decay over time. We
have already discussed themost significant cluster in this family, cluster 34, and have offered
a free-riding cum learning story. This interpretation could also hold for cluster 33. But
the behavioral pattern could alternatively result from participants who are cooperation-
minded themselves and try to make others cooperate as well. In cluster 32, choices initially
drop faster than experiences. But then the participant changes gears, to later again sharply
reduce contributions. The initial reduction in contributions suggests selfish motives. The
sizeable increase in intermediate periods would then have to be motivated by an attempt
at convincing others to contribute more. The participant would reason: if the decay con-
tinues, I will make less money than if I create the impression for others that cooperation is
worth the while. This reasoning would be consistent if the participant in question expects
others to be reactive, be they pure conditional cooperators, or other far-sighted freeriders.
Cluster 35 is very different from all remaining clusters. Participants contribute nothing
up to some point in time. Then contributions raise to the top, as do experiences. A con-
sistent explanation is a group of conditional cooperators who are all overly pessimistic. As
soon as one of them gives it a try, the remaining group members immediately jump on.
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The penultimate family consists of clusters 36–38. We have already discussed cluster 36
and offered a prevoyant form of free-riding: participants invest in sustaining cooperation
to expect a steady stream of income slightly above average. The same explanation might
hold for cluster 38, while cluster 37 looks more like classic, short-sighted free-riding.
In the final family, consisting of clusters 39 and 40, experiences are fairly poor, and
choices are even weaker. Except for the slight decay in the beginning, cluster 40 looks like
straightforward, short-sighted free riding. Recall that this is the prediction of standard the-
ory. Actually, the algorithm only puts 34 participants, or little more than 2% of the sample,
into this cluster. Already cluster 39 requires amodified behavioral program. It could be im-
perfect conditional cooperation, or a variant of far-sighted free-riding.
3.7 Conclusion
The linear public good is one of the workhorses of behavioral economics. Hundreds of
experiments have been run with this paradigm. The design is appealing as, in a stylized
way, it captures what arguably is the essence of many conflicts of life, running from the
degradation of the environment over the instability of a cartel to the precarious nature of
any constraining institutional framework. The design implements a multi-person, multi-
period prisoners dilemma with a known end. If one assumes that actors exclusively max-
imize individual profit, the repeated game has a unique solution. In the final period, all
group members will contribute nothing to the joint project. Through unraveling, this is
also the prediction for any earlier period.
The first experiments undertaken with this design have already refuted this prediction.
On average, contributions start at some higher level but decay over time. Per se, social pref-
erences can rationalize positive contributions, but they do not predict the decay. Interest-
ingly, per se the prominent concept of conditional cooperation cannot predict the decay
either. If all group members are perfect conditional cooperators and expect all others to
follow the same behavioral program, any level of cooperation can be sustained, depending
on initial beliefs. Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) propose a consistent explanation: the
decay could result from conditional cooperation being imperfect. Participants would be
willing to let themselves be guided by the level of cooperativeness in their group. But they
would always try to undercut slightly. In their reanalysis of Fischbacher’s and Gächter’s
data, Engel and Rockenbach (2020) have shown that true conditional cooperation is near-
perfect. The decay results from heterogeneity. The combination of choice data with belief
data shows that the decay results from the presence of short- and far-sighted freeriders. This
is where the present project starts. It uses machine learning methods to cast light on this
heterogeneity, and chart the type space.
The paper makes a methodological and a substantive contribution. On the methodol-
ogy side, it shows in which ways clustering can be used to infer the composition of the type
space. On the substantive side, it shows that existing theories about behavioral types can
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Figure 3.5: Experimental Data Clustered
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only explain a very narrow fraction of the data.
Repeated experiments generate time series data. In principle, the large family of algo-
rithms for clustering time series data is therefore appropriate. Based on a pilot, we select an
algorithmic configuration known to have excellent performance. Yet, contributions could
not exhibit a downward trend unless at least some participants hold a reactive choice pro-
gram. If we were to deprive the algorithm of the experiences that participants make, it
would lump together choice patterns generated by entirely different behavioral programs.
This is why we use multivariate clustering and feed the algorithmwith pairs of experiences
and choices.
Onemight naïvely think that the algorithmwill find asmany clusters as there are distinct
behavioral programs. With simulation, we show why this approach must fail. We simu-
late all combinations of five behavioral programs that have been theorized in the literature:
altruists, conditional cooperators, far-sighted freeriders, hump-shaped contributors, and
short-sighted freeriders. For investigating these five behavioral programs, we need many
more clusters. Yet we also show that we do not need the theoretical maximum of 350 clus-
ters; this would approach next to unusable for real data, as one would need a considerable
amount of data for that many clusters to be credible. We use internal cluster validation
indices to determine that the appropriate trade-off between underusing and overusing the
evidence is reached with approximately 40 clusters. Some of these clusters are indeed pure,
in the sense that all combinations of experiences and choices stem from participants of the
same simulated type. Yet many are not, as different behavioral problems may generate in-
distinguishable behavior. We do not see this as a limitation of the approach. Instead, it
demonstrateswhat can be achievedwith clustering: one is informed about distinct patterns
and must discuss whether they could be generated with alternative behavioral programs.
We apply this methodology to a large dataset consisting of 16,474 observations. Results
clearly show that the true type space is much more abundant than thus far assumed by the
literature. Only very few of the clusters that we find in the experimental data can be ratio-
nalized with any of the five theoretical behavioral programs used to simulate data. We find
practically no altruists and only very few outright selfish participants. Very few participants
are near-perfectly reactive, as assumed by the canonical model of conditional cooperation.
No cluster requires the assumption that players are hump-shaped, and perversely react to
good experiences.
On the motivational side, the observed clusters suggest that some participants try to ed-
ucate the remaining group members. Relatively many clusters can be rationalized by the
intention to invest in the cooperativeness of the group (and to stop doing that if the oppor-
tunity cost no longer outweighs the expected benefit). Some participants seem to repent
that they have exploited their peers, compensate them for the harm they have inflicted on
them, or even want to reward them for their cooperativeness.
On the cognitive side, quite some choice patterns are consistent with exploration. Ini-
tially, participants are unsure about the behavioral programs implemented by their peers.
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They only gradually adapt as they becomemore confident about the inferences they make.
It seems that participants intending to exploit the group cautiously test which degree of
exploitation will still be tolerated by the remaining groupmembers. Other clusters suggest
that participants choose by heuristic and mimic the experiences they have made.
The type space is considerably more abundant than typically assumed in the behavioral
literature. Further work is needed to understand the observed behavioral patterns. In the
next step, behavioral programs that could rationalize the observed patterns should be the-
orized and rigorously tested. This investigation is urgent if one hopes to learn from ex-
perimental data about the behavioral determinants of social dilemmata, in the interest of
designing more powerful interventions.
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What a moderate interpretation of the text? Halfway
between what it really means and what you’d like it to
mean?
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
4
Text Classification of Ideological Direction
in Judicial Opinions
This paper draws onmachine learningmethods for text classification to predict the ideolog-
ical direction of decisions from the associated text. Using a 5% hand-coded sample of cases
from U.S. circuit courts, we explore and evaluate a variety of machine classifiers to predict
“conservative decision” or “liberal decision” in held-out data. Our best classifier is highly
predictive (F1 = .67) and allows us to extrapolate ideological direction to the full sample.
We then use these predictions to replicate and extend Landes and Posner (2011) analysis of
how the party of the nominating president influences circuit judges’ votes.
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4.1 Introduction
In theUnitedStates, judgeswield significantpowerdue to the common law system(Dainow
1966). The extent of U.S. judges’ influence is a motivation for the extensive research into
the determinants of judicial decision-making. In particular, there is a large literature on
how opinions are affected by the ideology of the respective judge (Martin andQuinn 2002;
Martin, Quinn, and Epstein 2005; Segal et al. 1995).
A leading paper in this literature is Landes and Posner (2011). This paper looks at how
the party affiliation of U.S. circuit court judges affects the political ideology of their votes
(conservative or liberal) on the court. While judges are nominally non-partisan, party af-
filiation can be proxied by the party of the appointing president or the party share in the
Senate at the time of appointment. Landes and Posner (2011) show that judge party affilia-
tion is statistically related to the ideological direction of votes.
For their empirical analysis, Landes and Posner (2011) draw upon the Songer database
of U.S. circuit courts,1 which provides rich metadata, e.g., the political ideology of votes
for each judge in each case. The classification of votes by ideological direction was a labor-
intensive exercise which has led to frequent use in the empirical legal studies and political
science literatures (Ginn, Searles, and Jones 2015; Landes and Posner 2011; Reid and Ran-
dazzo 2016).
Notwithstanding its broad use in the literature, the Songer database has some limita-
tions. First, the political ideology classification has been assigned by human coders, which
could be error-prone. These errors add noise to regressions and complicate replicability.
In particular, as noted by Landes and Posner (2011), the political positions of conserva-
tive/liberal are not constant over time. Therefore, data coded in the past may not be cat-
egorized correctly, and Songer Project ideology labels for older circuit court opinions may
be systematically incorrect.
Another problemwith the database is the sampling approach. First, the database is only
available for 1925–2002, so that empirical analysis of vote ideology is only possible for that
time period. Second, only a small set of cases was labeled (just 5% of the cases for those
years). Finally, the authors used stratified sampling to get labels for similar numbers of
opinions across courts and time. Therefore, the dataset is not representative of the full
distribution of circuit court cases.
The goal of this paper is to address these shortcomings using machine learning and nat-
ural language processing techniques. The idea is to treat a machine to code the ideological
direction of the votes. Within the set of labeled cases, we can check howwell the algorithm
replicates human labels.
The classifierwould provide a number of benefits. As soon as the classifier is trained, pre-
dictions even for an extremely large sample cost very little relative to hand-labeling (which
require a human to read an opinion). We could potentially take the classifier to cases before
1 The original, as well as the extended versions, are available at songerproject.org.
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1925 and after 2002. Within the 1925–2002 period, we could classify the other 95% of un-
labeled cases. Besides producing new labels, the classifier could be used to audit and check
existing labels for probable errors.
In this paper, we produce such a model. For the sake of interpretability, we focus on
linearmodels. Themodelwhichworked best in our setting is aRidgeClassifier. Ourmodel
is trained on the complete opinion text in combination with the circuit, year, and case type
data. After optimization it achieves a cross-validated accuracy of 61.5% on the three-label
input and 66.5% on the two-label subset. The final calibrated classifier working on the two-
label subset achieves the same accuracy score while increasing its precision as well its recall
on the test set to 71.1% and 72.4% respectively.
With a validated dataset in hand, we use it to undertake an extended replication of Lan-
des and Posner (2011). First, we do our best to replicate the original paper and, despite
some problems in replicating the original dataset, we could replicate significance as well as
the direction of the most important coefficients. We extend the results and probe their ro-
bustness to multi-way clustering, group, and additional covariates. Finally, we show that
the results hold partlywhen using ourmachine-predicted ideological labels as the outcome.
This paper contributes to the emerging literature applying data science techniques to
empirical legal research questions. We review some of that literature in section 4.2. After
that, in section 4.3, we describe the supervised learning task to predict ideological labels
in circuit court decisions. Next, section 4.4 reports the results of our replication study.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature
This research sits at the intersection of two literatures. On one side, our paper is related to
the research on judge ideology, which is focused on the positioning of judges,mostly for the
U.S. Supreme Court (Epstein et al. 2012; Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers 2001; Ginn, Searles,
and Jones 2015; Johnson, Songer, and Jilani 2011; Kassow, Songer, and Fix 2012; Martin
and Quinn 2001; Masood and Songer 2013; Randazzo, Waterman, and Fix 2011; Reid and
Randazzo 2016; Sturm and Pritchett 1949).
The judge ideology literature has taken two main approaches. The first approach is
to hand-code cases by ideological direction. These include the Spaeth database for the
Supreme Court and the Songer database for the circuit courts (Epstein et al. 2012; Giles,
Hettinger, and Peppers 2001; Martin andQuinn 2001; Sturm and Pritchett 1949). The sec-
ond approach is to use a latent factor model based on the voting behavior, to estimate a la-
tent dimension for ideology based on judge agreement. This approach can identifymedian
judges and the relative judge positioning on a scale over time (Martin and Quinn 2002).
The advantage of the first approach is that the scale is interpretable, exists on the case
level, and relies on expert judgment. However, it is costly, and there are errors in coding.
The advantage of the second approach is that it is cheap to compute for all judges, but the
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scale is not directly interpretable and does not exist at the case level. The scale also requires
that judges vote in panels.
Our approach is something of a compromise, as we can formpredictions for all cases and
judges cheaply. It requires at least some hand-coding, but then can be applied to all cases.
Methodologically, it is different because it uses the directly interpretable ideological labels
of the hand-coded database. It does not assume a latent factor model, like Martin-Quinn.
It also does not rely on contrasting votes of judges in a panel. This is relevant in our context
because the large majority of decisions on the appellate courts do not have dissents. Voting
behavior is not necessary, only some hand labels and the original opinion text.
The second literature to which we contribute is that on using texts as data for social sci-
ence research. In particular, we contribute to that literature which uses texts to produce
measures of ideology or partisanship. In law, an old study in this vein is Segal et al. (1995),
who use texts from newspaper editorials as a proxy for the ideology of newly appointed
Supreme Court judges. More recently, popular methods in political science for scoring
ideology in text includeWordscores (Laver, Benoit, andGarry 2003),Wordfish (Slapin and
Proksch 2008), and Wordshoal (Lauderdale and Herzog 2016). These tools use statistical
differences in word frequencies by topic. They are most useful for text corpora for which
differences in ideology come through in different words. As opinions of (lower) judicial
courts are constrained in their (permitted) wording opinion texts may only satisfy that cri-
terion in a very limited fashion.
In the legal domain, our paper is most closely related to literature predicting case type
(Boella et al. 2012; Sulea et al. 2017; Undavia, Meyers, and Ortega 2018) and that concerned
with dimensions in judicial texts (Ash and Chen 2019; Ash, Chen, and Lu 2018). The three
papers closest to ours, in goal as well as methodological approach, are by Lauderdale and
Clark (2014), Aletras et al. (2016), and Cao, Ash, and Chen (2018). In Lauderdale and Clark
(2014), the authors use an LDA model to estimate how different issues at stake in cases are
related to Supreme Court judges’ voting behavior. The paper by Aletras et al. (2016) looks
at decision direction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in regard to the
violation of specific articles. The third paper, Cao, Ash, andChen (2018), separates opinion
texts into ideological and fact-driven parts, and look at howwell these different paragraphs
predict case directionality. However, noneof the approaches in those three papers are viable
for our goal or dataset. Lauderdale andClark (2014) use the underlying text, but their focus
on votes means that the approach is not applicable. In the case of Aletras et al. (2016), in a
modelling perspective the approach is similar. However, their results rely on very clean data
resulting in a very homogeneous directionality criterion. As a consequence, it is more than
a simple question of transferring their results. Last, the paper byCao, Ash, andChen (2018)
does look at ideological directionality. The focus on paragraphs, however, means that an
additional labeling effort is needed while we seek to minimize the costs of classification.
To recap, our paper contributes in the technical literature to the understanding how to
best implement a machine learning approach in the domain of judicial opinions. We aim
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to decrease labeling cost and increase scalability and reproducibility compared to the hand-
labeling approach while at the same time improving explainability relative to the latent
modeling approach.
4.3 Supervised Classification
This section focuses on the classification algorithm which can reliably predict the political
ideology of circuit court judges’ written opinions. After training the algorithm on exist-
ing ideology labels, it can predict labels for unseen opinions. The beginning of this section
provides information about the data necessary for classification. What follows is a detailed
description of how the classifier is trained. Finally, the classification performance is evalu-
ated.
4.3.1 Data
Broadly speaking, a supervised machine learning classifier maps an input to output. This
section enumerates the datasets used for the inputs and outputs in our context. For our
classification problem, we use the hand-coded ideology labels for these cases, provided by
the Songer Project, as output. As input we use the U.S. circuit court judges’ written opin-
ions.
Songer Data on Decision Direction. The output or label of our classifier is the
ideological direction of the opinion. As the number of circuit court judges’ opinions is
over 300 thousand, the Songer Project has annotated political ideology labels for only a
small sample of opinions, equalling less than 2.6% of the total published opinions avail-
able. The total is 769, 986 when only taking those not decided per curiam into account.
The cases were decided between 1925 and 2002 and the database contains a total of 20, 355
cases. Overall, four directionality codes are available: “liberal“, “conservative“, “mixed“
and “not ascertained“. While “mixed“ refers to the opinion of the case being of unclear di-
rectionality, “not ascertained“ signals that the coderswere unable to assign a label according
to the codebook’s instructions. Please note that directionality is defined for each particular
case type, with “conservative” and “liberal” being exactly opposite outcomes. Figure 4.1a
shows the distribution of labels for the complete dataset. The categories “conservative” and
“liberal” dominate, whereas the other two categories are underrepresented.
The Songer coders assigned the directionality of a case according to specific rules within
case type. The case type of an opinion identifies the nature of the conflict between the
litigants. Over 220 case type categories are organized into eight major categories: criminal,
civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, labor relations, economic activity and
regulation, as well as miscellaneous. Figure 4.1b shows the distribution of the eight major
categories for our dataset. “Civil rights” and “economic activity and regulation” are the two
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Figure 4.1: Summary Sta s cs
Landes andPosner (2011)mention in their paper that they applied substantial corrections
to the raw Songer data, but those are not laid out in sufficient detail to reproduce. We
approached the authors with the request to provide us with their version of the dataset.
Unfortunately, they were not able to provide it yet.
JudicialOpinionCorpus. Wematched the Songerdatasetwith theLexis dataset, con-
taining the full opinion text. With this approach, we could match 20, 052 opinion texts to
the 20, 355 entries that the Songer database comprises. Regarding the non-matchable cases
there is no clear pattern visible as these cases span nearly the complete time period as well as
nearly all circuits. The distribution across time and circuits does not reveal any peculiarities
either.
In terms of the matching itself, we subset the data according to the different circuits.
That was only done for speed, as matching is a linear searching process which has to be
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repeated for each query. The actual matching was then done on either Federal Reporter
citation or docket number. First, we tried to match via the normalized Lexis ID, i.e., the
Federal Reporter citation when the opinion spanned more than one page in the Federal
Reporter (to avoid confusion with other opinions). If such a match was not possible, we
matched via the circuit court and the docket number. The reason why we preferred the
Federal Reporter citation over the docket number is that the Songer database uses only
encoded docket numbers, which are less prone to errors.
Figure 4.1c shows the distribution of opinions’ word counts in our dataset. The shortest
opinion consists of oneword, the longest of 69, 320words. The average opinion consists of
2, 809words. Asweuse data fromLexis, each opinionhad a specific structure. We extracted
the text and split it into parts when encountering more than a single new-line character.
Special characters such as “new-line” characters and Roman numbers were removed.
If a potential heading was found within the text, we excluded it, the reason being that
such a heading would potentially include biasing information such as judge names. It is
especially important to exclude those, as the model could focus on judge names as a proxy
for the directionality since most cases were decided without dissent. This is an issue in our
empirical context because we would like to use the predicted data to analyze judge charac-
teristics. Including the judges in the prediction would induce mechanical correlation.
In a second step, we applied regular expressions trying to capture the part of the opinion
in which judges might dissent from the majority. Including a dissenting part which by its
nature goes against the directionality of themajority in the input would not only add noise
but may also lead the classifier to average over the different directions, leading to an overall
worse performance. Whenwe found a dissent, we split off the relevant paragraph and saved
it as an extra entry in the database, marking it as dissent. We excluded those entries and did
not use them as input.
4.3.2 Model
This sectiondescribes howwedeploy a supervised learning approach to predict the ideolog-
ical direction of decisions from the association opinion text. Our approach, as outlined by
Table 4.1, is quite uncommon in the literature of classifying a legal text’s ideology. More tra-
ditional approaches, mainly used for ideology detection in political speeches, include word
scores, word fish, orword shoalmodels. These approaches are either dictionary-based or re-
quire a reference text towhich all other instances are compared. Our approach, by contrast,
does not require one reference text to be selected and deploys more sophisticated selection
mechanisms than naïve word counts.
One characteristic of machine learning approaches is their exploratory nature. We, too,
test multiple combinations of data subsets, feature sets, models, and evaluation methods
to find the best performing one. The instances to test are either selected by theoretical
considerations, such as choosing only judicial quotations as predictive features; or they are
chosen based on popularity, such as choosing support vector machines because they are
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known for their excellent performance on a broad range of NLP classification tasks.
All calculationswere performed on theMax PlanckComputing andData Facility’s high-
performance cluster Draco, using one node of the type Broadwell with up to 40 CPUs and
256GBmemory. Moreover, each step relying on randomness was initializedwith a pseudo-
random seed for replicability. Our code most heavily draws upon functionalities provided
by the python package sci-kit learn (Fabian Pedregosa et al. 2011).
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Subset of Data. In order to investigate how different categories or a differing number
of labels affects a prediction, we constructed different subsets of the data for analysis. Four
subsets constructed from the original data and used for this analysis are listed in the first
column of Table 4.1. A naïve approach predicts political ideology labels regardless of case
type. However, the naïve approach ignores the fact that directionality in the Songer data
is assigned dependant on case type according to explicit rules differing for each case type.
Subsetting the data by case type factors in this aspect of the coding scheme.
However, as Figure 4.1b shows, the dataset is heavily imbalanced in favor of the case
types “economic activity” and “criminal”. As the remaining case types are only marginally
represented, we restrict the subset to these two case types, as only for them enough labeled
observations to train the classifier are available.
Moreover, not only case type but also the labels are imbalanced. As Figure 4.1a shows,
there is only a limited amount of observations available for the political ideology labels
“not ascertained” and “mixed”. We therefore derive two additional subsets. The subset
“two labels” only includes the labels “conservative” and “liberal” as those two are not only
the most frequent ones but also those we are most interested in. Especially if the remain-
ing two labels (“not ascertained” and “mixed”) are either considered as noise or wrongly
classified, this subset should improve the classifier’s performance. In particular, the exclu-
sion of the label “not ascertained” is likely to not be problematic in any case: The number
of cases labeled such is relatively low when compared to the other three labels. Moreover,
the codebook shows that this label may be used in any case where it was not possible to
assign one of the other three labels. Thismay either be due to the fact that the case truly fits
into no other category or merely due to a lack in inter-coder agreement. However, past re-
80
sults show that such a sparsely represented, miscellaneous category decreases classification
performance. For this reason, the final subset excludes this category altogether.
Input. We experimented with four different representations of the input. The most
straightforward approach is to feed the complete preprocessed opinion text into themodel.
After screening a sample of randomly drawn opinions and cross referencing them accord-
ing to the labeling instructions from the codebook, we identified two additional represen-
tations.
First, we separately extracted the citations from the cases. The topic, as well as the po-
litical directionality of a case, might be captured already by citations. Citation networks,
e.g. used by the Supreme Court Mapping Project, is one example using this reasoning (Ash,
Chen, and Lu 2018; Chandler 2007).2
Second, we extracted quotations from the text to serve as input. Many quotations im-
mediately preceded citations. It is in the nature of a quotation that it represents the most
relevant aspects to amatter at hand. As judges quote legal concepts from statutes and prece-
dents relevant to the matter discussed, quotations, in turn, may be associated with either a
“conservative” or a “liberal” leaning of the opinion.
The advantage of thewhole opinion text as input is that no information is lost. Its down-
side, however, is that it may include more noise than only citations or quotations.
Text Preprocessing. For any data subset, the raw text needs to be preprocessed. We
applied theprevalentpractice of removing capitalization, punctuation aswell as stopwords.
Furthermore, we reduced the words to their word stem, base, or root form (stemming).
FeatureEngineering. Thepreprocessed textwas tokenized, and the tokenswere then
used to form lists of n-grams (phrases) up to length three. N-grams extract information
from text through local word order (Sidorov et al. 2014; Suen 1979). In the next step, these
tokens were mapped to a numerical representation. We computed counts and frequencies
over n-grams. The second specification is to weight the counts (tf) by inverse document
frequency (idf), which upweights relatively rare words that could be more informative of
topic or ideology.
Apart from converting opinion texts to vectors, we included the year the case was de-
cided, the circuit at which the case was heard, and the case type as assigned by the authors
of the Songer database to the feature set. Via grid search, we established which input and
preprocessing combinations worked best, especially regarding single words versus n-grams.
Model. After vectorization, the next step is the actual classification of the text input,
listed in the second last column of Table 4.1. In general, the classifiers may be grouped
2 see SCOTUS Mapper Library by the University of Baltimore.
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into two families, with the first being statistical methods. The advantages of this family
are high explainability as well as being well-researched and understood (Ribeiro, Singh,
and Guestrin 2016). The second family are deep learning algorithms mostly comprising
some form of neuronal network architecture. In common NLP tasks, these algorithms
outperform traditional algorithms (Kim 2014; Vaswani et al. 2017).
However, a downside to these models is that feature introspection, as well as explain-
ability, are difficult. While there are attempts to developmethods for feature introspection,
such as Shrestha et al. (2017) orRibeiro, Singh, andGuestrin (2016), results so far have been
preliminary. Consequently, we focus on well-researched statistical classifiers, maximizing
thereby the explainability of the results. The classifiers we deploy are a passive aggressive
classifier (Crammer et al. 2006), a logistic regression (Schmidt, Le Roux, and Bach 2017), a
Ridge classifier (Rifkin, Yeo, and Poggio 2003), and a support vectormachine with stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD) learning (Zhang 2004). All models are trained on a train-test
split, stratified with respect to case type.
Model Evaluation. For model evaluation, we use standard performance metrics for
machine learning, namely accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score (last columnofTable 4.1).3
The F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. As compared to accuracy, for
example, it is more stable with respect to unbalanced datasets like ours.
Furthermore, in the context of this paper we consider precision as more important as
recall because our dataset contains much less liberal than conservative cases. Thereby, we
consider it asmore important to actually find these few liberal cases and risk to classify some
conservative cases as liberal.
As all performance measures are 5-fold-cross-validated, the scores reported are weighted
averages. As the label space per category is heavily imbalanced in the validation set, accuracy
has to be interpreted with care, and therefore the best performing classifier is selected by
referring to the weighted F1 score. In our case, an additional model evaluation is the use of
the predictions in the replication analysis below.
4.3.3 Evaluation of Results
In the following, we provide in-depth analysis across the different classification models in-
troduced by Table 4.1.
PerformanceMetrics. Figure 4.2 depicts the performancemetrics F1 score, accuracy,
precision and recall for all models tested. Figure 4.2 shows that the scores depend more
heavily on the subset-input combination than on the specific classifier used.
3 While in traditional statistics measures such as the p-value are more prevalent, that measure is not appro-
priate in machine learning because we are trying to form accurate test-set predictions rather than to test for
treatment effects. Moreover, the features in machine learning are often highly correlated, so the estimated
coefficients for them are difficult to tease apart.
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Based on this observation, we select four models to analyze and compare them in detail.
Figure 4.2 depicts the model for each of the four subsets tested which reaches the highest
F1 score. We report the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score respectively (coded by color,
see legend). Each of the four groups of bars refers to a different subset of the data, for
which we explored different modeling approaches. The top row looks only at the liberal
and conservative votes, dropping the category “other”. Second, we classify the full dataset
with all three categories. Third, we limit the dataset to criminal cases. In the bottom row,
we limit the dataset to economic cases.






























Figure 4.2: Best Performing Combina ons by Subset
On the y axis, we indicate a feature that all four models have in common: They perform
best on the input opinion text, rather than on citations or quotations. While additional cal-
ibration and tweaking of themodel parameterswould improve the performance of the clas-
sifier using either citations or quotations as input, the result is consistently outperformed
when using the complete opinion text as input. This observation contrasts with the idea
that citations or quotations would summarize the information in ameaningful way. How-
ever, instead of subtractingwhatwe considered as noise, it seems that these input variations
subtract important information.
Asmentioned, the four subsets differ with respect to the subset of cases. Comparing the
subsets concerning label, we differentiate between two- or three- label classification. The
subset displayed at the top of Figure 4.2 takes two labels into account. A random guess,
assuming a random distribution of labels, should yield an accuracy of approximately 50%.
The model reaches an accuracy of 67.04%, lying clearly above this threshold.
The second group of statistics are from the three-labels model. Howmuch performance
do we gain when predicting two instead of three labels? The two models at the top of
Figure 4.2 show – only these two take all case types into account – an increase in accuracy
from 62.00% to 67.04%. We believe that this increase in performancemay offset the loss of
information by excluding the label “mixed/other” as less than 1/7 of all cases fall into this
category. This opinion is shared by other authors as well: Most studies drawing upon the
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Songer/Auburn do exclude the “mixed/other” cases. However, for the sake of thorough-
ness we undertake the calibration presented in the following section for both the two- and
three- label subset.
In the third and fourth groups of performance metrics, we show the three-label model
but subset on case type. Interestingly, performance depends strongly on the case type. As
mentioned in subsection 4.3.1, directionality is defined within case type while the number
and quality of rules are quite distinct. Additionally, as Figure 4.1 shows, case type is heavily
imbalanced in favor of economic rather than criminal. These two facts help to explain why
the subset “criminal” only reaches an accuracy of 55.80% and, by contrast, why the subset
“economic” achieves an accuracy of 77.10%. However, in order to increase generalizability,
we insteadopt to focus on classifiers trainedondata containing all case types, as some results
from, e.g., the case type “economic” may carry over to the case type “criminal”.
Probability Calibration. In the following, we analyze our classifiers’ calibration:
Predicting a judicial opinion to either be conservative or liberal, we not only want to know
the label but how confident the classifier is in assigning one particular label versus the other.
In order to boost calibration, the classifiers were re calibrated using either a sigmoid or an
isotonic calibration function.
The sigmoid function rests on a parametric approach based on the sigmoid model by
Platt, Cristianini, and Shawe-Taylor (2000). The non-parametric isotonic variant is based
on an isotonic regression.





















(13 , 13 , 13 )
(12 , 0, 12 )
(0, 12 , 12 )
(12 , 12 , 0)
(0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0)




(a) Ridge (Isotonic Calibra on)
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(b) SGD (Sigmoid Calibra on)
Figure 4.3: Dri -Plots Showing the Change of Predicted Probabili es a er Calibra on
Figure 4.3 depicts the Ridge and SGD classifier respectively. For both classifiers, the cal-
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ibrationmethods were applied for visualization purposes.4 The three corners of Figure 4.3
correspond to the three classes: conservative, liberal, andmixed/other. Arrows point from
the probabilities predicted by an uncalibrated classifier to the probabilities predicted by a
calibrated classifier. For clarity of presentation, only each fiftieth data point from the test
set is depicted.
Figure 4.3 shows that calibration results in both classifiers shifting fromunder-confident
to over-confident predictions, as the mass of predicted points moves away from the center




3) towards the edges. This means that the classifier is likely to categorize similar
cases very differently, as the predicted label is further away from the decision boundary for
all cases. On the other hand, it alsomeans that the classifier getsmore confident about cases
which are hard to classify. However, we accept this change, as both the absolute accuracy
and the F1 score increase, although there may be an additional error for boundary cases.
While the two classifiers do not majorly differ in their confidence, they do differ in their
error rate of assigning the label “liberal” to liberal cases. If one looks at the blue arrows,
which depict cases for which the true label is “liberal”, one can see that for the Ridge clas-
sifier (left panel) the mass of the blue arrows falls into the simplex spanned by the corner
points ( 12 ,
1




2),(1, 0, 0). Every arrow point found within this simplex is classified
as “liberal”. Consequently, as the mass of blue arrows falls into that area, the mass of them
is categorized correctly. In contrast, for the SGD classifier (right panel) a lower amount
of the blue arrows falls into that area, meaning that the misclassification rate for “liberal”
is higher. This means the precision for “liberal” is lower for SGD compared to the Ridge
classifier. On the other hand, the inverse is true for the recall. As the original dataset fea-
tures fewer liberal cases than conservative ones, on balance we might prefer to misclassify
conservative cases as liberal instead of liberal ones as conservative. At this point, this speaks
in favor of the Ridge classifier vs. the SGD classifier.
When looking at the “mixed/other” cases, we can see that the Ridge classifier classifies
the majority of them correctly. However, that seems to come at the expense of misclassi-
fying a disproportionally high amount of liberal cases. For the reasons stated above, we
consequently exclude the “mixed/other” to gain performance in predicting only the labels
“conservative” and “liberal”.
Figure 4.4a provides another visualization to assess how well the probabilistic predic-
tions of different classifiers are calibrated: It displays reliability curves which show the cor-
rect proportion of conservative cases (vertical axis) against the bins of predicted probabil-
ities that a case is conservative (horizontal axis). The closer the reliability curve is to the
45-degree line, the better is the classification model’s performance in terms of reproducing
the original distribution. The Ridge classifier with isotonic calibration, as well as the SGD
classifier with sigmoid calibration, are highlighted in shades of blue.
4 Probability calibration was performed on data not used for model fitting. To this end, the training set
consisting of 80% of the Songer data was cut in thirds and the model was then trained with 3-fold cross-
validation. During this, 2/3 of the data were used for training and 1/3 was used for calibration. For each
classifier the calibration algorithm yielding the best results was chosen.
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(b) SGD (Sigmoid Calibra on)
Figure 4.4: Reliability Curves and Distribu on Diagram
Consider the Ridge classifier: For all cases which it predicts to be conservative with a
20% probability, about 40% are actually conservative. In other words, it underestimates
conservativeness. However, for cases close to the hyperplane (probability of .5 for either
directionality), Ridge approximates the directionality distribution very well.5 Finally, at
around 70% likelihood, the classifier begins to overestimate the number of conservative
cases.
Alongside Figure 4.4a, Figure 4.4b shows that despite calibrating the classifiers, a sig-
nificant part of the predicted directionality’s mass lies close to the decision boundary of
.5. This, in turn, means that the classifiers have to be relatively precisely close to the de-
cision boundary and be able to shift away mass from the decision boundary. Figure 4.4b
shows that the two classifiers most successful in this are the Ridge classifier, calibrated with
the isotonic algorithm, and the SGD support vector machine, calibrated with the sigmoid
5 This is an important aspect as the Ridge classifier is similar to a support vector machine in that it uses the
instances closest to the hyperplane for the separation of the data points.
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algorithm.
Heatmaps. In the previous paragraph, we concluded that a two- label classifier for all
case types will be the basis for predicting political ideology labels. In terms of performance
metrics, the SGD classifier reaches the highest F1 score. However, the decision for the final
model should not just take the F1 score but rather the types of errors that the classifiermakes
into account, as well. Therefore, Figure 4.5 plots normalized6 confusionmatrices for those



























































Figure 4.5: Confusion Matrices for the SGD and Ridge Classifiers
As mentioned in subsection 4.3.2, we consider it as crucial to correctly predict as many
liberal cases as possible even if some conservative cases are wrongly predicted as liberal. Fig-
ure 4.5b shows that as far as liberal cases are concerned, the SGD classifier predicts 697 cases
correctly as liberal but almost as many cases (686) wrongly as conservative. The Ridge clas-
sifier displayed by Figure 4.5a, by contrast, predicts 805 liberal cases correctly as liberal and
only 578 liberal cases wrongly as conservative.
Best Classifier. Based on performance metrics, heatmaps, and calibration results, we
can select the classifier most suited for the task set out in this paper. The F1 score – our
preferred performance metric – peaks both for the Ridge classifier, calibrated with an iso-
tonic function, and for the SGD-classifier, calibrated with a sigmoid function. The second
performance metric we consider as critical is precision, for which the Ridge classifier shows
better results than SGD. In the same vein, the reliability curves show that Ridge is closer to
the 45-degree line than SGD, which makes the former preferable. The only aspect where
the SGD support vector machine slightly outperforms the Ridge classifier is in terms of
mass, as shown in Figure 4.4b. However, overall, the difference in this regard is negligible.
6 The normalized heat is calculated by dividing each value by the row mean.
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Given this reasoning, we chose the Ridge classifier calibrated with the isotonic algorithm as
model to perform out-of-sample predictions.7
4.3.4 Analysis
This section analyzes and interprets the predictions of the best two-label classifier. We look
at predictions over time and by judge. We also interpret themodel by examining predictive
features.
PredictionoftheTimeSeries inDecisionDirection. Landes andPosner (2011)
point out that the accuracy of the original Songer data is susceptible to the year in which
a judge decided a case. Coders had more trouble coding older cases as compared to newer
ones. We would like to see if this is reflected in differential performance of our classifier
over time.
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Figure 4.6: Frac on of Conserva ve and Liberal Cases, each Calculated for Actual as well as Predicted Case Direc-
onality, Plo ed by Year
Figure 4.6 shows the fraction of conservative and liberal cases by year for all circuits.8
We include out-of-sample data which is made up of scraped Lexis data without the cases
7 The final specifications of the classifier are as follows: We preprocess the text by excluding all stop words
as well as punctuation. Following that, a lemmatizer is applied. This input transformed into bi-grams and
then fed to a tf-idf-vectorizer. That vectorizer calculates the distance based on the “l2”-norm. It also makes
uses the three additional features of year, circuit and case type. The regularization strength parameter α for
the Ridge classifier is 2.0
8 The cases categorized as “mixed” or “other” are excluded.
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already within the Songer dataset. The original scraped dataset holds more than 1 million
cases. As our classifier uses the year of the case, the circuit, and the case type as laid out by
Songer,9 these features have to be available for all out-of-sample cases as well. Especially the
last one constrains the Lexis dataset because the case type was only available for cases of the
years 1930 and later. Consequently, Figure 4.6 shows out-of-sample predictions only for
those years.10
Figure 4.6 shows that for the in-sample predictions on the test set of the Songer data (20%
hold-out data), the predictions closely approximate the original labels. This is also reflected
in the high correlation of .73 (α < 1%). Especially for the years 1950 to 1980, the classifier
performs very well. The out-of-sample predictions for that time period approximate the
trend observed in the Songer data. Only for the years of 1980 onwards, the out-of-sample
data (red line) is predicted to be considerably more conservative.
This spread may be caused, amongst others, by the classification error. Another reason
could be the sampling process used by Songer and its team to construct the database.11 To
test this presumption, we plot a subset of the Lexis data constructed according to Songer’s
rules (“Songer-distributed out-of-sample”, the orange line).
Indeed, we find that the orange and red lines diverge after 1980, with the orange line
being closer to the original Songer data. This illustrates that indeed the sampling process
heavily influences the distribution of decision directionality: As soon as the total amount
of cases increases12 by a significant amount, a spread appears. As the absolute number of
court cases increased over time (Casper and Posner 1974), at least for cases after 1980, the
Songer datamay not be a good sample for the full set of cases. Consequently, the difference
in out-of-sample predictions as compared to Songer predictions may simply stem from the
fact that there is a structural shift in conservativeness (either in variation or trend) from
1980 onwards which is not represented by the Songer sample.
Directed Votes per Judge. Next we zoom in on particular judges. We look at per-
formance for the ten judges who cast most of the votes in the Songer dataset, analyzing
performance in civil and criminal cases separately. Those judges who did not hear both
civil and criminal cases were excluded. The horizontal axis of Figure 4.7 indicates the true
proportion of conservative votes while the vertical axis indicates the predicted proportion
9 We matched the Lexis case types to the one laid out in the Songer database. However, the match has no
bijective property. In order to get a reasonable good match, the subcategory case types of both, the Lexis
data base as well as the Songer data base were used. This match is surjective with the Lexis subcategory case
types as a base set. Then the matched Songer sub categories are aggregated to a Songer top category. Except
for very few cases (< 1000) this aggregation is unequivocal.
10If one is willing to forgo the performance gain introduced by the case type feature (about 2.5% points in the
current configuration), one can predict directionality for all Lexis cases.
11 For the original Songer database, at maximum 30 cases per year per circuit were sampled from all available
cases after 1961. Before 1961, only 15 cases per year per circuit were selected.
12Where for the year 1945 only slightly more than 100 cases per year per circuit were coded with a usable case
type in the out-of-sample dataset, for the year 2000 there are more than 2000 per year per circuit.
89
of conservative votes. Each point indicates these statistics for a single judge. If a judge’s
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Figure 4.7: Frac on of Directed Votes per Judge – Comparison of Actual and Predicted Votes
Figure 4.7 shows that for civil cases, predicted and actual fractions are quite close. A χ2-
test shows that the distribution of predicted fractions is not statistically different from the
distribution of actual fractions (p-value> .1). For case type “criminal”, however, the distri-
butions of true and predicted fractions across judges are statistically different. The reason
for thismight be that themajority of criminal cases is labeled as conservative. Consequently,
as the classifier uses the case type as feature, it can increase performance on criminal cases
by labeling it as conservative. In other words, the classifier tends to overpredict the number
of conservative cases in criminal law.
Feature Inspection. To further understand the two-label classifier, we investigate the
features that are most important in driving our predictions. For this purpose, let feature
be a feature, value be a value it could take, and label one of the ideological directions (con-
servative or liberal). We ranked the informativeness of each feature by the highest value of
P(feature = value|label = conservative) divided by P(feature = value|label = liberal).
Note that these are equivalent to coefficients from a Naïve Bayes Classifier.
The coefficients of the different features are represented by their standardizedmoments,
meaning that normalization was performed by dividing through the standard deviation.
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This means that each coefficient is on the same scale and therefore comparable. The hy-
perplane separating “conservative” from “liberal” lies at 0, meaning, a hypothetical case for
which all the decision results would be zero falls into neither category. The higher the co-
efficient of a feature, the further away does a single feature move the case instance from the
hyperplane when the feature is present within the case.
Table 4.2 lists themost informative features used by our best performing classifier. Please
note that the most informative features for the label “liberal” are constructed such that
they are least informative for the label “conservative”. The features are either opinion-text
phrases, quotation phrases, or citations.
Table 4.2 shows that the coefficients differ vastly in absolute size across the three different
input variations. This corroborates the results of themetric scores. Especially for citation as
input, the range of the coefficients’ values is very narrow, with−7.49 being the minimum
and 10.16 being themaximum. Consequently, many features loading clearly either the “lib-
eral” or the “conservative” side are needed in order to have the case fall into a category. By
contrast, the range of the coefficients’ values for opinion text is much wider, with a mini-
mum of−57.67 and a maximum of 189.96. A case including the words “reverse remand”,
for example, would be classified immediately as liberal. In essence, this means that features
for the opinion text or quotations as input are more informative than for the citations.
The first columnofTable 4.2a andTable 4.2bhave themost predictive quotations. Quo-
tations loading heavily on the label “conservative” are “knowingly” or “unique circum-
stances”. The court quotes these phrases, i.e., they are singled out as relevant to the case
at hand. Both phrases indicate a possible conviction. As the code book by the authors of
the Songer database very often label a conviction as “conservative”, this seems to be in line
with the data provided. On the other side, the quotations for “liberal” are not as easily
interpreted.
The second column of Table 4.2a displays those citations loading on the label “conser-
vative”. For the most heavily conservative citation, Humphrey v. Moore, the court limited
the power of unions from infringing too far on employees of a company who were not
part of the union. In Dandridge v. Williams, the court found that the state has some right
to interpret how it puts into practice federal welfare laws. In consequence, Maryland was
found not to be in violation of the Anti-Discrimination Act. Another conservative exam-
plewould beUnited States v. Robinson, inwhich the court strengthened the police powers
for searches during lawful arrests under the Fourth Amendment.
In comparison, the second column of Table 4.2b features citations which the classifier
finds tobe indicative of a liberal case. Themost indicative citationwouldbeUnited States v.
Taylor, a case inwhich thebar for convictionon charges of conspiracywas raised. Coppedge
v. United States dealt with the fact that the sentenced petitioner had not received the ple-
nary review of his conviction to which he is entitled, and all his appeals against his con-
viction against this ground were dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision to
dismiss his appeal and generally strengthened defendants, rights in this regard. In the same
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vein, Green v. United States reversed the sentencing of the defendant under the Fifth
Amendment as he was put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Consequently, while
absolute size of the coefficients for citations hint at only a limited quality for the overall
classification into either “liberal” or “conservative”, the cases as such seem to fall into the
right domain.
The last column shows the predictive phrases from the full opinion text. Features such
as “judgment affirm” or “plaintiff appeal” are predictive of the label “conservative”. In line
with those, but not shown here, are the features “affirm judgment” and “appeal dismiss”
on place 11 and 14 respectively. This is in line with labeling rules as set out by the Songer
team for criminal cases, where the coding rules state that affirming the decision against an
appellant is to be coded as conservative. Conversely, within themost predictive features for
“liberal”, one can find “reverse remand”, “remand proceeding”, or “reverse case”, reflecting
that predictive features seem to be driven by criminal cases.
Table 4.2: Best Predic ve Features
(a) Best Predic ve Features for Label “Conserva ve”
quotations (Ridge) citation (Ridge) opiniontext (Ridge)
coef feature coef feature coef feature
1 -17.13 knowingly -7.49 Humphrey_v_Moore -57.67 motion new
2 -13.18 John_Doe -7.43 Dandridge_v_Williams -53.71 plaintiff argue
3 -11.97 unique_circumstances -6.59 SEC_v_Chenery_Corp -51.91 prior art
4 -11.47 X -6.42 Co_v_Zenith_Radio_Corp -50.86 appellant claim
5 -11.40 No -6.19 Dalehite_v_United_States -50.78 grant motion
6 -11.03 minor -6.06 Brady_v_Maryland -49.45 plaintiff appellant
7 -10.85 search -5.60 United_States_v_Robinson -48.85 plaintiff contend
8 -10.63 attractive_nuisance -5.55 Mal_v_Riddell -45.70 fiduciary duty
9 -10.09 may -5.38 Port_Gardner_Investment_Co_v_U -45.62 plaintiff appeal
10 -10.04 overhead -5.25 Olim_v_Wakinekona -44.01 judgment affirm
(b) Best Predic ve Features for Label “Liberal”
quotations (Ridge) citation (Ridge) opiniontext (Ridge)
coef feature coef feature coef feature
1 19.98 that_where_the_State_has_provided_an_opportuni... 10.16 Yes_v_United_States 189.96 reverse remand
2 19.86 Motion_for_Judgment 9.18 United_States_v_Taylor 133.90 remand proceeding
3 19.57 fairer_to_those_adversely_affected_by_a_bond_f... 9.11 ...Inc_v_Commissioner 103.28 case remand
4 19.16 take_care 9.09 Townsend_v_Sain 98.70 remand district
5 18.30 urge_that_the_indictment_charged_the_maintenan... 8.88 United_States_v_Young 89.69 government argue
6 17.32 good_faith 8.43 Dennis_v_United_States 85.99 remand new
7 17.30 anything_of_value 8.21 Coppedge_v_United_States 84.05 proceeding consistent
8 16.76 crack a_little_bit_of_time_to_research_on_the_... 8.15 ...Inc__v_United_States 75.33 consiStatent opinion
9 16.76 a_little_bit_of_time_to_research_on_the_backgr... 8.00 Green_v_United_States 74.29 new trial
10 15.49 clear_and_convincing 7.97 Brown_v_Board 60.13 reverse case
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4.4 Replication and Robustness Checks
This section focuses on the replication aspect of Landes andPosner (2011). For comparison,
all tables and figures that Landes and Posner (2011) produced with data of circuit courts are
listed in Table D.1, section D.1. The most relevant tables for our purposes are Tables 11 and
13 as numbered in the original paper.
Summary Statistics. This paragraph compares our summary statistics listed in Ta-
ble 4.3b to those by Landes and Posner (p. 803, 2011) listed inTable 4.3a. As can be seen, the
statistics differ. We count a total of 56, 602 cases; Landes and Posner (2011) count 55, 041
cases. Furthermore, we count more opinions classified as “conservative” or “other” than
Landes and Posner (2011) do.
One possible explanation for these diverging results is that not all of the corrections that
Landes and Posner (2011) applied in the original paper were described in sufficient detail so
that they could be reproduced. We were able to apply the corrections concerning political
ideology, but we were unable to apply judge-related corrections. Landes and Posner (2011)
briefly mention judge-related corrections and refer to a website for a detailed description.
This website, however, is no longer available online.
Table 4.3: Court of Appeals Votes by Subject Ma er and Ideology for 538 Court of Appeals Judges Only: 1925–
2002
(a)Original by Landes and Posner (2011)
Crim Civ Rts First Due Proc Priv Labor Econ Misc Total
Conservative 6823 2721 566 461 117 1351 9361 525 21925
Liberal 1876 1766 477 201 67 1922 9884 559 16752
Mixed 635 460 89 51 13 420 1775 22 3465
Other 5321 210 102 79 3 179 6047 958 12899
Total 14655 5157 1234 792 200 3872 27067 2064 55041
(b) Replica on
Crim Civ Rts First Due Proc Priv Labor Econ Misc Total
Conservative 7217 2647 397 412 83 1397 11084 478 23715
Liberal 1911 1755 379 176 38 0 10375 596 15230
Mixed 613 473 86 48 9 423 1689 31 3372
Other 5652 212 40 24 3 2232 5177 945 14285
Total 15393 5087 902 660 133 4052 28325 2050 56602
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Regression. Next we replicate the primary regression analysis of circuit court judges in
Landes and Posner (2011), focusing only on the essential part of their analysis. For Table 13,
we replicate the regressions focusing on the fraction of conservative votes and only taking
the period from 1925 to 2002 into account.13 Regarding the baseline regression, Landes and
Posner (2011) specify their regression model as follows:
FrConij = β0 + β1Xi + w (4.1)
where FrConij denotes the fraction of conservative votes, calculated as votes per judge
over the sample period. Xi encompasses several judge characteristics such as the party of
the appointing president, share of Republican senators at the time of nomination, year
of appointment, gender, race14, prior experience as a district judge, and judge-circuit fixed
effects15
According to Landes and Posner (p. 810, 2011), their regressions are weighted either by
the judge’s total votes in civil cases or the total votes in criminal cases. Furthermore, Landes
and Posner (2011) do not specify how they compute their standard errors, but we assume
that they use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (treating each judge as an observa-
tion) and therefore use errors of that type for the replication.
Civil Cases. With Table 4.4, we provide our first replication table, dealing with civil
cases only. Column (1) corresponds to Landes and Posner (2011) Table 13, column (6).16 As
in the original paper, we report the t-statistics, rather than standard errors or p-values, for
all coefficients in parentheses. Landes and Posner (2011) do not specify how they computed
standard errors for their regressionTable 13, butwe inferred that theyusedheteroskedasticity-
robust errors.
The main research interest of Landes and Posner (2011) was whether judges follow their
party affiliation in their decisions. They find a significant influence of being appointed
by a Republican president (RepPr ) on the fraction of conservative votes for civil cases
(Table 4.4, column 1). Our result for civil cases (Table 4.4, column 2), is quite similar when
compared to Landes and Posner (2011)’s; in our data, being appointed by a Republican is
associated with a positive and significant effect of voting conservatively in civil cases. The
evidence for a relationship between party and ideology actually appears to be stronger in
our replication than implied by the original study.
13 In turn, this means that we do not display results for the fraction of liberal votes, as displayed in columns
(2) and (4) of Landes and Posner (2011) Table 13, nor do we report results for the period of 1960–2002 as
reported in Table 14.
14Race is a dummy for Black = 1, 0 else
15The judge specific datawas acquired fromtheAuburndatabase byGaryZuk,Deborah J. BarrowandGerard
Gryski onhttp://www.songerproject.org and then matched to the Songer data by a judge identifier code.
16These are the columnswith the “uncorrected” data. We only compare uncorrected data as Table 4.3 showed
that we were not able to replicate even summary statistics for the corrected version.
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Apart fromdeployingheteroskedasticity-robust errors, wepropose amodel specification
with multi-way clustering (non-nested) as recommended by Badir Alnidawy (2015). Based
on the advice from Abadie (2020), we add two-way clustering by circuit and year. This
allows for correlation in the error term across judges within court over time, and across
courts in the same year as well. Clustering leaves coefficients unchanged, and a comparison
of columns (2) and (3) reveals that t-statistics only differ slightly as a result of the two-way
clustering.17
While Landes and Posner (2011) grouped the data on judge level, we additionally run
the empirical analysis with data at the vote level. This specification allows us to control for
case characteristics with circuit-year fixed effects. For getting at the effect of party affiliation
on ideology, this is an important step econometrically because the number of Republican-
appointed judges and the proportion of conservatively decided cases could be correlated
over time due to unobserved confounding factors.
The dependent variable is now binary. It equals one for conservative decisions and zero
for liberal decisions (cases with the mixed/other category are dropped). The vote level re-
gression model both includes circuit-year fixed effects, and clustered standard errors by
judge and year. This specification successfully replicates the significant positive effect of
a conservative appointing president (RepPr ) on the fraction of conservative votes.
Model specifications (5) and (6) are estimated not only with hand-labeled but also with
predicted data. The predictions on which estimation results of columns (5) and (6) are
based, were generated with a calibrated Ridge classifier.
These re-estimations serve as an alternativeway to assess the performance of the classifier.
The rationale behind this procedure is that generating labels is not the ultimate goal, but
using these labels in an empirical model is. Therefore, even if the classifier cannot predict
political ideology with an accuracy of 100%, its performance can be viewed as appropriate
if the results of the empirical model do not change drastically when estimated with the
classifier’s predictions.
As far as column (5) is concerned, using predicted instead of hand-labeled data does not
change the results for coefficientsRepPr . Estimating the vote-level fixed effectsmodelwith
predicted labels instead of hand-labeled (column6) results in estimates forRepPres that are
no longer statistically significant.
Criminal Cases. With Table 4.5, we provide our second replication table; it deals with
criminal cases only. Landes and Posner (2011) found a positive and significant influence of
being appointed by aRepublican president (RepPr ) on the fraction of conservative votes.
Our result for criminal cases is quite similar to Landes and Posner’s, our coefficient being
slightly larger.
17We provide regression results with errors clustered on the year of appointment, circuit court, and the party
of appointing president in Table 4.4, column (3).
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Furthermore, for criminal cases, Landes and Posner (2011) found a negative effect of ap-
pointment year. However, we do not find such an effect. They also report a negative im-
pact of being black (Black) on crime conservatism, which we replicate. Two-way clustering
changes t-statistics only slightly. This leads to no change in significance level for the coeffi-
cient (RepPr ), but it left the coefficient (Black) to no longer be significant.
The fixed effects multi-way clustering model on vote level data replicates the significant
and positive effect of the party of the appointing president (RepPr ) as well as of being
black (Black) on the fraction of conservative votes.
The multi-way error component model using predicted data could not reproduce the
significance of the coefficient RepPr . Instead, being male turned to have a significant
negative impact on criminal conservatism. The fixed effects multi-way clustering model
on vote level with predicted data could neither reproduce the significance for coefficient
RepPr nor Black.
Extreme Bounds Analysis. The extreme bounds analysis (EBA) is a sensitivity test
that examines how robustly the dependent variable of a regressionmodel is associated with
a variety of possible determinants (Hlavac 2016). We estimate an EBA, including all pos-
sible combinations of independent variables that Landes and Posner (2011) specified. To
limit the influence of coefficient estimates with high multicollinearity, we follow the rec-
ommendations by Hlavac (2016) and specify the maximum acceptable variance inflation
factor to be 7. Next, we increase the weights of those regression models that better fit the
data – that is, by its likelihood ratio index according to Mcfadden (1974).
Figure 4.8 showshistograms for each of the independent variables included in themodel.
The green curve displayed in each histogram is a density curve which approximates the
coefficients’ distribution with a normal distribution.
A positive coefficient indicates that holding all else equal, a higher value of the examined
variable is associated with a higher fraction of conservative votes. On the other hand, if
most of the area of the histogram’s bins lies to the left of zero, higher values of the corre-
sponding variable are associated with a lower fraction of conservative votes.
For the civil cases, Figure 4.8a suggests that when the appointing president (RepPr ) is
Republican (rather thanDemocrat), when the judge was appointed in later years (YrAppt),
andwhen the specific judgeparticipated in ahigher fractionofmiscellaneous votes (FracMisc),
a judge’s fraction of conservative votes increases. Furthermore, circuits 1 and 7 are consis-
tently associated with a higher fraction of conservative votes.
Being black (Black), having served more years as a district judge (DistrictCourt), and an
increasing fraction of economic votes (FracEcon), are associated with a lower fraction of
conservative votes. Furthermore, circuits 3, 9, and 10 have a lower fraction of conservative
votes.
To conclude the visual inspection as well as the interpretation of the statistics, found in































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.8: Histograms Extreme Bounds Analysis, for Civil and Criminal Cases
1 are very strongly associated with the dependent variable.
For criminal cases, Figure 4.8b shows that being appointed by aRepublican (rather than
Democrat) president (RepPr ) is consistently associated with a higher fraction of conser-
vative votes for all regression models estimated. Furthermore, circuits 1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11
are associated with a higher fraction of conservative votes.
By contrast, being black (Black) and having served more years as a district court judge
(DistrictCourt) decrease the fraction of conservative votes. Furthermore, circuits 2 and 3
are associated with a lower fraction of conservative votes.
To conclude the visual inspection, EBA results for criminal cases suggest that the vari-
ables Pr , Black as well as circuit 8 and 10 are robustly associated with the fraction of con-
servative votes.
4.5 Conclusion and Outlook
This paper had twomain goals. Our first goal was to replicate the analysis on circuit courts
proposed by Landes and Posner (2011), and to add multiple robustness checks to assess
the validity of the regression model initially specified. Second, we show an approach for
extending the dataset used in the original study via machine learning, especially in regards
to the input used for any future algorithm.
As far as replication of the empirical analysis of Landes and Posner (2011) is concerned,
we were able to reproduce the most critical findings. The robustness checks found, just as
Landes and Posner (2011) did, that the party of the appointing president and being black
influences the fraction of conservative votes. We find that the result for party affiliation
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is actually stronger than the original article found, as it extends to both civil and criminal
cases.
What explains our different results? We paid particular attention to the code generating
the fraction of conservative votes. As multiple reshaping and grouping operations as well
as joining different datasets were necessary in order to obtain this variable, its calculation is
not exactly trivial. We can imagine that a small mistake in the original code by Landes and
Posner (2011), such as an inner instead of an outer join, could change the fraction. In turn,
its association with the dependent variable may also change.
However, we could not replicate the exact summary statistics of the dataset Landes and
Posner (2011) used because they did not provide replication code and did not sufficiently
specify their corrections in the original paper. That, in particular, may affect the rest of
their findings.
In order to extend the dataset, we experimented with different classifying algorithms,
where the best one was a passive-aggressive classifier for economic cases, reaching a F1 score
of 74.49%.
In order to assess the validity of the classification, we compared the regression results
obtained by using predicted data to those obtained by using only hand-labeled data. Co-
efficients found to be significant with the replication as well as with the robustness checks
were not replicated with the predicted data, suggesting that that 1) the classifier still needs
improvement, or 2) researchers should be careful with using predictions as data in down-
stream empirical analysis. Future research should, therefore, take into account that the
distribution of the Songer data in regards to cases per circuit per year does not mirror the
distribution of the universe, and as such it may skew the predictions of any classifier. Over-
sampling is only an imperfect correction for this issue, as is the inclusion of the circuit or
year as a feature. Otherwise, the consistency of results may not be guaranteed.
One aspect that we neglected thus far is that predictions cannot be directly plugged into
a regressionwithout correcting for the classification error. Fong andTyler (2020) proposed
one approach to do so. However, Fong and Tyler (2020) describe a case in which one or
more independent variables are predicted. In our case, however, we predict the dependent
variable. Therefore, we propose to develop a correction approach in order to prevent for-
ward propagation of the prediction error used within a dependent variable which at this
point may be of the main reason for failure.
Furthermore, the distributions of the enlarged dataset and that one of the original data
are significantly distinct. Overall, the classifier was trained on roughly 5% as compared
to the number of labels that were predicted. As soon as such a considerable disbalance
is present, non-randomdraws or the lack of stratification is very problematic. Lack of strat-
ification is the case with the original Songer database, i.e., Songer (1993) does not keep the
original distribution of cases per circuit as they focused on preserving other aspects such as
the presence of all circuits in each year.
Taking the above into account, our results provide a concise groundwork for future re-
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search in this area. First, in order to establish a ground truth that goes beyondmere statisti-
cal significance and also looks at distributional aspects, more than just regression results are
needed. Here, we suggest that multiway error component modeling as well as an extreme
bounds analysis should be used on any prior results before trying to take them as a baseline
for any extension of the Songer database.
Secondly, in regards to machine learning, we show quite clearly that any input which
does not include the complete opinion text in some form cannot result in a good overall
performance. That is important as it shows that other aspects which are otherwise very
useful in the domain of law, such as citations for citation networks, do not contain enough
information for this specific task. This holds despite the fact that when using citations as
input, the classifier uses many citations to which it assigns the correct ideology label if one
were to label them by hand. However, when taken as an aggregation, neither citations nor
quotations are distinctive enough.
Moreover, while the Songer database features four labels, our results show that the er-
ror the classifier makes on the label “mixed” is nearly equally split between “conservative”
and “liberal”. As the label “other” is negligible in terms of occurrence, we can, therefore,
conclude that training a classifier only on the two labels “conservative” and “liberal” does
not introduce any systematic bias. Due to the increase in performance, such a setup should
consequently be preferred. Lastly, looking at the regression results, itmay be that text alone
is not enough. Future research should therefore also think about takingmeta-information,
such as the circuit court it was heard at, into account.
Moreover, looking at the literature of the median judge (Martin, Quinn, and Epstein
2005), it may also be important with which other judges a judge sits on a panel. This may
be another important aspect, a machine learning classifier may have to take into account.
We hope that our work acts as a baseline on which future work can build on. The ob-
vious next step is to scale back on the interpretability of the model in favor of sophistica-
tion: Specifically, we propose a modified doc2vec model in combination with an attention
mechanism. Furthermore, future work could stack multiple classification algorithms tai-
lored more closely to the rules of the coding book that the Songer database provides.
Another exciting avenue for future work is to compare in depth the differences, advan-
tages, and disadvantages of various methodological approaches. A particular exciting com-
parison is a Bayesian framework, as proposed by Martin and Quinn (2002), compared to
machine learning approaches, as suggested by this paper.
Apart from methodological extensions, a more content-related one is particularly inter-
esting: Most of the literature is targeted towardshigh ranking courts, such that the Supreme
Court or circuit courts. This lack of attention towards lower courts might stem from the
fact that the universe of cases to code is vast. Consequently, not even a partially coded
dataset, as far as political ideology labels are concerned, is available for lower courts. A clas-
sifier, trained on circuit courts’ opinions could predict the label for opinions of lower courts
and, by that, help to close this particular gap in the literature.
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Table 4.4: Regression Analysis of Court of Appeals Votes: 1925–2002, Civil Cases
Dep. Variable: Fraction of Conservative Votes
true data predicted data
Landes (2009) replicated multi.clus vote multi.clus.pred vote.pred
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RepPres 0.035∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.031
(3.860) (2.125) (4.136) (3.821) (2.942) (1.417)
SenRep 0.072 −0.017 −0.017 0.095 0.004 0.219
(1.710) (−0.090) (−0.347) (0.647) (1.677)
YrAppt 0.0003 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.001
(0.790) (0.665) (1.237) (0.202) (0.796) (0.431)
Gender −0.006 0.015 0.015 −0.026 −0.0004 −0.058
(0.260) (0.344) (0.318) (−0.681) (−0.011) (−1.384)
Black −0.028 −0.105 −0.105 0.007 −0.125 −0.001
(1.180) (−1.505) (0.124) (−0.023)
DistrictCourt 0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.002 −0.002 −0.0005
(0.330) (−1.455) (−1.183) (−1.712) (−0.345) (−0.417)
FracEcon −0.090 −0.230 −0.230∗∗ 0.355∗∗ −0.249 0.451∗∗∗
(1.640) (−1.506) (−2.690) (2.774) (−1.918) (3.531)
FracMisc −0.049 1.345∗ 1.345∗ −0.920 1.464∗∗∗ −0.324
(0.350) (2.442) (2.107) (−1.842) (6.118) (−0.673)
circuit FE yes yes no no no no
circuit-year FE no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 535 498 498 4169 498 4169
R2 0.240 0.119 0.119 0.047 0.123 0.066
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Linear regression with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Variables: RepPres: Party
of the appointing president, conservative or liberal (omitted category); SenRep: Share of republican senators at the point of election;
Gender: sex of the judge, male or female (omitted category). Black: dummy for the race of the judge; DistrictCourt: Years spent as
a district judge; FracEcon: Fraction of economic votes; FracMisc: Fraction of miscellaneous votes; Circuit Variables: All regressions
include 11 dummy circuit variables – circuits 1 to 11. The D.C. court is the omitted circuit variable.
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Table 4.5: Regression Analysis of Court of Appeals Votes: 1925–2002, Criminal Cases
Dep. Variable: Fraction of Conservative Votes
true data predicted data
Landes (2009) replicated multi.clus vote multi.clus.pred vote.pred
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RepPres 0.056∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.038 0.005
(4.220) (3.634) (3.811) (3.022) (1.734) (0.829)
SenRep −0.076 −0.151 −0.151 0.010 −0.020 0.078∗∗
(1.090) (−1.399) (0.141) (−0.542) (2.844)
YrAppt −0.001∗∗∗ −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.0003 0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗
(3.390) (−0.023) (−0.032) (−0.601) (2.876) (−2.709)
Gender −0.014 −0.019 −0.019 0.010 −0.023∗ −0.012
(0.710) (−0.740) (−0.876) (0.545) (−2.219) (−1.750)
Black −0.057∗ −0.091∗ −0.091 −0.081∗∗ −0.020 −0.027
(2.060) (−1.814) (−1.047) (−2.717) (−0.257) (−1.697)
DistrictCourt 0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.0003 −0.001 0.001
(0.140) (−0.817) (−0.390) (0.360) (−0.346) (1.917)
circuit FE yes yes no no no no
circuit-year FE no no yes yes yes yes
Observations 523 498 498 13543 498 13543
R2 0.240 0.084 0.084 0.019 0.052 0.014
∗p< 0.05; ∗∗p< 0.01; ∗∗∗p< 0.001.
Linear regression with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
Variables: RepPres: Party of the appointing president, conservative or liberal (omitted category); SenRep: Share of republican senators at
the point of election;Gender: sex of the judge,male or female (omitted category). Black: dummy for the race of the judge;DistrictCourt:
Years spent as a district judge; FracEcon: Fraction of economic votes; FracMisc: Fraction of miscellaneous votes; Circuit Variables: All






Wecollected samples at thebehavioral economics laboratory1 located at theFriedrichSchiller
University of Jena aswell as at theDecisionLab2 located at theMax Planck Institute forRe-
search on Collective Goods in Bonn. Table A.1 compares the two samples collected.
Table A.1: Session Overview
Jena (2018–11) Bonn (2019–06) overall
observations 88 146 229
sessions 8 12 20
color-blind 1 2 3
failed 1 2 3
share females 0.60 0.61 0.61
mean age 22.17 25.75 24.41
A.2 Favorite Color
This sections exhibits that mouse movements are unlikely to be driven by other factors




choice of color, we asked them to report their favorite color. Table A.2 shows that most
participants stated not to have a favorite color. 12.93% of the participants actually reported
their favorite color. A binomial test shows that the probability of successes (favorite colors
reported) is not significantly different from a random choice (p-value = .32).
Table A.2: Count of Par cipants’ Favorite Colors
blue green brown pink yellow grey none
count 30 36 2 14 16 37 53
A.3 Archetypes
Table A.3 provides an overview of the interpretation of the four behavioral archetypes
found.
Table A.3: Interpreta on of Behavioral Archetypes by Type of Die Rolled
number color
A maximize payoff; report face rolled report face rolled
A = Ω report face rolled; temptation, guilt report face rolled; temptation, curiosity
A < Ω maximize payoff maximize payoff
A > Ω report face rolled; guilt report face rolled; guilt
A.4 Screenshots of the Experiment
In the following, we provide screenshots of the experiment. Screenshots are taken for treat-
















B.1 List of Labels
The following list denotes the labels that were assignedmanually by Fochmann et al. (2019)
after reading the chat texts.
1. money, general
2. money, pro honesty





8. risk, pro honesty
9. risk, pro lying
10. honesty, general
11. honesty, pro honesty
12. honesty, pro lying
13. number, general
14. number, pro honesty

























32. reality vs. game
33. tax fairness
34. tax honesty
B.2 Concepts to Potentially Influence Lying Behavior
After participants had stated their surplus hours, they reported sociodemographics (e.g.,
age, gender) and information on their risk attitudes. Furthermore, we extracted five items
from the German Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Janke and Glöckner-
Rist 2014) with 10-item scales to measure affects concerning joy, anger, fear, guilt, and
shame. Additionally, we collected individual data on lying morale and income. In the
following, we analyze the distribution of answers concerning the questions asked.
Overall, we collected 351 observations; participants were 24.8 years old, and 60% of them
were female. Experimental evidence shows that economics students lie more than students
in other fields (López-Pérez and Spiegelman 2019). In the sample collected, 11% of the par-
ticipants study economics, and 34% stated having taken more than one class in economics.
After reporting sociodemographic characteristics, participants stated the intensity of feel-
ings and emotions experienced throughout the experiment. Figure B.1 shows that there is
notmuch variation concerning anger, fear, shame, and guilt. There is, however, substantial
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guilt
Figure B.1: Emo ons Experienced During the Experiment
Apart from positive and negative affects, we asked about concepts potentially related
to lying behavior such as income, religiosity, risk attitudes, lying attitudes, political ori-
entation, and experience with laboratory experiments. Figure B.2 shows that there is not
much variation in income stated and the number of times a participant prays. The experi-
enced complexity of the experiment is also heavily skewed to the left. There is substantial
variation in risk attitudes (1 = not at all prone to take risks; 9 = very prone to take risks),
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attitude towards lying (1 = one should never lie for one’s advantage; 10 = one should lie for
one’s advantage), political orientation (1 = left-wing; 9 = right-wing), and the experience
with laboratory experiments (1 = never; 5 = more than 20 times). Furthermore, there is a
substantial variation in a participant’s confidence in the other participants’ honesty. The
question asked: “Out of 100 participants, howmany do you think state more than the true
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Figure B.2: Concepts Poten ally Related to Lying Behavior
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C.1 Internal Cluster Validation Indices for Simulated Data
In Figure C.1 all indices are normalized to the unit interval. Indices to be minimized are
recoded and reported as inverse.
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Table D.1: Overview of all Tables and Figures in Landes and Posner (2011) concerning Circuit Courts
Figure 3 Total votes by year appointed to the court of appeals
Table 11 Court of appeals votes by subject matter and ideology for 538 court of appeals judges only: 1925–2002
Table 12 Fraction of mixed, conservative and liberal votes for 538 court of appeals judgesby president at time of appointment: 1925–2002
Table 13 Regression analysis of court of appeals votes: 1925–2002 (t-statistics in parentheses)
Table 14 Regression analysis of court of appeals votes: 1960–2002 (t-statistics in parentheses)
Table 15 Circuit effects on ideology of judges’ votes
Table 16 Regression analysis of appellate court votes: current judges (t-statistics in parentheses)
D.2 Data Preprocessing
We applied preprocessing tailored to our data. Aswe use data fromLexis, each opinion had
a specific structure. We extracted the text and split it into parts when encountering more
than a single newline character. Special characters such as “newline”-characters andRoman
numbers were removed.
If a potential headingwas foundwithin the text, we excluded it, because it would poten-
tially include biasing information such as judge names. It is especially important to exclude
judge names, as the model could focus on judge names as a proxy for the directionality as
131
most cases were decided without dissent. This is an issue in our empirical context because
wewould like touse the predicteddata to analyze judge characteristics. Including the judges
in the prediction would induce mechanical correlation.
In a second step, we applied regular expressions to capture the part of the opinion in
which judges might dissent from themajority. Including a dissenting part that goes against
the directionality of the majority in the input would not only add noise but may also lead
the classifier to average over the different directions, leading to overall worse performance.
If we found a dissent, we split off the relevant paragraph and saved it as an extra entry in the
database, marking it as “dissent”. We excluded those entries and did not use them as input.
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D.3 All Classifier Input Combinations






























































Figure D.1: F1 score
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Figure D.2: Recall Score
D.4 Judges
Tables D.2, D.3, D.4 and D.5 present yet another way how to assess the performance of
the best classifier. We predict the directionality of an opinion and use it to calculate the
fraction of conservative or liberal votes by a judge. We split the judges’ population by the
party of the appointing president, resulting in four different specifications. Overall, actual
and predicted fractions of votes by the ten highest ranked judges by specification are pretty
similar and reassure that our classifier performs sufficiently well for our analysis.
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Table D.2: 10 Judges with the Highest Frac on of Conserva ve Votes, Appointed by Conserva ve Presidents
Frac con sum name
0.89 48 Barksdale, Rhesa H.
0.85 69 Loken, James B.
0.84 65 Hansen, David R.
0.83 110 Easterbrook, Frank H.
0.82 28 O’Scannlain, Diaruid F.
0.82 61 Luttig, J. Michael
0.80 93 Edmondson, James L.
0.80 72 Magill, Frank J.
0.80 104 Boudin, Michael
0.80 45 DeMoss, Harold R., Jr.
Note: hand-labelled data
Frac con sum name
0.87 48 Barksdale, Rhesa H.
0.87 69 Loken, James B.
0.83 66 Arnold, Morris S.
0.82 109 Easterbrook, Frank H.
0.80 15 Lewis, Robert E.
0.80 65 Hansen, David R.
0.80 44 DeMoss, Harold R., Jr.
0.79 61 Jones, Edith H.
0.79 103 Boudin, Michael
0.78 97 Higginbotham, Patrick E.
Note: predicted data
Table D.3: 10 Judges with the Highest Frac on of Liberal Votes, Appointed by Conserva ve Presidents
Frac lib sum name
0.71 11 Thomas, Clarence
0.63 44 Hitz, William
0.59 137 Gibbons, John J.
0.58 39 Waddill, Edmund, Jr.
0.58 46 Miller, William Ernest
0.58 73 Mansmann, Carol Los
0.58 43 Pratt, George C.
0.56 56 Roth, Jane R.
0.56 142 Northcutt, Elliott
0.56 107 Lively, Frederick P.
Note: hand-labelled data
Frac lib sum name
0.63 44 Hitz, William
0.62 11 Thomas, Clarence
0.57 119 Wilbur, Curtis D.
0.56 116 Van Orsdel, Josiah A.
0.56 70 Thompson, Joseph W.
0.56 46 Miller, William Ernest
0.56 55 Roth, Jane R.
0.56 142 Northcutt, Elliott
0.56 108 Lively, Frederick P.
0.55 43 Pratt, George C.
Note: predicted data
D.5 Robustness Checks
Additionally to the histograms that Figure 4.8 provides, we go on to analyze the EBA’s
statistics on civil cases, displayed by Table D.6a.
For civil cases, we estimated 510 regression models. Figure 4.8a provides information
about the share of regression coefficients that are statistically significant as well as lower
(column 1) or greater (column 2) than zero. There was no coefficient significant for which
the size of at least 50%of estimated coefficients lies below zero. By contrast, therewere three
coefficients found to be significantwhile having values larger than zero in at least 50%of the
estimated models. These were the fraction of republican senators at the point of election
(92%), the fraction of miscellaneous votes (64%) as well as circuit 1 (100%).
Consequently, Leamer (1985)’s EBA (column 3), defines circuit 1 as the only robust vari-
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Table D.4: 10 Judges with the Highest Frac on of Conserva ve Votes, Appointed by Liberal Presidents
Frac con sum name
0.89 45 Evans, Terence Thomas
0.84 38 Parker, Robert Manley
0.78 69 Williams, Jerre S.
0.76 83 Garza, Reynaldo
0.75 60 Anderson, Robert P.
0.74 27 King, Carolyn Dineen
0.74 78 Mehaffy, Pat
0.73 131 Miller, Wilbur K., Jr.
0.73 37 Murphy, Michael R.
0.73 11 Kravitch, Phyllis A.
Note: hand-labelled data
Frac con sum name
0.82 44 Evans, Terence Thomas
0.81 37 Parker, Robert Manley
0.80 20 Rutledge, Wiley Blount
0.78 27 King, Carolyn Dineen
0.76 82 Garza, Reynaldo
0.75 134 Breyer, Stephen G.
0.74 163 McMillian, Theodore
0.74 19 Cole, Ransey Guy, Jr.
0.74 68 Williams, Jerre S.
0.73 30 Stewart, Carl Edmond
Note: predicted data
Table D.5: 10 Judges with the Highest Frac on of Liberal Votes, Appointed by Liberal Presidents
Frac lib sum name
0.71 11 Faris, Charles
0.71 11 Thomas, Sidney Runyan
0.67 16 Hough, Charles M.
0.66 24 Russell, Robert L.
0.66 51 Haney, Bert E.
0.65 29 Ferguson, Warren J.
0.63 99 Higginbotham, Aloyisus Leon
0.63 14 Sarokin, Haddon Lee
0.63 22 Strum, Louie
0.62 24 Clark, William
Note: hand-labelled data
Frac lib sum name
0.66 24 Russell, Robert L.
0.63 14 Sarokin, Haddon Lee
0.63 22 Strum, Louie
0.62 27 O’Connell, John J.
0.62 24 Clark, William
0.61 16 Hough, Charles M.
0.61 98 Higginbotham, Aloyisus Leon
0.60 150 Robinson, Spottswood W., III
0.60 51 Haney, Bert E.
0.57 31 Lucero, Carlos
Note: predicted data
able.
Furthermore, Table D.6a includes results from Sala-i-Martin (1997)’s EBA (columns 4
and 5). Figure 4.8a suggests that a normal distribution does not sufficiently well approx-
imate the regression coefficients’ distribution. For this reason, we focus on Sala-i-Martin
(1997) EBA results from amodel that does make assumptions about the coefficients’ distri-
butions. As a rule of thumb, those variables for whichmore than 90% of the regression co-
efficients’ cumulative distribution is located either above or below zero, can be interpreted
as being robustly connected with the dependent variable (Hlavac 2016). For the variables
of being black (96%), the years of having served as a district court judge (93%), as well as
for the fraction of economic votes (93%), more than 90% of the cumulative distributions
lie below zero. By contrast, for the variables of being appointed by a conservative president
(99%), the fraction of miscellaneous votes (98%) as well as for circuit 1 (100%), more than
90% of the cumulative distributions lie above zero.
EBA statistics for criminal cases, displayed in D.6b, are interpreted below. Overall, 127
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cdf β <= 0
generic
cdf β > 0
generic
(Intercept) 0.25 0.50 FALSE 0.47 0.53
Pres 0.00 0.92 FALSE 0.01 0.99
SenRep 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.30 0.70
YrAppt 0.00 0.50 FALSE 0.11 0.89
Gender 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.33 0.67
Black 0.47 0.00 FALSE 0.96 0.04
District Court 0.01 0.00 FALSE 0.93 0.07
FracEcon 0.50 0.00 FALSE 0.95 0.05
FracMisc 0.00 0.64 FALSE 0.02 0.98
Circuit 1 0.00 1.00 TRUE 0.00 1.00
Circuit 2 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.52 0.48
Circuit 3 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.91 0.09
Circuit 4 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.62 0.38
Circuit 5 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.29 0.71
Circuit 6 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.42 0.58
Circuit 7 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.08 0.92
Circuit 8 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.21 0.79
Circuit 9 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.83 0.17
Circuit 10 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.71 0.29
Circuit 11 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.43 0.57
regression models were estimated.
Columns 1 and 2 of TableD.6b show the fraction of the respective regression coefficients
that are statistically significant and lower or greater than zero at the same time. Only for the
dummy variable Black, more than 88% of the values estimated were significant and smaller
than zero.
By contrast, there were three coefficients, Pr (100%), circuit 8 (100%) and circuit 10
(100%) found to be significant and showing more than 50% of its values larger than zero.
Table D.6b summarizes results from Leamer (1985)’s EBA (column 3). This test concludes
that three variables are found to be robustly connected with the dependent variable, which
are Pr as well as circuits 8 and 10.
Furthermore, Table D.6b includes results from Sala-i-Martin (1997)’s EBA (columns 4
and 5). As was the case with civil cases, Figure 4.8b suggests that a normal distribution does
not fit the coefficients’ distribution verywell. For this reason, we focus onEBA results from
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cdf β <= 0
generic
cdf β > 0
generic
(Intercept) 0.00 0.50 FALSE 0.14 0.86
Pres 0.00 1.00 TRUE 0.00 1.00
SenRep 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.70 0.30
YrAppt 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.44 0.56
Gender 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.61 0.39
Black 0.88 0.00 FALSE 0.99 0.01
District Court 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.78 0.22
Circuit 1 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.06 0.94
Circuit 2 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.60 0.40
Circuit 3 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.71 0.29
Circuit 4 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.46 0.54
Circuit 5 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.25 0.75
Circuit 6 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.49 0.51
Circuit 7 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.07 0.93
Circuit 8 0.00 1.00 TRUE 0.01 0.99
Circuit 9 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.33 0.67
Circuit 10 0.00 1.00 TRUE 0.01 0.99
Circuit 11 0.00 0.00 FALSE 0.14 0.86
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a parameter-free model. For Black (99%), more than 90% of the cumulative distributions
lie below zero. By contrast, for the variables of being appointed by a conservative president
(Pr ) (100%), for circuit 1 (94%), circuit 7 (93%), circuit 8 (99%) and circuit 10 (99%) more
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